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A PATTERN-ORIENTED APPROACH TO FAIR USE
MICHAEL J. MADISON*
ABSTRACT
More than 150 years into development of the doctrine of "fair use" in
American copyright law, there is no end to legislative, judicial, and
academic efforts to rationalize the doctrine. Its codification in the
1976 Copyright Act appears to have contributed to its fragmentation,
rather than to its coherence. As did much of copyright law, fair use
originated as a judicially unacknowledged effort via the law to
validate certain favored practices and patterns. In the main, it has
continued to be applied as such, though too often courts mask their
implicit validation of these patterns in the now-conventional "case-
by-case" application of the statutory fair use "factors" to the defen-
dant's use of the copyrighted work in question. A more explicit
acknowledgment of the role of these patterns in fair use analysis
would be consistent with fair use, copyright policy, and tradition.
Importantly, such an acknowledgment would help to bridge the
often difficult conceptual gap between fair use claims asserted by
individual defendants and the social and cultural implications
of accepting or rejecting those claims. In immediate terms, the
approach should lead to a more consistent and predictable fair use
jurisprudence. When viewed in light of recent research by cognitive
psychologists and other social scientists on patterns and creativity,
in broader terms, the approach should enhance the ability of
copyright law to promote creative expression.
* Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. E-mail: madison@law.
pitt.edu. This Article was prepared with the assistance of a Dean's Scholarship Award from
the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Many thanks to Kevin Ashley, Dan Hunter, Josh
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INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, the pop philosopher Robert Fulghum published a
collection of brief essays in All I Really Need To Know I Learned in
Kindergarten. In the first of those essays, he stated his credo: "ALL
I REALLY NEED TO KNOW about how to live and what to do and
how to be I learned in kindergarten. Wisdom was not at the top of
the graduate-school mountain, but there in the sandpile ... [was one
of] the things I learned: Share everything."' This Article uses
Fulghum's simple statement as an entree to one of the most intrac-
table and complex problems in all of law: What is fair use?
Share everything. Surely this must be right, and surely it must
have some purchase in our everyday lives as well as in our mythical
childhoods. And in law? The idea that sharing is good finds expres-
sion in a variety of places in our legal system, often without contro-
versy, typically as applied to tangible things. In the world of legal
intangibles-the intellectual property world-claims of sharing lie
at the bottom of particularly bitter contemporary disputes. The
Internet has brought, among other things, file sharing systems,
sometimes known as peer-to-peer networks,2 which can be used to
share (or swap, or worse) digital versions of copyrighted works on
the Internet, bypassing traditional publishers and distributors. If
sharing is good, the logic goes, use of these systems should be
noninfringing under the Copyright Act, either because such use does
not implicate the exclusive rights of the copyright holder,' or be-
cause such use constitutes fair use.4
1. Robert Fulghum, ALL I REALLY NEED TO KNOW I LEARNED IN KINDERGARTN:
UNCOMMON THOUGHTS ON COMMON THINGS 6 (1993) (emphasis added). Like a lot of pop
philosophy, Fulghum's book supports nearly any interpretation imaginable. For the purposes
of this Article, it is merely a starting point.
2. From a popular standpoint, the best known of these programs was Napster's
MusicShare software, which was the subject of the litigation recounted in Part I. See infra
notes 23-27 (describing peer.to-peer networking).
3. The Copyright Act provides that the owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights to
reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, and publicly display the copyrighted work, as well as
the right to prepare derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
4. Fair use of a copyrighted work is "not an infringement." Id. § 107. Part II of this
Article analyzes the text of this statute.
[Vol. 45:15251528
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Copyright law, however, currently and endlessly tries to refute
that logic, rightly pointing out that "sharing" is an empty concept
when considered in isolation.5 Litigation by copyright owners
brought against the suppliers of file sharing technologies and indi-
rectly against end-users or consumers of those technologies has
uniformly ended in victory for the plaintiffs and in defeat for the
notion that "sharing" in this context constitutes fair use.6 It seems
that neither authors nor their audiences are on the playground,
presumably the locus of Fulghum's precept.
Yet the ethics of sharing sometimes do apply in copyright, partic-
ularly in fair use. Fair use is, by design, a tool for permitting the
5. "Steal nothing," the counterpart statement sometimes offered by publishing
industries, is likewise meaningless when considered in isolation. Compare Grand Upright
Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Exodus
20:15 ("Thou shalt not steal.") to open the copyright opinion), with David Nimmer, Thou Shalt
Not Steal: A Canon of Construction of Title 17?, in 27 NEW MATER 1 (Intellectual Property
Section of the State Bar of California, Spring 2002) (on file with author), and Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813,867 n.183 (2001) (distinguishing unauthorized
copying from theft, on economic grounds). But see John Seely Brown & Paul Duguid, Stolen
Knowledge, in SITUATED LEARNING PERSPEcTIVES 47-56 (Hilary McLellan ed., 1996) (using an
Indian phrase to illustrate the importance of the listener or learner to the social practices of
learning).
6. The relevant cases have not, as a rule, demanded relief against end users. Three cases
have sought to enjoin distribution of file sharing computer programs based on claims of
vicarious and/or contributory infringement. The plaintiffs succeeded in two of these cases. See
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). The third, Metro.Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), resulted in a finding of no liability for the
defendant. The court based its ruling not on a finding of fair use by individual program users,
but on the ground that the defendant lacked ongoing involvement in the operation of the file
sharing system at issue, involvement that was arguably key to the result in Napster. See id. at
1041-46. The ruling in Grokster is on appeal before the Ninth Circuit. Two other pieces of
related litigation have advanced related claims of copyright holders against file sharing
technologies or cognates. See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C.
2003) (denying motion to quash subpoena issued at request of copyright holder for discovery
of identity of ISP subscriber engaged in file sharing), rev'd, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003); UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that fair use did not shield
defendant's posting of digital copies of musical works on Internet servers for download by
subscribers). The court in Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3 Board, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4660 (SHS),
2003 WL 21524529 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2003), granted final judgment in favor of third party
defendant the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. (RIAA) for claims the MP3
Board, Inc. brought against it alleging that RIAA wrongfully demanded MP3 Board to
discontinue supposed infringing endeavors.
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unauthorized sharing of works of creative expression.7 The difficulty
in applying those ethics lies in the conceptual apparatus surround-
ing fair use, not in the idea of sharing itself. That apparatus, as it
currently stands, is considerably less than robust.
When, and under what circumstances, should use of file sharing
systems to reproduce and distribute copyrighted works be consid-
ered fair use under copyright law? At present, the law suggests that
such use is never "fair" for copyright purposes.' I assume that such
an extreme position cannot be sustained with regard to all potential
claims. But if such use of file sharing programs by a single pair of
computer users might constitute fair use, when does equivalent use
by a vast (or even unquantifiable) number of similar users cross the
threshold into infringement? The law of fair use gives us neither an
answer to this question nor a mechanism for producing an answer.
The key to understanding fair use, I suggest, lies in identifying a
framework for fair use analysis that connects the issue of individual
use of copyrighted works to the issue of use of those works at a so-
cial level. In this Article, I characterize that framework as a
"pattern-oriented" approach, because it asks whether an individual's
use of a work without the consent of the copyright owner is consis-
tent with a provable social or cultural pattern of conduct. That pat-
tern should exist largely independent of the legal system itself and
be adjacent to, but not ordinarily part of, the market economy. I
suggest that such a pattern-oriented approach offers not only a
method of analyzing cases involving file sharing on the Internet, but
also a coherent method of analyzing fair use questions generally.
7. It is only one such tool supplied by copyright doctrine. Others, beyond the scope of this
Article, include the distinction between idea and expression, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000)
(denying copyright protection to systems and methods); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879);
Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and
Ethics, 88 CoRNELL L. REv. 1278, 1311 n.178 (2003); narrowing interpretations of the
exclusive rights of the copyright holder, see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); and the bounds of
doctrines of secondary infringement. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984) (limiting application of doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability
for copyright infringement).
8. This is the implication of Napster, Aimster, and Grokster. The reasoning of the two
appellate courts is examined in more detail in Part I. The court in Grokster largely adopted
the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Napster regarding the existence of direct infringement
via use of the Grokster system and did not independently evaluate a possible fair use
argument. See Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1034-35.
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the fair use
problem by summarizing litigation over file sharing computer tech-
nologies. In its most important sense, the problem described in this
Article lies deeper than the Internet. Litigation over videotape re-
corders9 and photocopiers 1° likewise questioned the fair use implica-
tions of unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted works occurring
simultaneously at an individual level1' and at a collective level of
massive scale. Those earlier cases did not resolve the question, how-
ever, and its persistence exposes continuing flaws in fair use as a
whole. Part II examines the text and meaning of the fair use stat-
ute, based both on instructions for its application provided by the
Supreme Court and also on glosses offered over the years by copy-
right scholars. Part II concludes (not surprisingly) that neither the
statutory text nor judicial or scholarly interpretation offers a stable
framework for applying fair use either to file sharing problems or to
copyright problems generally. Part III looks more closely at both
historical and contemporary judicial decisions regarding fair use.
Part III argues that judicial practice offers more hope for the doc-
trine than might be inferred merely from the text and commentary
described in Part II. Though formally fact-specific, fair use decisions
have in fact developed a sense of context that can be generalized as
a framework for analysis across fair use as a whole.
Part IV revisits fair use doctrine in light of that conclusion, offer-
ing a reading that diverges from the conventional approach in that
it does not situate fair use in the context of the appropriate limits of
the use of a work of authorship. Rather, this reading situates fair
use in the context of the confines of a relevant social or cultural
pattern or practice.' 2 The pattern-oriented approach introduced in
this Part is based not on a conventional sense of finding patterns in
the cases themselves,' but in the different sense of relating the
9. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 417.
10. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by
an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
11. It may be that the unauthorized reproduction on this level occurred innocently.
12. Classic examples of related approaches to connecting legal rules to context-based
understandings of social patterns include ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) and Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
13. In copyright, one of the most straightforward examples of this approach has been
situating a given claim that a defendant is vicariously liable for copyright infringement
20041 1531FAIR USE
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content of the cases to the content of patterns existing in society
outside the legal system. Part IV reviews relevant patterns, showing
the extent to which fair use jurisprudence has been relatively un-
troubled as applied to more traditional, concrete patterns and ren-
dered frustratingly abstract by arguments about the fairness of
"decontextualized" use. My argument is not the first to note that the
law of fair use has ignored its own history or relevant factual con-
text. 14 Nor is it the first to suggest that fair use should be compre-
hensively and systematically reexamined.15 It is, however, the first
argument to place social practices at the heart of the doctrine. This
Part suggests that the cases offer a pattern-oriented approach to
fair use questions across the board, while remaining faithful to the
text of the statute, an approach that is more reliable and predict-
able, if not always friendly to users of file sharing technologies, than
current analysis.
Part V asks whether good reasons exist to adopt this framework
prospectively, suggesting that the pattern-oriented approach to fair
use decisions is not only consistent with both the statute and with
fair use traditions, but also that it may be justified in the context of
copyright policy. What good do patterns do?
At one level, social or cultural patterns may be characterized by
sufficient internal behavioral homogeneity that, as an economic
matter, permitting unrestricted use of copyrighted works by
pattern-participants may be welfare-enhancing, rather than
welfare-reducing. Moreover, the pattern-oriented approach observed
in the case law is consistent with recent research in cognitive psy-
chology and sociology that theorizes that relatively simple cognitive
structures at the individual level, and relatively simple social and
between patterns defined by "the dance hall cases" (where the defendant has a sufficient
economic interest in and supervisory authority over infringing performers to warrant
liability) and the "landlord/tenant cases" (where both economic interest and authority are
too attenuated). See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber
Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEo. L.J. 1833,
1844-55 (2000).
14. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 975 (2002); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers and Others Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine
for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107 (2001).
15. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REV.
1659, 1678-82 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
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cultural relationships, may be aggregated into complex patterns of
activity. The products of these patterns are simultaneously difficult
to predict with specificity and likely to produce novelty and creativ-
ity-the very sorts of end results that copyright policy, in a central
sense, is designed to achieve. Without necessarily intending to do so,
social and cultural patterns underlying case-by-case adjudication of
fair use problems may have achieved something that formal reliance
on the fair use statute has been unable to produce: a framework for
analyzing fair use problems that is both stable and relatively pre-
dictable in the context of legal doctrine, and that corresponds in a
sensible way to the behavior of individuals and institutions gov-
erned by copyright law.'" The Conclusion suggests how other prob-
lematic areas of contemporary copyright law may benefit from anal-
ysis using the pattern-oriented approach.
I. FAIR USE AND FILE SHARING
The idea that a "work" of authorship may be created, consumed,
shared, and reproduced in the context of a social or cultural practice
is an ancient one. Homer "shared" the contents of his epic poems
with his listeners, and they in turn shared those epics with theirs,
all in the context of accepted and well-understood traditions and
patterns of oral learning."7 These traditions and patterns preserved
these works and distributed them across both space and time. Law
may regulate those practices, but practice necessarily informs law.
In the context of privacy law and of the First Amendment, Robert
Post has written that law does and should respond to social and
cultural practices and patterns.1" "[A1ll legal values are rooted in the
16. The fact that such a framework is "messy" rather than clear in all cases is a necessary
reflection of the culture that it addresses. See GUYORABIDqR& ROBERT WEISBEwG, LITERARY
CRIcISMS OF LAw 463 (2000).
17. For a general discussion of the history and development of oral learning in this
context, see ROSAuND THOMAS, LITERAcY AND ORALITY IN ANCWFNT GREECE (1992) and
ROsAtaND THOMAS, ORAL TRADMON AND WRm'ErN RECORD N CLASSICAL ATHENS (1989).
18. See, e.g., Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1272-73 (1995) [hereinafter Post, Recuperating; Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and
Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647 (1991); Robert
C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort,
77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989); see also C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to
Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 744 (1986) (describing "property"
20041 1533FAIR USE
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experiences associated with local and specific kinds of social prac-
tices." 9 Without belaboring possible doctrinal connections between
copyright law and the First Amendment, Post's argument, that
"information" and expression do not exist in a vacuum and that
their regulation must account for the social patterns in which they
are embedded, is right, too, in the intellectual property context.20
Whether use of file sharing technologies, for example, constitutes a
legitimate use of copyrighted works can only be properly assessed
against knowledge of the presence or absence of equivalent patterns.
Yet debates about fair use seem to have lost that sense of context.
as a cultural creation); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935) (decrying law's reliance on "platonic" pre-legal
categories); Michael J. Madison, Complexity and Copyright in Contradiction, 18 CARDOZO
ARTs & ENT. L.J. 125, 170-71 (2000) [hereinafter Madison, Complexity] (relying in part on
institutional arguments in the context of First Amendment jurisprudence to argue for more
contextual sensitivity in copyright generally); Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1087 (2002) (analyzing privacy as a group of related social practices).
In pursuing this theme, I note the argument that our norms and preferences cannot be
treated as completely exogenous to legal and other systems that, in part, produce them. See
Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J.
2029,2038 (2001) (warning of technology-driven norm 'feedback loops" that structure privacy
norms); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an
Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 389,414 (noting effect of law in shaping
norms and values); Fisher, supra note 15, at 1733-39 (relating this argument to fair use);
Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1025 (1998) [hereinafter Madison, Legal-Ware] (arguing that endogenous nature of fair
use norms exposes fragility of the public domain); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences,
Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 235 (1993) (claiming inadequacy of social
practices as normative justifications for rules that produce them). It is a simple matter to
observe that law and social structures are mutually constitutive. The difficult task is to join
both concepts, as well as the role of the individual, in a single analytic framework. See Julie
E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of"Rights Management," 97
MIcH. L. REV. 462, 517-32 (1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace); Lawrence
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CEi. L. REV. 943, 992-93 (1995). For more
analysis of the independent character of social patterns, see infra Part IV.A.
19. Post, Recuperating, supra note 18, at 1272.
20. Yochai Benkler makes a similar argument at a more abstract level than I pursue in
this Article. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. CoMM. L.J. 561 (2000)
(noting the potential of "horizontal" technologies to support different kinds of creative
expression); see also Timothy Wu, Application-Centered InternetAnalysis, 85 VA. L. REv. 1163,
1194-1204 (1999) (describing role of distributed computing power across the Internet in
facilitating new and creative forms of social organization). Though this Article pursues the
argument at a pragmatic level, the expressive dimensions of this phenomenon are relevant
as well. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
FAIR USE
Both copyright and its fair use doctrine once had that sense and,
properly read, both still should have it.2 This Article examines how
to investigate context and patterns of this sort and how to reconcile
such an approach with the Copyright Act. This Part recounts judi-
cial analysis of file sharing technologies to date in order to sharpen
the Article's argument that the fair use doctrine can be redeemed
using a pattern-oriented approach.
All copyright problems start with the existence of a work of au-
thorship protected by copyright law.22 The copyright problem raised
by file sharing computer technologies is that these technologies
permit end-users to reproduce and distribute copyrighted works on
a massive scale without the owner's permission. Consumer-oriented
file sharing programs are part of a class of technologies known more
precisely as "peer-to-peer" (P2P) networks, which enable partici-
pants in a network of digital electronic computers to transmit con-
tent directly and horizontally, that is, from "peer" computer to
"peer" computer, rather than transmitting content hierarchically to,
or retrieving content from, a higher-level "server" or host com-
puter.' In practical terms, these technologies enable consumers of
digitized copies of copyrighted products, such as songs, movies,
books, video games, and computer programs, to exchange and/or
acquire "copies"24 of those products from one another, rather than
21. Lloyd Weinreb makes a related argument, but without suggesting an analytic
framework, in Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1137, 1152-53 (1990) (suggesting that fair use cases should be decided according to
community standards of fairness).
22. Copyright automatically attaches to each and every work of authorship fixed in a
tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
23. See PEER-TO-PEER: HARNESSING THE POWER OF DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (Andy
Oram ed., 2001). For useful accounts of the technical evolution of P2P systems and their place
in a theory of legal regulation, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 134-38 (2001); Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 679, 726-45 (2003). The computer architecture of horizontal relationships that P2P
systems enable is contrasted with the client/server architecture of the World Wide Web
(among other systems), in which transmitting computer files from user (client) to user (client)
requires the intermediate steps of uploading each file to a hierarchically distinct server, and
downloading that file from that server.
24. Subtleties of both language and technology can be obstacles when discussing file
sharing and copyright law. File sharing software is commonly referred to as both "file sharing"
and "file-swapping" or "file-trading" software. Whether anything is improperly "shared,"
.swapped," or "traded" using a given P2P system is, of course, one of the very questions that
the law is trying to assess. Copyright law forbids unauthorized reproduction or distribution
20041 1535
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from a producer or distributor of those products. File sharing or P2P
systems differ technically in many respects,' but these basic legal,
technical, and practical dimensions are common to all.
Whether use of such systems to share copyrighted works is lawful
is a question that begins with the story of a company known as
Napster. In 1999, Napster released MusicShare, a free computer
program for Internet users.2' A copy of the MusicShare "client" pro-
gram installed on the computer of an Internet user allowed that
user to connect to computer servers operated by Napster, and
(using that connection) to search for copies of copyrighted songs
stored on the computers of other (connected) MusicShare users.
Those searches facilitated "peer-to-peer" uploading and down-
loading of designated songs, in the digital MP3 file format, between
MusicShare users.' The software was a runaway success.'
of works in "copies." See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2000). A detail that requires that I qualify my
description at this point with the disclaimer that I do not intend to opine as to whether
translation of a song or movie from compact disc or videotape to a computer file constitutes
making a "copy' of the copyrighted work. According to the Copyright Act, '[copies' are
material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known
or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
Legally, are users who "share" copyrighted works engaged in unauthorized reproduction and
distribution of copies of those works, where both uploading and downloading of the computer
files involved, for all intents and purposes, mere intangibles? Presently, American law
confirms that such users are in fact engaged in unauthorized reproduction and distribution
of copies. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). But
see R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act's Neglected Solution to the
Controversy Over RAM 'Copies," 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 126-35 (arguing that transmission
of computer files does not involve a "distribution" of material objects within the meaning of
the Copyright Act).
25. Some relevant differences are described below.
26. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
27. Id. MP3 is a digital file format for storing audio in compressed form, easy to send and
receive using standard Internet protocols. It is a file extension for computer files using the
Motion Picture Expert's Group-1 Audio Layer 3 (also known as MPEG-3 or MP3) algorithm
for compressing digital files. At the time of the Napster litigation, MP3 files were the most
popular format for converting music files recorded in another format medium into files small
enough to be both playable using computer devices and transformable using relatively modest
amounts of network resources. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia
Sys., Inc. 180 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999).
28. When entering a preliminary injunction, the district court relied on evidence that
nearly seventy million copies of Napster's computer program had been downloaded from
Napster's website and that nearly 10,000 music files were shared per second using the
Napster system. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902. See Peter Jan Honigsberg, Essay, The
Evolution and Revolution of Napster, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 474-75 (2002) (noting mass
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In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
preliminary injunction against Napster's operation of its system, 29
in large part on the ground that widespread use of the system by
MusicShare users did not comport with any understanding of "per-
sonal" or "private" consumptive use of copyrighted songs and there-
fore constituted direct copyright infringement." Napster's knowl-
edge that MusicShare users were making and distributing unautho-
rized MP3 versions of copyrighted works amounted to vicarious and
contributory copyright infringement.3' The injunction required that
the company monitor its system aggressively in order to avoid unau-
thorized transmission of copyrighted works. 2 The associated burden
proved too great, and the injunction effectively killed the company.33
Some specifics of the MusicShare technology are relevant to both
the court's result and to the fair use analysis embedded within it.
When installed on the computer of someone connected to the
Internet and activated by that user via a connection to the Internet,
the MusicShare program obtained an inventory of computer files in
MP3 format stored in specified locations on the user's computer and
copied that inventory to central computer servers maintained by
Napster.' MusicShare further permitted the computer user, while
logged on to Napster's computer servers, to search the inventories
or directories of MP3 computer files of other MusicShare users si-
phenomenon aspects of Napster technology). Among some technologists, Napster has been
viewed as something of a pop culture (and therefore not wholly respectable) phenomenon,
taking not particularly complicated technical ideas and selling them to the masses. See Andy
Oram, Gnutella and Freenet Represent True Technological Innovation, at
httpYJ/www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2000/05/12/magazine/gnutella.html (May 12,2000)
(criticizing Napster from a technical perspective).
29. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011.
30. See id. at 1013-19.
31. See id at 1019-24.
32. See infra note 56 and accompanying text (describing subsequent history of the Napster
litigation).
33. The system was shut down in July 2001. See John Borland, Napster Buyout Blocked:
Fire SaleLikely,at http:/news.com.com/2100-1023_3-956382.html?tag=rn (Sept. 3,2002). The
company filed for bankruptcy protection in June 2002 and its assets were sold in November
2002. See John Borland, Roxio Closes Napster Asset Buy, at http'//news.com.com/2100-1023-
975627.html (Nov. 27, 2002). The service was relaunched in October 2003 as an authorized
digital music downloading site. See John Borland, Legal Napster Up and Running, at
http'J/news.com.comI2100-1027-5099002.html (Oct. 29,2003).
34. This description of the technical underpinnings of the Napster system is derived from
the account included in the court's opinion. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-12.
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multaneously logged on to that server.' MusicShare then enabled
the first user's computer to download "copies"36 of MP3 files selected
by the user directly from the computer of another MusicShare
user.37 Each transmission of a given MP3 file, therefore, involved a
simultaneous "download" of the file (by the requesting user, from
the responding user) and "upload" of the file (by the responding
user, from the requesting user). Besides developing and supplying
the MusicShare software, Napster maintained the computer servers
and related software to which each MusicShare user connected via
the Internet.'
Three aspects of this system have potential legal significance.
First, before each upload/download transaction occurred, a given
MP3 computer file was electronically present in the memory of the
computer of only one of the two participants in the transaction.39
When the transaction was consummated, that file remained resi-
dent in its original location, but an electronically identical file
was now also present in the memory of the computer of the other
participant. Colloquially speaking, the file was "reproduced" via
operation of the Napster file sharing "system," a system consisting
of MusicShare clients and the Napster server. Now located in the
memories of two users' computers rather than one, the file by de-
fault remained available for download from either user's computer
by other MusicShare users.' Second, although the file itself never
passed through the Napster server, information about its origin and
35. See id. at 1012.
36. See supra note 24 (describing ambiguity of the term "copies").
37. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012. It is technically but not legally significant that all of
this activity took place "on" the Internet, that is, using communication devices that exchange
signals through the network of computer networks that comprises the Internet, but not "on"
the World Wide Web. See F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TEcH. L.J. 293, 297-98 (2001).
38. The MusicShare program also included functionality that permitted users to
correspond with one another while logged in to the Napster system. A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 907 (N.D. Cal. 2000). This feature was not at issue in the
Napster litigation.
39. The file would ordinarily be stored in nonvolatile memory, or what computer users
colloquially refer to as the computer's "hard drive."
40. Equally important, each user now had the ability to transfer the MP3 file to a
recordable compact disc, a process known as "burning." If a MusicShare user received an MP3
file through the Napster system, then burned that MP3 file to a compact disc, in theory that
file would now exist on two computer users' hard drives, as well as on the compact disc. See
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 909.
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destination locations did. The server itself brokered the introduction
of one MusicShare client and user to another. Third, the identities
of each MusicShare user and client computer remained technically
unknown to all other MusicShare users and clients,4 as well as to
Napster itself. Whatever the legal characterization of the conduct of
MusicShare users, Napster contended that it had no knowledge of
the character of their behavior on a transaction-by-transaction ba-
sis. 42 Each MusicShare user could log on to the Napster system
using a unique alphanumeric identifier of his or her own choosing.
Each MusicShare user was identified to the Napster servers by that
alphanumeric identifier and by a separate numeric identifier that
corresponded to the user's actual computer. Functionally, operation
of the Napster system was all but anonymous.'
The plaintiffs in the case were nine record companies and music
publishers-owners of copyrights to musical compositions and
sound recordings that had been converted without their permission
to MP3 format." They sued Napster for vicarious and contributory
copyright infringement, arguing that the company was responsible
legally for the infringing activities of individuals who had down-
loaded and were using the MusicShare product on the grounds
that Napster knowingly encouraged infringement by users and con-
tributed significantly to their conduct,' or alternatively because
Napster provided a facility for users' infringement, and profited as
a result,' or both.
41. See id. at 905.
42. See id. at 902, 905.
43. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1005.
44. How this conversion takes place is a matter generally beyond the scope of the Napster
litigation itself, as is the question of whether MP3 versions of the plaintiffs' works constitute
unauthorized reproductions, or unauthorized derivative works. In some cases, record
companies or recording artists release MP3 or other digital recordings of these works. In
many others, MP3 files are created by copying recordings from "traditional" music
media--compact discs, cassette tapes, perhaps even vinyl recordings--onto recordable
computer media. See id. at 1011. The process in general is colloquially known as"ripping," the
software that is used to perform the process is known as "ripping" software, and the resulting
MP3 files are known as "ripped" music or tracks. See id.
45. In other words, a claim of contributory liability for copyright infringement. See id. at
1019-22.
46. In other words, a claim of vicarious liability for copyright infringement. See id. at
1022-24.
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In enjoining operation of the Napster system, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that use of the system by individuals to "share" or "swap"
unauthorized reproductions of musical recordings and compositions
violated the Copyright Act.'7 Napster's defense, to the extent that it
dealt with the behavior of MusicShare users themselves,8 charac-
terized users as merely innocent "consumers" of music."9 Regardless
of how consumers used the recordings found on (or through) the
Napster "system," such use, they argued, was allegedly "personal"
and/or "non-commercial. 50 Both defenses were based on Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios,51 in which the Supreme Court
held that the manufacturer of the Betamax video tape recorder
(VTR) was not liable to producers of copyrighted television program-
ming because the device was "capable of substantial noninfringing
uses," a standard that the Court developed by drawing an analogy
to legal standards governing cases alleging contributory infringe-
ment of patent rights.52 In Sony, the Court concluded that the VTR
was a patent-like "staple item of commerce," in that it was fre-
quently used for individual, noncommercial "time-shifting"- record-
ing television programming with the consent of some copyright hold-
ers themselves, and otherwise legitimately as "fair use." 3 The Ninth
Circuit refused to extend the arguable time-shifting privilege recog-
nized by the Court in Sony to embrace so-called "space-shifting. " "
47. See id. at 1027.
48. Napster also raised a "safe harbor' defense based on the "service providers" provisions
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). The district
court determined that Napster was unlikely to prevail on its DMCA defense, and the Ninth
Circuit, while giving greater weight to possible application of the statute, agreed that there
were serious questions regarding its application and that the balance of hardships tipped in
favor of the plaintiffs. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025; A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 54
U.S.P.Q.2d 1746 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (denying defendant's motion for summary adjudication of
§ 512 defense).
49. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,912-17 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(summarizing defenses emphasizing use of Napster technology for "sampline of music and
"space-shifting" music files).
50. See id. at 912.
51. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
52. Id. at 442 (drawing analogy between copyright and "staple article of commerce"
doctrine in patent law).
53. Id.
54. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019. But see Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C.
§ 1008 (2000) (providing that noncommercial uses of certain audio recording technology will
not support liability for copyright infringement), Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
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As operator of the system, Napster was held liable as a secondary
infringer, accountable for knowing about and profiting from users'
infringement, while having the technical ability to prevent it. 55
Since the MusicShare client and the Napster system in general
were popularly referred to as "file sharing" technology from their
inception, these facts and arguments framed the first judicial exami-
nation of an express claim that "sharing" is and should be permitted
in copyright law. As the district court wrote in the first line of its
opinion granting the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction:56
"The matter before the court concerns the boundary between shar-
ing and theft, personal use and the unauthorized worldwide distri-
bution of copyrighted music and sound recordings."57 Although the
injunction was granted and affirmed based on the vicarious and
contributory liability claims against the company,' for present pur-
Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (dicta recognizing space shifting as fair
use in suit brought under Audio Home Recording Act). Napster's "space-shifting" claim is
considered in more detail infra at notes 239-43 and accompanying text.
55. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019-24.
56. The district court entered an injunction preliminarily enjoining Napster from
"engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or
distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings, protected by
either federal or state law, without express permission of the rights owner." A & M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000). The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court as to Napster's liability, but ruled that the injunction was overbroad, and
remanded the case to the district court. The lower court entered a revised, slightly narrower
injunction. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Nos. C 99-05183 MHP, C 00-1369 MHP,
2001 WL 227083 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001), affd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
57. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
58. The court held that Sony applied only to the plaintiffs claims for contributory liability,
see Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21, because it interpreted Sony's "substantial noninfringing
uses" standard as merely limiting the extent to which a defendant could be deemed to "know"
of the infringement solely by virtue of selling a device capable of reproducing copyrighted
works. Accordingly, with respect to those claims, Napster could be held liable "only to the
extent that Napster: (1) receives reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files with
copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings; (2) knows or should know that such
files are available on the Napster system; and (3) fails to act to prevent viral distribution of
the works." Id. at 1027.
As to the contributory infringement claims, Napster could be held liable only if it had actual
knowledge of infringement occurring via its system. With respect to the claims for vicarious
infringement, the court ruled that Sony did not apply. See id. at 1022-23. The court further
ruled that Napster could be liable "when it fails to affirmatively use its ability to patrol its
system and preclude access to potentially infringing files listed in its search index." Id, at
1027. Although this conclusion might be read in context as suggesting that vicarious liability,
too, required that Napster have actual knowledge of the infringement before it could be held
to have the right and ability to control that infringement, the district court's revised
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poses, the heart of the matter remains the defense that Napster
users were themselves "sharing," (and not infringing) when they
"shared," "swapped," or "traded" individual copyrighted musical
works and sound recordings using the Napster system.
While the case seemed to present this question of "sharing," nei-
ther the court of appeals nor the district court truly addressed it.59
The Ninth Circuit had little trouble establishing that users of the
Napster system were engaged in direct infringement:
[Pilaintiffs have shown that Napster users infringe at least two
of the copyright holders' exclusive rights: the rights of reproduc-
tion, § 106(1); and distribution, § 106(3). Napster users who up-
load file names to the search index for others to copy violate
plaintiffs' distribution rights [in their copyrighted musical works
and sound recordings]. Napster users who download files con-
taining copyrighted music violate plaintiffs' reproduction
rights.o
The court cited no authority.61
irjunction described the burden of identifying infringing computer files on Napster's system
as "shared." The plaintiffs had to provide Napster with a list of infringing works and Napster
had to implement a technical means of searching its system to block transactions in files that
corresponded to those works even if the file titles did not literally correspond to those on the
plaintiffs' list. Napster was liable for its users' infringement, in other words, if it failed to
block infringing files after receiving "reasonable knowledge" of their existence. See A & M
Records, Inc., 2001 WL 227083, at "1, affd, A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d
1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
59. The fact that the decision in Sony was perceived by all parties in Napster and by the
courts involved as central to the litigation ensured that the issues litigated were guided by
the Sony framework for fair use, an analytic approach that reinforced the distinction between
"personal" or *private" use and all other uses. Yet the popular and intuitive norm behind the
Napster technology was its facility for enabling audience members (Napster users) to
communicate works to one another, as well as communicate about works to one another-a
facility reinforced rhetorically by the company with its selection of the "MusicShare" label for
the client software. A "personal use" defense was thus suggested by Sony but rendered
unlikely by the nature of the technology. At least one commentator has speculated that this
reasoning lay behind Napster's decision not to contest the proposition that Napster users were
engaging in direct infringement. See Niels Schaumann, Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-
Peer Technology, 28 WM. MrrmL L. REV. 1001, 1041-42 (2002).
60. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
61. Such authority exists, though it remains controversial. As for the liability of Napster
users who logged on to the Napster system and made files on their computers available for
other users to download, see, for example, Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 118 F.3d 199,203 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding a library liable as an infringing "distributor"
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The court then turned to the question of fair use of plaintiffs'
works by users of the Napster system.62 The court concluded that
the district court did not err in its judgment that the defendants had
not satisfied their burden of showing that fair use precluded grant-
ing the plaintiffs the relief they sought.' Central to its conclusion
regarding fair use were three aspects of the case: first, that the
works involved (musical compositions and sound recordings)
were not "transformed" in any way via processing by MusicShare
clients;" second, that the scale on which the MusicShare client was
deployed made use of the system effectively commercial, even
though neither Napster nor MusicShare users paid or collected
anything for either distribution of the software or sharing music
files;" and third, this large-scale, nontransformative, commercial
enterprise was operated anonymously with respect to virtually all
individuals involved.' To the Ninth Circuit, Napster was effectively
when it makes an unauthorized copy of a work available to the borrowing public); Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 551 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("Webbworld
'distributed' PEI's copyrighted works by allowing its users to download and print copies of
electronic image files."); Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1156 (M.D. Fla.
1993) (holding operator of an online bulletin board service liable for infringing distribution).
But see Reese, supra note 23, at 126-35 (arguing that transmission of computer files does not
involve a "distribution" of material objects within the meaning of the Copyright Act).
The liability of MusicShare users who downloaded files from other users is confirmed by
Stenograph L.L.C. v. BossardAssocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See also MAI
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a user
makes a "copy" of software when it is loaded into the computer's RAM, or volatile memory).
But see Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYToN
L. REV. 547, 550-52 (1997) (contesting whether a RAM copy of a computer program should be
considered to be "fixed" for purposes of copyright law).
62. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014-19. Fair use is considered to be a mixed question of law
and fact. This, coupled with the fact that the Ninth Circuit was reviewing an order granting
a motion for a preliminary injunction, dictated the court's giving the district court a wide
berth with respect to whether entry of the order under these circumstances was appropriate.
Reversal was appropriate only if the district court committed a clear error of law.
63. Napster argued that the plaintiffs, in having requested a preliminary injunction, bore
the burden of establishing each element of their case, including the conclusion that fair use
did not apply. The court noted that the weight of authority was against Napster's argument,
as fair use is typically pleaded and proved as an affirmative defense, but noted that resolution
of the point did not affect its ultimate resolution of the case. See id. at 1014 n.3.
64. See id. at 1015. As discussed in more detail in Part IV.C.3, one key consideration for
courts evaluating fair use claims is whether the work in question has been 'transformed." See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (indicating that the central
inquiry in evaluating fair use claims is the extent to which the new work is "transformative").
65. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015.
66. See id. Distinguishing authority that suggests that "personal" use of a work, alone or
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operating a conventional (if virtual) marketplace for sales of copies
of recorded musical compositions, cutting into the plaintiffs' sales of
compact discs 7 and undermining the plaintiffs' potential for devel-
oping such a marketplace of their own.6
The conclusion that Napster should be held liable for copyright
infringement by its users is not an unreasonable one, but the court's
formal analysis of the fair use question is unsatisfying.6" The Ninth
Circuit's approach asks first, whether the musical works and sound
are undergoing any audible change, and second, whether they are
the subjects of transactions that have the look and feel of commer-
cial exchanges. These are not extraordinary questions. As I describe
in more detail in Part III, they are entirely typical of contemporary
fair use analysis. They are echoed in other, related litigation that
either directly or indirectly analyzes fair use of musical works via
file sharing systems or similar computer networks.
The Seventh Circuit, for instance, in In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation,° applied Sony's "noninfringing uses" standard to the
"Aimster" file sharing system by considering the possibility that
Aimster might be used to exchange uncopyrighted material (avoid-
ing the fair use question altogether) or genuinely to "space-shift"
music actually owned by the system user (so that each copy of the
within a small circle of family members and acquaintances, is privileged, the district court
concluded that, because of the anonymity of MusicShare users, such use could not fairly be
characterized as "personal." See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,
912-13 (N.D. Cal. 2000). This "personal use' exemption, to the extent that it exists, can be
supported either on the ground that such use does not unreasonably interfere with the
legitimate economic expectations of the copyright owner (no loss exists), or on the ground that
the circle of family and friends is bound by informal norms that limit onward redistribution
of the work (the loss is limited and outweighed by the benefits associated with reinforcing
intimate social networks). The district court's reasoning suggests reliance on the latter
interpretation, though one wonders whether that reasoning would support a finding of
.personal use" in any context where communications were sustained primarily through
computers.
67. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
68. See id. at 1018-19.
69. Its analysis of the contributory and vicarious infringement problem is unsatisfying as
well. See 2 PAuL GomDsTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2, at 6:12-1 (2d ed. 2003), cited in In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643,649 (7th Cir. 2003) (criticizingNapster for suggesting that
Napster's knowledge of infringement was sufficient to demonstrate contributory liability);
Stacey L. Dogan, Infringement Once Removed: The Perils of Hyperlinking to Infringing
Content, 87 IOWA L. REV. 829, 873-78 (2002).
70. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of
Am., 124 S. Ct. 1069 (2004).
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work in effect remains virtually tethered to its owner, rather than
entering a marketplace).7" No credible evidence suggested the proba-
bility of such uses, so the court affirmed an injunction restraining
operation of the system.72
In a proceeding to quash subpoenas issued under the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act7" seeking disclosure of the identity of an
individual suspected of illegally sharing MP3 files via Verizon's
Internet service, the district court in In re Verizon Internet Services,
Inc. 7" dismissed concerns that enforcement of the subpoena would
tend to diminish the individual's interest in fair use, and it enforced
the subpoenas.7"
In UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc.,76 decided before Napster,
the district court entered a judgment of direct copyright infringe-
ment against a company that, via its "My.MP3.com" service, distrib-
uted MP3 files of musical works via the Internet to individuals who
supplied nominal evidence to the distributor that they already
owned copies of those works. The court held that the company's
activities did not amount to fair use of those works. The company's
fair use claim was deemed "indefensible," the equivalent of "a bald
claim that defendant should be able to misappropriate plaintiffs'
property simply because there is a consumer demand for it."7"
What is missing in these analyses is missing more broadly from
the law of fair use as a whole-a concern not merely with works of
authorship themselves, but with the manner in which those works
are used. The court in Napster concluded that individual use of
the Napster system was irrelevant. What counted was the massive,
anonymous scale of unauthorized transmissions. The court in
Aimster devoted less time than the Napster court did to its fair use
analysis, but it did contemplate briefly how the Aimster system was
71. See id. at 652-53.
72. See id. at 653-56.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2000).
74. 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003).
75. See id. at 262-64 (noting that any First Amendment concerns, including those
predicated on fair use, were built into the design of the subpoena authority granted by §
512(h)). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit later reversed the orders
enforcing the subpoenas on the ground that they were not authorized by the statute. See
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
76. 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
77. Id. at 352.
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being used. The court noted the possibility the Aimster system
might accommodate both large-scale infringing use and genuine
noninfringing use. Rather than resolve tension between the two
possibilities, the court concluded that the evidence was not suffi-
cient to demonstrate that the latter was significant.v8 The story of
file sharing systems, and thus the story of fair use, is incomplete in
this focus on the work at the expense of its context.
On the Internet, and with a little analysis, everything is "per-
sonal" and everything is "commercial." By separating the intellec-
tual content of creative works of authorship from any necessary
physical instantiation, (i.e., copyrighted works can multiply across
the Internet and be enjoyed by millions without ever being printed
out or burned to a compact disc or DVD) 9 the Internet explodes the
limited ability that the current form of fair use possesses to sustain
these gradations. Every copyright-implicated use of the Internet
seems to be fair, or, as the cases involving online sharing currently
teach, none is. The availability of the fair use doctrine as a means
to sustain meaningful distinctions between legitimate and illegal
uses of copyrighted material needs to be revived, in a way that is
true to the history of the doctrine and copyright policy. Assessments
of the fair use doctrine in the digital context have focused, as have
the courts themselves, on the economic character of the works being
made available without producer controls on the Internet.s' But
78. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 652-53.
79. See Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 275
(2003) (describing copyright complications of works of authorship not embodied in genuine
tangible media).
80. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002) (characterizing the
distinction between "complementary" and "substitutional" uses as "orthodox" in fair use
economics). Some of the more interesting of these analyses include Michael W. Carroll,
Disruptive Technology and Common Law Lawmaking: A Brief Analysis of A & M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5 (2002); Stacy L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The
Implications of Sony for Napster and Other Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939
(2001); Michael A. Einhorn, Copyright, Prevention, and Rational Governance: File Sharing
and Napster, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 449 (2001); Shubha Ghosh, Turning Gray into
Green:" Some Comments on Napater, 23 HASrINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 563 (2001); Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REv.
1613 (2001); Honigsberg, supra note 28; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative
Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERxEIEYTEcH. L.J. 539 (2003) [hereinafter
Ku, Consumers]; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and
the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHi. L. REv. 263 (2002) [hereinafter, Ku,
Creative Destruction]; David G. Post, His Napster's Voice, 20 TEMP. ENVn. L. & TECH. J. 35
(2001); Schaumann, supra note 59; Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of
1546 [Vol. 45:1525
20041 FAIR USE 1547
proceeding on this basis, even enjoining the operation of Napster,
has done little to slow the growth of technologies that enable distri-
bution of digitized copyrighted works without authorization from
their owners."'
Litigation over file sharing systems is likely to continue. Copy-
right plaintiffs are beginning to strategize lawsuits filed directly
against users of such systems, 2 suggesting that a confrontation is
likely between competing constructions of fair use, unmediated by
arguments regarding the character of secondary liability for copy-
right infringement. But the problem with fair use lies deeper than
with the implications of new technology for "personal use." Courts
and commentators have failed to deploy fair use as an affirmative
expression of copyright policy. The core of copyright policy is the
constitutional mandate that copyright law serve the interests of
"Progress."' The Supreme Court teaches that in twentieth (and
now twenty-first) century terms, "Progress" is measured by the
creativity that the mechanisms of copyright induce, both via
its original production function," via fair use,' and via other
Napster: Internet Technology, Copyright Liability, and the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining,
26 U. DAYTON L. REv. 247 (2001).
81. It is unclear whether the injunctions against Napster and Aimster, and litigation
against Grokster, has measurably diminished the scale of use of other unauthorized file
sharing systems. See Mary Madden & Amanda Lenhart, Pew Internet Project Data Memo
(July 2003), available at http'/www.pewinternet.org/reportspdfs/PIP-Copyright-Memo.pdf
(reporting results of survey suggesting widespread popular disregard for copyright interests
implicated in file sharing systems for music); Lee Rainie et al., Pew Internet Project and
Comscore Media Metrix Data Memo (Jan. 2004), available at http'/www.pewinternet.org/
reportslpdfs/PIPFileSwappingMemo_0104.pdf (reporting results of survey suggesting
decrease in use of file sharing computer software).
82. In Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C.
Cir. 2003), an Internet Service Provider (ISP) avoided compliance with a subpoena served by
the Recording Industry Association of America seeking the identity of ISP subscribers
suspected of illegal file sharing, on the ground that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act did
not authorize service of such subpoenas in the absence of a predicate law suit. Even before
this case was decided, the recording industry had initiated lawsuits directly against individual
users of unauthorized file sharing services. See Amy Harmon, The Price of Music: The
Overview; 261 Lawsuits Filed on Music Sharing, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2003, at Al. Since the
decision, the pace of filings has increased. See John Schwartz, Music Industry Returns to
Court, Altering Tactics On File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at C1.
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (defining "Progress" as the measure of congressional
authority in copyright and patent matters).
84. See, e.g., Quality King Distribs. v. L'anza Research Intl, Inc., 523 U.S. 135,151 (1998).
85. Famously, but unhelpfully, copyright is described as implementing a balance between
the incentives provided by the exclusive rights granted the author of a copyrighted work and
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means.8 As the Court noted in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,87
"[tihe fair use doctrine thus 'permits [and requires] courts to avoid
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.'"' An
uncritical and acontextual focus on the work of authorship as such,
at least in the context of fair use,89 fails to articulate any credible
connection between copyright doctrine and production of creative
works of authorship.'
Understanding fair use as a flexible tool to promote creativity is
thus, without more, too broad a perspective to be meaningful in
practice. One common contemporary refinement, based on a focus
on the work of authorship, argues that the scope of fair use is de-
fined either by the scope of the plaintiffs economic interest in ex-
ploiting the work, or by the level of production and distribution
incentives needed by plaintiffs and similarly situated authors and
publishers. As I note in the next Part, and as others have argued at
much greater length,9 both economic arguments are incomplete
measures of the copyright system. If the promotion of creative
expression is determined by maximizing either the returns of au-
thors and publishers, or their financial incentives, at the extremes
(all markets, or no markets) there is either no room whatsoever for
fair use (since it interrupts the copyright owner's profit flow) or no
room whatsoever for copyright in the first place (since any
copyright-based limits on an author's ability freely to access and
reuse existing materials would depress that author's incentive to
produce new works).' A system of either sort is conceptually feasi-
the value of access afforded the consumers of that work. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,
228 (1990).
86. See supra note 7 (noting other limiting doctrines in copyright).
87. 510 U.S. 569(1994).
88. Id. at 577 (alteration in original) (quoting Stewart, 495 U.S. at 236).
89. And perhaps more broadly in copyright. See discussion infra Part IV.B (describing
possible relevance of pattern-oriented analysis to additional copyright problems).
90. In a similar vein, Michael Birnhack argues that appeals to the interests of "users" in
fair use and elsewhere must articulate both descriptive and normative connections to
constitutional "Progress." See Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law,
1 BUFF. INTELL. PRop. L.J. 3 (2001).
91. See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve,
53 VAND. L. REv. 1799 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Perfect Curve]; Cohen, Lochner in
Cyberspace, supra note 18; Lunney, supra note 14.
92. Judge Richard Posner argued in a recent opinion that the economic argument is
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ble9" but neither pragmatic nor, more importantly, desirable. It is
far from clear that a system designed exclusively to assure financial
rewards to authors and publishers will encourage them to behave
creatively rather than (or in addition to) selfishly. Anecdotal evi-
dence strongly suggests that authors and publishers of a variety of
types of information works will work exhaustively to limit uncom-
pensated uses of those works, whether or not those efforts are so-
cially valuable.9' And it is also likely, as this Article argues, that we
can stimulate much of the creativity we want by looking to struc-
tured-but non-market-based-social processes.
II. THE FAIR USE STATUTE AND ITS INTERPRETATIONS
This Part describes possible sources of a coherent and positive
account of fair use-the statutory language itself, scholarly efforts to
theorize fair use and copyright, and judicial interpretations of the
statute. It concludes that twenty-five years after the doctrine was
codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, courts are no closer to a mean-
ingful understanding of the doctrine than Congress appeared to be
at the time of the law's enactment. Experienced copyright scholars
will be familiar with much of this material and may wish to skip
ahead to Part III.
consistent with a comprehensive model of fair use that endorses "complementary" uses (such
as criticism) as "fair" and rejects "substitutional" uses (such as selling unauthorized
reproductions) as unfair. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 617 (7th Cir. 2002).
The model is less comprehensive than it appears, however, since it raises the prior question
of determining the character of the copyright owner's legitimate market. The Supreme Court
has said that fair use means, among other things, that the copyright owner's judgment
regarding economic harms caused by unauthorized use ought not to be always trusted. See
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 598.
93. The foundations of copyright are sufficiently contested that thought experiments of
this sort are not incredible. See, e.g., David Lange, A Comment on New York Times v. Tasini,
53 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 653 (2003) (imagining a world without copyright law); Mark Stefik,
Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us To
Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BEmLEY TECH. L.J. 137 (1997) (imagining a technological
world in which digital rights management technology allows all uses to be priced).
94. See Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV.
433 (2003) (describing information producers' reliance on statutory and common law
strategies); Madison, Legal-Ware, supra note 18, at 1077-92 (describing norm-reinforcing
effects of shrinkwrap and clickwrap licensing); Lunney, supra note 14 (describing effects of
market-oriented fair use framework).
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A. Conflicts and Complications in the Statutory Text
Any positive framework for fair use must begin with the language
of the statute:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A [which
define infringement of a copyright], the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit edu-
cational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the
above factors.95
This section was added to the Copyright Act as part of the whole-
sale statutory revision that was enacted in 1976 and took effect in
1978. 6 Prior to that time, fair use was a well-recognized element of
copyright jurisprudence (dating, by most accounts, from the mid-
1800s),9 but it was entirely nonstatutory. In fact, during the
lengthy negotiations that preceded enactment of the new statute,
most of the discussion of fair use focused on whether it should be
95. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
96. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (2000)).
97. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575-76; WILLIAM F. PAThY, THE FAIR USE PRIVLEGE IN
COPYRIGHT LAW 1-63 (2d ed. 1995) (summarizing history of "fair use" in copyright); Okediji,
supra note 14, at 118-37.
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codified at all or instead left to continued judicial development.9"
Arguments in favor of codification prevailed, but on terms that,
upon an initial reading, have suggested to most judges and scholars
that Congress intended to leave the substance of the doctrine undis-
turbed." Among other things, the text of the statute reviews the
primary kinds of cases in which the fair use doctrine typically had
been invoked, and it lists the "factors" upon which courts deciding
fair use questions had most commonly and historically relied. The
House Report that accompanied that final bill noted that Congress
intended not that the "fair use" doctrine be applied categorically, but
rather that cases raising fair use questions be decided on a "case-by-
case" basis."°
The apparent innocence of this mostly standard account belies the
interpretive demons that it conceals, even beyond the accepted ad-
monition that fair use is notoriously fact-specific."0 It is clear that
the statutory text offers far less than it appears to.
1. "Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 106 and 106A,
the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of
copyright."
The first and most obvious problem with the statute appears in
its opening line. The "fair use" of a copyrighted work is not an in-
fringement. A "use," therefore, might be fair or unfair, but what is
a "use?" Nowhere in the Copyright Act is this term defined, and
nothing in §§ 106 or 106A, which define the scope of infringement
liability, depends on the term "use." Infringement liability depends
on unauthorized "reproduction," "distribution," "display," and "per-
formance," among other things."a The predecessor to the current
Copyright Act, the Copyright Act of 1909, defined infringement in
terms of unauthorized printing, reprinting, copying, and vending
the copyrighted work.3 The original American copyright statute,
98. See PATRY, supra note 97, at 261-366.
99. Codification of the principle was designed to assure more reliable application of equity
in copyright. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976); infra notes 326-40 and accompanying
text.
100. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66.
101. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
103. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
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enacted in 1790 and in effect when the modem form of fair use be-
gan to take judicial form in the mid-1800s, spoke in terms of unau-
thorized "printing, reprinting, publishing and vending."1 4 One
might logically conclude that the fair use doctrine is simply coex-
tensive with the scope of infringement liability (printing, reprinting,
publishing, and vending might be infringing, or it might be fair, for
example), but the differing terminology suggests something more.
The distinction between copyright infringement and fair use is not
a binary "either/or.""5
The second problem is that this phrase carves out an exception to
what otherwise would constitute liability for infringement. "Fair
use" is not infringement of a copyright. The most plausible reading
of this text, therefore, is that the plaintiff in this case must prove
that the defendant's "use" is not a fair use. Yet courts have con-
cluded almost universally that the burden of proof with respect to
an allegation of fair use lies with the defendant. 1° The statutory
text leaves us with a debate about whether fair use constitutes a
"right" of the copyright consumer/new author (an argument some-
times enhanced by resort to counterpart "information" interests
under the First Amendment) or merely a "privilege" to be exercised
only in relatively rare cases.' °7
2. 'including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research""s
This portion of the statute is referred to as the "preamble," and its
relevance to fair use jurisprudence has been unclear since the codifi-
cation of fair use. The list of "uses" provided in the preamble might
be applied to any given dispute in several different ways: as a sum-
104. See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
105. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003)
(describing different conceptions of how consumers might engage copyrighted works, and the
extent to which those conceptions do or should trigger infringement liability).
106. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
107. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 n.3 (11th Cir.
2001) (dicta expressing support for the argument that fair use ought to be considered a right
of the consumer or new user).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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mary of the four factors that follow" and therefore redundant of
them; as a guide for application of the four factors; as illustrative of
the first of those factors, which focuses on the purpose and character
of the "use;" as additional factors whose presence might tip the
scales in favor of "fairness" and whose absence might suggest in-
fringing use; as uses that are presumptively fair, in which case the
fair use claim could be rebutted under the four factors that follow;
or as a statutory list to which one or more canons of statutory con-
struction should apply, limiting or merely illustrating kinds of "fair"
uses.
10
The legislative history of the statute speaks in different direc-
tions. The 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law,"' prepared as part of the com-
prehensive investigation of copyright that preceded the 1976 revi-
sion, characterized the judicial form of fair use as meaning "that a
reasonable portion of a copyrighted work may be reproduced with-
out permission when necessary for a legitimate purpose which is not
competitive with the copyright owner's market for his work.""' The
House Report that accompanied the final bill fifteen years later
relied on a different portion of the Register's Report, which provided
a list of examples of kinds of uses that fair use had recognized:
quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of
illustration or comment; quotation of short passages in a schol-
arly or technical work, for illustration or clarification of the au-
thor's observations; use in a parody of some of the content of the
work parodied; summary of an address or article, with brief quo-
109. See discussion infra Part II.A.4-7.
110. As is typical with the canons, there are competitors. One might look to "expressio
unius est exclusio alterius," defined as [a] canon of construction holding that to express or
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999). Alternatively, one might rely on "ejusdem generis," the
principle that a list of examples be interpreted in light of the terms that precede it. See id. at
535. For a list of the canons used by the Supreme Court, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV.
26, 97-108 (1994).
111. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW (1961), reprinted in 2 ARTHUR FISHER, STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1199 (1963)
[hereinafter 1961 REPORT].
112. Id. at 24. The 1961 Report goes on to characterize prior law as rendering "often the
most decisive" the competitive character of the use, now embedded in the first and fourth fair
use factors. Id. at 25.
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tations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a portion
of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a
teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson;
reproduction of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or
reports; incidental and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or
broadcast, of a work located in the scene of an event being re-
ported. 13
A comparable list appears in the statute. The fact that the list is
self-evidently illustrative rather than exhaustive"" indicates that
an infringement may be excused as "fair" even if it amounts to a use
that does not appear on the list.11
The Supreme Court has stated that the uses listed in the pream-
ble are plainly but merely illustrative and that fair use adjudication
should be based on "case-by-case" examination of the four factors. 6
Perhaps more than any other, this theme lies at the heart of statu-
tory analysis of fair use. 1 17 The Court has rejected the claim that the
theme of "productive use" unifies the uses listed in the preamble,
and the argument that a use is fair only if it is deemed "productive"
rather than "consumptive.""' On the other hand, the Court also has
113. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) (quoting 1961 REPORT, supra note 111, at 24). The
1961 Report constructed its review of the history of fair use by first listing examples of types
of fair uses that, in general, had been considered fair and not infringing. It then provided a
list of factors that, the Report argued, typically were used by courts in specific cases to decide
whether a particular defendant had infringed. 1961 REPORT, supra note 111, at 24-25. The
House Report that accompanied the bill repeats the same format, quoting the list of examples
from the 1961 Report, then listing the four factors proposed for what is now § 107, and
explaining, "These criteria are relevant in determining whether the basic doctrine of fair use,
as stated in the first sentence of section 107, applies in a particular case ...." H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1476, at 65.
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (stating that "[tihe terms 'including' and 'such as' are
illustrative and not limitative').
115. See, e.g., Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1494-95 (11th Cir. 1984).
116. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (rejecting the
argument that Harper & Row created a presumption of unfairness if the defendant's use was
commercial); see also William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit,
Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 667, 674-76 (1993) (concluding that
giving presumptive weight to the preamble overvalues its influence in the context of the
statute as a whole).
117. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539,552,560 (1985); SonyCorp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,448-
49 n.31 (1984).
118. See, e.g., Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 477-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that VTR
use ought to be considered not "productive" and therefore not fair); LEON E. SELTZER,
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indicated that the uses listed in the preamble are relevant only to
the first factor, rather than to the statute as a whole. "The enquiry
here may be guided by the examples given in the preamble to § 107,
looking to whether the use is for criticism, or comment, or news
reporting, and the like ...."1n9
3. "In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include ....... '
The word "shall" suggests that a court reviewing a fair use claim
ought always to examine all four factors that follow, but courts dis-
pose of fair use claims without explicitly reviewing each of them.'21
"Include" is defined in the statute to mean what it appears to
mean-other factors may, but need not, be considered.2
2
Yet the statute does not suggest any other relevant factors. Nor
does it suggest how to discern them. And it does not tell courts how
to compute a fair use determination based on the factors on which
the court does rely. Some courts have relied on the "good faith" of
the accused infringer, as a catchall factor justified by the historical
sense that fair use is an "equitable" doctrine. 23 Even apart from the
notorious difficulties associated with measuring good faith in any
context, why the "good faith" of the infringer should matter here is
unclear. To the extent that copyright policy is informed by a utilitar-
ian calculus maximizing social welfare in terms of "creativity" and
EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE iN COPYRIGHT 24 (1978). Given dissatisfaction with the Court's
more recent endorsement of a "transformative use" standard for the first factor, arguments
in support of a "productive use" standard have reappeared. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren,
Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission
Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 31-32 (1997); Okediji, supra note 14, at 174.
119. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
120. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
121. See Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 392 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 103 (2003)
(noting plaintiff's argument that district court erred by failing expressly to give adequate
consideration to each of the four factors); see also Educ. Testing Serv. v. Stanley H. Kaplan,
Educ. Ctr., Ltd., 965 F. Supp. 731, 736 (D. Md. 1997) (dispensing with a factor-by-factor
analysis of fair use and relying on the "broader perspective" of alleged unfairness of copying).
122. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
123. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,551(1985); Fisher
v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432,437 (9th Cir. 1986). But see PATRY, supra note 97, at 3-6 (distinguishing
the equitable sense of fair use as "fairness" from the historical connection between "equity"
and English equity courts).
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"creative" works of authorship, 24 the question ought not to be
whether the defendant believed that he or she was acting legiti-
mately, but whether the outcome of the defendant's efforts was more
socially valuable than the outcome produced by allowing the copy-
right holder to enjoin the use or obtain payment.
The other unlisted factor to receive significant judicial attention
is whether the copyrighted work at issue has been published, ac-
cording to copyright law's definition of that concept. 125 Prior to the
1976 revision, unpublished works were protected by statutory copy-
right only under limited circumstances;' by definition, therefore,
most of the time there was no ground to consider "fair use" as a
defense to infringement of an unpublished work. The revision
brought unpublished works within the scope of statutory copyright,
thus raising the fair use question. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises," the Supreme Court found that the unpub-
lished nature of the plaintiff's work weighed against the defendant's
claim of fair use.' The Court claimed a statutory basis for its ruling
in the second fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, but
a better explanation of its reasoning is that the Court was filling in
a new factor for a situation not anticipated at the time of drafting. 29
Congress modified the statute partly to reverse the Court's stan-
124. The incentive function of copyright law is settled law, and I do not challenge its
normative basis. See discussion infra Part V.A. More generally, however, the normative
underpinnings of copyright doctrine remain unsettled as a conceptual matter. See Garon,
supra note 7, at 1278.
125. See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (11th
Cir. 1999).
126. Prior to the 1976 revision, statutory copyright encompassed creative works that were
published and accompanied by an appropriate copyright notice. (Certain unpublished works
might obtain federal copyright protection by being registered with the Copyright Office.) As
part of that revision, the rule limiting copyright's scope to published works was dropped. Since
1978, under American law copyright has attached automatically to all works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
127. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
128. Id. at 554.
129. The nature of the copyrighted work, in fair use terms, typically suggests some inquiry
into the character of the creativity that defines it as a work protected by copyright.
Technically, whether a work has been published or not involves an inquiry into distribution
not just of the work (the intangible protected by copyright), but of copies of the work (the
tangible instantiations of the work). Moreover, reading "unpublished" into the considerations
made relevant by this factor seems inconsistent with the intent of Congress, because prior to
1978 an unpublished work could not, with minor exceptions, be the subject of an infringement
action in the first place.
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dard. An unpublished work now may be reproduced under color of
a valid fair use defense.' But the fact that a work is unpublished
remains a factor weighing against fair use.'
4. "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
Courts and scholars trace delineation of the four factors to Justice
Story's seminal fair use opinion in Folsom v. Marsh. 2 The fact that
the factors have a distinguished pedigree, however, has not spared
courts significant confusion in their modem interpretation.
"The purpose and character of the use" suggests either one in-
quiry (purpose and character being synonymous) or two (purpose
being one question, character being the second). One might suppose
that the "purpose" of the use is the category into which the use al-
legedly falls, such as research, teaching, or criticism. The "charac-
ter" of the use might be the extent to which the use is consistent
with the claimed purpose. A critic's quotation of the entire second
act of a three-act play would use the play for a critical "purpose," but
the "character" of the critical use would be excessive and therefore
infringing. To most courts, parsing the language of the statute in
this way seems excessive; they typically quote and invoke "purpose
and character" as a single criterion. To the extent that "character"
is given independent significance, courts relate the term to the pos-
sibility that the defendant did not act in "good faith."
The second phrase ("including whether such use is of a commer-
cial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes") is similarly
opaque. The term "including" again requires that the phrase be
interpreted as a nonexclusive limitation, but the opposing of "com-
mercial nature" and "nonprofit educational purposes" is misleading.
It suggests that these phrases oppose one another (though "commer-
130. Congress was petitioned to clarify the statute, which it did in 1992. Section 107 now
states: "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above [four] factors." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see
Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 386, 395-96 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 103 (2003) (finding
that defendant made fair use of unpublished manuscript).
131. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003).
132. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). For a discussion of Folsom, see infra
Part III.A.
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cial" likely opposes "noncommercial," and "nonprofit educational
purposes" opposes several things, including for-profit educational
purposes and nonprofit, noneducational purposes). It also suggests
that these two concepts define the scope of the kinds of "purposes"
and "characters" to which the first factor applies. Even under the
most limited reading of the preamble, the preamble's list of likely
"fair" uses describes a universe of possibilities that is broader than
those provided here.
One answer to this conundrum comes from the give-and-take of
the negotiating that led to the statute. A factor defined only by "pur-
pose and character of the use" would have sufficed to restate the
point of the law at the time; the references following the commas
were inserted at the request of certain copyright-holding ("commer-
cial nature") and certain copyright-using ("nonprofit educational
purposes") interests. 33 But the origin of the language begs the ques-
tion of what it means within the context of this factor alone, and
more importantly of what the language means in the context of the
balance of the statute. The notions that commercial infringement is
less likely to be fair, and that nonprofit educational infringement is
more likely to be fair, were plausible to Congress because they came
from somewhere in the history of the law.
Equally problematic are distinctions that courts have drawn un-
der color of this factor between "commercial" and "noncommercial"
use, 134 between "transformative" and non-"transformative" use, 135
and between "productive" and non-"productive" use.1 31 What pre-
cisely each of these distinctions means is uncertain. Use by a for-
profit enterprise (such as a newspaper) may nonetheless be not
"commercial," and infringing "commercial" use may exist, as in
Napster, where not-for-profit users infringe copyrights in order to
avoid having to pay to acquire copies oft a copyrighted work.
"Transformative" use is more likely to be fair, but virtually any
nonreplicative use in some sense "transforms" the original work,
and the point on the "transformation" scale where this factor begins
133. See PATfY, supra note 97, at 320-63, 433-34.
134. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,562 (1985); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1984).
135. See Campbell v. Acuff.Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
136. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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to favor the defendant is unknown.'37 Moreover, the extent to
which any of these distinctions is currently operative under the fair
use doctrine is open to doubt. The Court offered the "commercial"
versus "noncommercial" distinction in Sony and Harper & Row,
then retreated from that argument in Campbell, but perhaps
only in part." Sony rejected a "productive" use standard for fair use
as a whole; Campbell introduced the idea of the favored "trans-
formative" use under the first factor.
In Napster the court suggested that anonymous use might count
against a defendant under this factor, at least in cases where the
defendant argued that making the work available to someone else
(whether or not named as a defendant, or even identified) is excused
as fair use.3 9 The fact that the second person is known to the first
makes the contact legitimate, perhaps as a form of "personal use,"
which the Court appeared to endorse in Sony when it accepted off-
the-air videotaping of television broadcasts for "time-shifting" pur-
poses as fair.1" It is difficult to see a basis in the statute or its legis-
lative history for this distinction, unless it could be argued that the
anonymous "character" of the use is in some way inconsistent with
a nominally legitimate "purpose."
5. "(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;"
The Court has stated that the scope of the fair use defense varies
with the degree of creativity inherent in the plaintiffs work. A fact-
137. Whether "productive" or "transformative" use guides the first fair use factor, either
inquiry threatens to trap courts and litigants into making the kinds of aesthetic judgments
that the copyright system expressly disclaims. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside
of the narrowest and most obvious limits."); Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th
Cir. 1983) ("[Jludges can make fools of themselves pronouncing on aesthetic matters....
[Airtistic originality is not the same thing as the legal concept of originality in the Copyright
Act."). Judgments of creative merit tend to emerge nonetheless. See Robert A. Gorman,
Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1
(2001); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247,266-97
(1998).
138. On remand in CampbeU, the plaintiff was given the burden of developing evidence of
market injury caused by the defendant's alleged infringement, but the defendant retained the
overall burden of proof with respect to fair use. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
139. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).
140. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 447-56.
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oriented work or other work deemed to involve minimal creativity
is presumed to allow broader latitude for noninfringing copying.
141
Factual and fact-based works need less in the way of copyright's
incentive, require less authorial imagination, and are worth more
to future generations of authors and scholars needing access to their
contents. Research and scholarship with respect to such works (no-
tably, "purpose and character" concerns) are more likely to be "fair."
Other works are deemed to be highly creative (novels, songs) and
therefore allow narrower ranges of copying. Later authors (typically,
also creating "highly creative" works) are assumed to be as capable
of creating on their own, and from their own imaginations, as were
the authors whose works they would infringe. Criticism and com-
ment may be favored purposes as to more creative works, but only
within relatively narrow bounds.
This view has not been reconciled with the long-standing "nondis-
crimination" principle in copyright law. The availability of copyright
protection is said not to depend on the content or character of the
creative "authorship" manifested in the work, so long as some "mini-
mal" creativity is present.'42 The nondiscrimination principle de-
pends in part on questions of judicial (and administrative) compe-
tence to determine the creative character of a work, in part on con-
siderations of equity between contemporaneous authors of different
kinds of works, in part on considerations of equity between authors
of different eras, and in part on predictive considerations. One can-
not know today which work of authorship is likely to be successful,
or influential, or beloved. The legal system ought not, therefore, try
to encourage or discourage the production of any work, so long as it
is at least "minimally" creative. On top of all that, it is not clear that
the legal system ever should assume that certain types of works
ever can be, even in artistic terms, "more" creative or imaginative
than others.
141. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
142. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,362-63 (1991); supra note
137.
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6. "(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;"
This factor appears to command courts to undertake a bit of arith-
metic. The accused infringer may not borrow "too much" of the copy-
righted work, a notion that appears to restate the purpose and char-
acter of the use. But as with the "purpose and character" language
of the first factor, the language of this third factor offers subtleties.
The accused infringer may not borrow an untoward "amount" of the
plaintiffs work. Even if the "amount" is not too great, the "substanti-
ality" must nonetheless pass muster, suggesting (in a way that
courts have acknowledged awkwardly) that this third factor has
both quantitative and qualitative components." Again, in apparent
violation of the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle, courts are
authorized to determine whether a quantitatively minor infringe-
ment might nonetheless invade the "heart" of the plaintiffs work of
authorship.'" What constitutes the "heart" and how the "heart" is
to be identified are unclear. The "heart" might be the seat of the
creativity expressed in the work (judged either by the author, some
relevant audience, or by some panel of qualified experts), or it might
be that portion of the work judged to be of the highest economic
value.
The quantitative dimension of the third factor might seem to be
unproblematic, but courts have not explored its depths in any detail.
Even a one-to-one correspondence between the plaintiffs work and
the defendant's copy, once assumed always to be infringing, may be
excused as fair, at least in some cases of infringement involving
analog magnetic tape,'" photocopying,'" and perhaps some digital
reproduction. 47 Even outside this realm, it is not clear how the
"quantitative" standard should be reconciled to the purposes of copy-
right. If copyright law is held to exist for the purpose of providing
necessary incentives to otherwise undermotivated authors, and if
143. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-66. The argument that "character" of the work
assesses the relationship between the use and its purpose might be said to make this third
factor, and both of its dimensions, redundant.
144. See id. at 565.
145. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
146. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d. 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
147. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
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even complete reproduction copyrighted works have no cognizable
ex ante effect on those incentives in some cases, then under what
circumstances should it be said that less-than-complete reproduc-
tion has a more significant effect, and becomes "unfair?"
7. "(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work."
Since courts have not been able to answer this last question effec-
tively under the third fair use factor, they instead have tried to
answer it under the fourth fair use factor. The Supreme Court has
suggested that courts should use this factor to consider the effect of
a possible expansion of the current use by others similar to the de-
fendant: "A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work
requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it
should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential
market for the copyrighted work."'" Under current law, therefore,
evidence that large numbers of people have engaged in unconsent-
ed reproduction or distribution of the plaintiff's work is likely to
count against fair use.
What should we make of the disjunctive "potential market for or
value" of the work? "Market" and "value" might be the same thing,
but the linguistic distinction appears purposive. The "value" of a
commodity often declines over time." 9 Markets, at least to econo-
148. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
590 (1994); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,568. Note how the
.noncommercial" language pops into that standard, giving rise to a burden-shifting
presumption regarding "commercial" use. Under Sony, evidence that the allegedly fair use is
commercial leads to a presumption that the use is infringing, and the defendant bears the
burden of proving that it is fair. Evidence that the allegedly fair use is noncommercial
reverses the presumption.
The "widespread effect" language arguably was implicit in pre-1976 copyright law, as
argued by the dissent in Sony. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 484 & n.36 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). With
the advent of photocopying technology, courts expressed concern that what might begin as
small-scale reproduction of copyrighted works for personal or scholarly use might quickly be
transformed into large scale reproduction and distribution. See Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d
at 1368 (Cowan, J., dissenting); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 65 (1975) (concluding in the legislative
history that many isolated instances of infringements may become, in the aggregate, a major
obstacle to copyright protection). But that concern has never developed into a framework for
analysis.
149. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REv. 775, 799-800 (2003);
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mists, are eternal-and "potential" markets are especially so. Does
the statute mean to speak of damage to the plaintiff? Actual damage
likely is not required to defeat fair use; "potential" markets may be
affected even if the copyright owner's purse has not yet suffered,
since the defendant may have somehow "prevented" the plaintiff
from developing new sources of income.' Does the "market" or
"value" of "potential" market refer to sales of copies of the work, or
also to anticipated royalties? Are lost royalties relevant only if they
were anticipated or foreseen at the time of the work's creation (and
therefore connected to some constructive "incentive" calculus in the
mind of the author or publisher)? Or it is enough to conclude that a
"market" or the work's "value" has been diminished merely by fail-
ure of the accused infringer to compensate the plaintiff voluntarily?
How much weight a court should assign to an alleged "effect" is
similarly in doubt. The action or inaction of the accused infringer
may be economically inconsequential, at least at present. If the
plaintiff can speculate about aggregate "effects" using the Court's
gloss about use that becomes "widespread," then nearly any use by
the defendant is potentially infringing, and never fair. But one can-
not argue that the economic effects of small, innocent acts must
always be aggregated and their effects deemed to support the plain-
tiffs claim of infringement. At a sufficiently large level, the conclu-
sion always will be that some economic injury can be demonstrated.
Instead, it must be the case that some aggregations do not adversely
affect "the potential market" for the work. The fourth factor raises
the question of how to relate the effect of an individual's allegedly
"fair" use to the effect of large-scale allegedly "fair" use. As to this
point, the statute is silent.
In sum, on its face the statutory text appears to reflect little more
than a grant of authority to courts to excuse infringement because
it is not the sort of thing that really is copyright infringement.
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MIcH. L. REv. 409, 481 (2002).
150. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001); Infinity
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104,106 (2d Cir. 1998); UMG Recordings Inc. v. MP3.com,
Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. CV. 98-7840,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669, at *65-66 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2000). Under this approach, even
Sony likely would have been decided differently. For a completely different perspective, see
generally Ku, Creative Destruction, supra note 80 (arguing that the file sharing cases can be
decided by determining that digital versions of works of expression are not entitled to
copyright protection, if producers are compensated for their creation in noncopyright
determined ways).
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Courts have abundant flexibility to assert that the defendant is or
is not engaging in the sort of activity that copyright owners should
care about, that the defendant has borrowed "not much" or "too
much" or "just the right amount" of the plaintiffs work, and that
any alleged injury to the plaintiff is or is not worth worrying about.
At the end of the day, this is less an analytic framework than a
mechanism for declaring that fair use is simply not infringement-
which is the very statement that begins the statute. Since courts
already have other tools for declining to find infringement when
they want to act flexibly,' the facial emptiness of the statutory
language means that alone, it is almost entirely useless analytically,
except to the extent that it structures the collection of evidence that
a court might think relevant to its decision.
B. Theories of Fair Use
Lloyd Weinreb, coming to virtually the same conclusion," 2 sug-
gests that this result is consistent with the notion that there is no
positive theory of fair use, beyond a set of conventions established
over time. 53 But if theory can help in so many other areas of the
law, there is little reason that it should not have a role here. Why
have the doctrine at all, if it is to have no meaningful content?
As it happens, however, scholarly efforts to rationalize fair use
have contributed much to our understanding of copyright over-
all, but less in the way of a firm structure for fair use. Theories
of fair use closely track theories of copyright more generally.
The latter generally can be broken down into those that focus
on consequentialist concerns 4 and those that do not. Noncon-
sequentialist (moral and natural rights) arguments have the weaker
151. The court might declare that the copyright owner's exclusive rights under § 106 are
not implicated, or might find an absence of "substantial similarity" between the plaintiff's
work and the defendant's work, for example. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
152. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1291, 1298 (1999) (concluding
that the doctrine relies on the notion that the assumptions on which copyright is based do not
apply).
153. See id. at 1307-10.
154. Instrumental arguments can be broken down further into utilitarian arguments,
which are defined currently in mostly monetary or economic terms, and arguments based on
noneconomic goals. See Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145,
1223-25 (2000); David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MIssouRI L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003).
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hand generally as a matter of doctrine, given the Supreme Court's
fcrmal rejection of non-incentive-based theories of copyright law
generally. 5 ' As a result, such theories have little to offer by way of
affirming fair use. 56
The most prominent utilitarian account of fair use comes from
Wendy Gordon. Taking the goal of copyright as maximizing social
welfare and assuming that an economically efficient market system
is the best way to maximize social welfare (because of its ability to
process individual utility preferences), fair use plays a role in copy-
right principally to the extent that it cures "market failures" of one
sort or another.57 Fair use is disfavored if the defendant's use inter-
feres with the operation of an actual or potential market for the
work; it is favored if the market is unlikely to permit the transfer
and if the defendant can demonstrate the particular social value of
the use.se Both in its presumption in favor of the market in all
cases, and in its focus on the defendant's particular use, the "market
failure" approach is seen as not only lacking an affirmative vision
of what fair use should be (since as "the market" expands, fair use
155. See Feist Pub'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-61 (1991).
156. See Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 33, 51-53 (1997) (arguing that moral rights are fundamentally
incompatible with fair use); Garon, supra note 7, at 1301 ("The sacrilege of fair use, parody,
and the public domain would tear at this sacred bond between author and work.*).
157. See Gordon, supra note 15, at 1610-14. Economic models of copyright as a whole are
developed, among other places, in William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the
Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1203 (1998) (describing a contractual price discrimination
model); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and Its Substitutes, 1997 WIs. L. REv. 865,866; William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325
(1989) (elaborating on a model based on appropriability of returns from public goods); Robert
P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293 (1996) (discussing a transactions cost model); Michael J.
Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001) (describing
a model based on price discrimination). The limits of the neoclassical economic model in
copyright are discussed in Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 18, at 480-515.
158. Some recent cases have adopted this approach. In American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc., the Second Circuit wrote:
[It is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment for a particular
use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the
means for paying for such a use is made easier .... [Mt is sensible that a
particular unauthorized use should be considered "more fair" when there is no
ready market or means to pay for the use .... The vice of circular reasoning arises
only if the availability of payment is conclusive against fair use.
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913,930-31 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Princeton
Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386-88 (6th Cir. 1996).
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likely contracts), but is also seen as hostile to fair use in most
cases. 159
Arraying utilitarian arguments for copyright in service of an ex-
pansive reading of fair use, Raymond Ku argues that fair use can be
theorized as a species of justifiable "creative destruction" of copy-
right markets, in which uncompensated uses challenge existing
production and distribution structures but do not undermine under-
lying incentives to create new works."6° The overall efficiency of the
system is preserved so long as consumers internalize their costs
of consumption not by paying for each additional copy of a work
(the premise of the "market failure" model, above), but by paying
for technologies of consumption, such as computers, Internet ac-
cess, and VTRs. Ku argues forcefully that this perspective justifies
a finding of fair use in the file sharing context. This is a provocative
recasting of the economic argument for copyright, but it has rela-
tively little to offer as an affirmative account of fair use. As with the
"market failure" hypothesis, the "creative destruction" hypothesis
allows room for fair use just so long as the efficiency of the underly-
ing market for the creation of new works is preserved-that is, so
long as consumers do indeed fully internalize the full cost of their
consumption of copyrighted works.'61 To the extent that an efficient
159. See Lunney, supra note 14, at 985-88 (arguing that fair use represents an affirmative
balancing between users and copyright owners); Loren, supra note 118, at 25-27 (advocating
for an expansion of market concepts in fair use cases that values externalities generated by
"fair uses). But see Jonathan Dowell, Comment, Bytes and Pieces: Fragmented Copies,
Licensing, and Fair Use in a Digital World, 86 CAL L. REV. 843, 876-77 (1998) (arguing that
the market failure premise for fair use does not necessarily lead in all cases to a denial of fair
use privilege even if the market exists). Gordon has argued that her initial proposal placed
more emphasis on distributive values than has been recognized typically. See Wendy J.
Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Commodification and Market
Perspectives, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 149 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil
Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002); Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property:
A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031 (2002). Other proposals explicitly to
recognize redistributive social values via fair use (even in the presence of functioning
markets) include Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKUY TECH. L.J. 115, 134-35 (1997)
(arguing in favor of express recognition of redistributive features of copyright); Okediji, supra
note 14, at 146-53 (same).
160. See Ku, Consumers, supra note 80, (arguing that file sharing system use should be
"fair" so long as copyright owners' incentives are preserved via income from other sources).
161. See Ku, Creative Destruction, supra note 80, at 294-99.
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market demands that consumers obtain permission, fair use should
give way."6 2
Opening up the consequentialist framework to concerns beyond
efficiency or monetized utility creates new possibilities for an affir-
mative role for fair use, but in practice proposals along these lines
are unhelpfully broad. Glynn Lunney argues that in any particular
case, the court ought to balance the copyright owner's interest in,
and incentive derived from, protection of the copyright against the
interests of the individual defendant and the public implicated in
unconsented access and use.' William Fisher's proposed "recon-
struction" of fair use takes largely the same approach, blending
concerns of economic efficiency with the goal of achieving "a sub-
stantive conception of a just and attractive intellectual culture.""'
Alternatively, but relatedly, fair use might be designed to privilege
or subsidize certain special uses, whether in connection with produc-
ing additional creative works (independent of the extent to which
such works are, or may be, undervalued by the market) or with
subsidizing other valuable social, cultural, and/or political interests.
But there is little agreement as to which types of access and use
ought to receive such special treatment, limiting the value of this
approach. Such privileges may extend to scientific and educational
research,"6 "transformative" uses, such as parody and criticism,
i66
162. Cf Weinreb, supra note 152, at 1306 (noting that the essential problem with economic
theories of copyright is that they depend on a calculus of incommensurables).
163. See Lunney, supra note 14, at 981-85 (describingSony as balancing); Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REv. 483, 492-98
(indicating that the balancing of such interests is essential to an economic analysis of
copyright law).
164. See Fisher, supra note 15, at 1477. Fisher in fact articulates two distinct models of fair
use, one based on the efficiency premise alone and a second that adds dimensions based on
the "just culture" premise.
165. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBoX 230 (1994); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in
Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 101 n.216 (1997) (emphasizing importance of access rights for
both scientific and educational communities).
166. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-80 (1994) (noting that
transformative uses such as parody contribute to the progress of science and the arts); Micro
Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that transformative
use is entitled to broader deference); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits:
The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009,1034-
36 (1990) (recognizing that transformative uses are commonplace and often are not infringing
uses); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV.
873,884-86 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOVTWARE,AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
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use that furthers or supports "democratic values" of informed citi-
zenship and political participation,'67 idiosyncratic visions of the
good or fair community, 1" personal or private use, 6 9 and/or noncom-
mercial use, 170 among other things.
Jessica Litman's proposal comprehensively to restructure copy-
right around the copyright owner's legitimate interest in commercial
exploitation of the work'7' offers the virtues of simplicity and rela-
tive clarity, particularly from the standpoint of the prospective
consumer user. The proposal echoes and updates Ray Patterson's
conviction that copyright has always been and should remain
essentially regulatory, rather than proprietary, 172 and from that
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)) (arguing that the existing fair use
doctrine should be construed to protect radical improvements wrought by the transformative
user); Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, the Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a Parody,
45 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY' OF THE U.S.A. 546 (1998) (emphasizing the utility of parody and satire
in promoting the goals of copyright law); Leon R. Yankwich, Comment, What is Fair Use?, 22
U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 214 (1954) (suggesting that publishing a work constitutes, in part, an
invitation to consume for purpose of criticism). Judge Leval argued that the Campbell decision
restored a normatively and prescriptively appropriate equilibrium to fair use jurisprudence
as a whole. See Pierce N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Use,
13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 23-26 (1994).
167. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981, 1036-38 (1996) (arguing that law should
be amended to address privacy concerns of individuals in using copyrighted networked
materials); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 364-82 (1996) (linking copyright policy to political foundations of liberal society).
168. See Fisher, supra note 15, at 1744-94 (arguing that the fair use doctrine could promote
development of ideal visions of the American community); Weinreb, supra note 21, at 1152-53
(arguing that fair use represents a community sense of"fairness," but not explaining how such
a sense might arise and extend beyond a particular case). The "good life"/community
construction argument can be made from perspectives internal to fair use and copyright,
which might be said to manifest their own sense of the right community, or from one or more
external perspectives.
169. On the role of personal use in copyright, see Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social
Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 215, 283-89 (1996); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy:
Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 845, 854-55 (1997); Deborah Tussey,
From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129 (2001).
170. See Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV.
19,39-47 (1996) (discussing the difference between using copyrighted material for commercial
and noncommercial purposes). Dennis Karjala proposed a variation on exemptions for
noncommercial use: a distinction between "widely distributed" and "generally inaccessible"
works. See Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22
U. DAY7ON L. REV. 511, 522-25 (1997).
171. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COFmGHT 171-82 (2001).
172. See L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
perspective fair use remains (as Patterson argued it should)
derivative of copyright itself. Before one can approach fair use from
this perspective, however, one needs to understand what "commer-
cial use" might mean or, more generally, how to cabin the regulatory
approach, just as one needs a framework for cabining the econom-
ists' property-based approach.
17 3
In all, the number of competitors and the vigor of the debate
only to the conclusion that what fair use means, and what it should
mean, is no more clear as a theoretical matter than it is as a doc-
trinal matter. In practice, the only way to deal with both sorts
of indeterminacy seems to be to approach disputes on a highly
contextualized basis.174 The next Part takes up the topic of how to
frame that context. In the remaining section of this Part, however,
I consider how judicial interpretations of the fair use doctrine have
failed to seize opportunities to give the doctrine a coherent contex-
tual structure.
C. The Modern Judicial Response
In the encounter between a critic, scholar, or consumer and a
copyrighted work, fair use potentially enters the licensing calculus
twice: once when the user is deciding whether to rely on the fair use
doctrine or instead to obtain permission from the copyright holder,
and a second time (assuming that permission was not obtained)
during possible later litigation. Fair use thus plays an important ex
ante role in structuring uses of copyrighted works, a role that is
frustrated by the confusing character of the statutory text and not
helped much by scholarly theorizing about markets or the special
1992, at 249.
173. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
174. Justin Hughes rightly points out the essential lack of distinction between work and
context with respect to legal questions involving creativity. See Justin Hughes, The Line
Between Work and Framework, Text and Context, 19 CARDoZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 19,24 (2001).
In a sense, therefore, I am supposing the existence of a dividing line where one perhaps ought
not to exist. As I hope to make clear, however, it appears that courts have adopted and relied
on such a line. Cf Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1105 (1990) (criticizing courts for failing to develop a consistent set of principles or values to
govern fair use).
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favors that copyright owes science, education, the democratic pro-
cess, or the energies or personality interests of authors.17
The courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, might play an
especially useful role here, offering a gloss on the doctrine that could
guide lower courts and copyright counsel and thus help to rational-
ize planning decisions in a way that might be more sensible than
taking the opinions apart only to see their connections to the sepa-
rate four fair use factors. The Court's fair use jurisprudence has
formally disclaimed a rationalizing role, leading not to the emer-
gence of a coherent gloss on fair use but to fragmentation of the
doctrine.176 The Supreme Court has given us three significant ac-
counts of fair use. Below, I review the major doctrinal points offered
in each of the Court's fair use opinions.
1. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States
The first milepost in the Court's fair use case law is an opinion
that never was. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States77 affirmed
by an equally divided Court (and therefore without an opinion) a
decision by the United States Court of Claims that the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) had not infringed copyrights, by reason
of the defense of fair use, when it photocopied entire scholarly arti-
cles from scientific journals for distribution to NIH researchers. The
Court of Claims had reasoned that the defendant's photocopying,
though extensive, had not been shown to damage the interests of the
publishers and that the interests of medical research and science in
general likely would be injured by a judgment in the plaintiffs fa-
vor. 
178
The Court split 4-4, Justice Blackmun not participating, and thus
lost an opportunity to define the scope of the fair use doctrine at a
175. Of course, on the strongest form of market-oriented fair use, the planning calculus is
clear: the ostensible user should always obtain express permission. Failure to do so
constitutes either failure to acknowledge an existing market or the creation of an unlawful
impediment to the emergence of a new market.
176. See Madison, Legal-Ware, supra note 18, at 1099-1105 (discussing the various
approaches that courts take in analyzing fair use cases); David Nimmer, 'Fairest of Them All"
and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 263, 266-
84 (arguing that recent cases suggest fundamental unpredictability of fair use).
177. 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
178. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1353-54 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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time just prior to its incorporation into the statutory copyright
scheme.179 Among other things, the case presented the then-novel
question of the applicability of fair use to wholesale, literal repro-
duction of copyrighted works by putative "consumers" of those
works. It also presented the disjuncture between a relatively small-
scale practice (photocopying of pages of an individual article by a
single or small number of readers) that likely was neither damaging
to authors and publishers nor grossly out of step with historical
practice, on the one hand, and the import of that small-scale prac-
tice being repeated extensively, over a long period of time by large
numbers of "consumers" and publishers, on the other hand.
2. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
The Court's first in-depth encounter with fair use came in 1984
in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,"s the
"Betamax" case. Sony stood accused of contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement by virtue of its distribution of Betamax
VTRs, which enabled television viewers to infringe copyrights in
broadcast television programs by recording them onto videotape."8 '
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling against Sony, deciding
that Sony was not liable so long as the machines were "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses."8 2 The noninfringing uses consisted
largely of fair use by television viewers, who, the record demon-
strated, were engaged in private, personal "time-shifting" of their
favorite programs."s
The Court's route to its decision focused on the first and fourth
fair use factors, which favored VTR users, and downplayed the sec-
ond and third factors, which favored the plaintiff. The first question
that the Court posed was whether television viewers were engaged
in "commercial" use of the broadcast programs, as a commercial use
179. The Court accepted one earlier fair use case, but it merely accepted a finding that
infringement had occurred by affirming the lower court decision by a 4-4 vote, and therefore
without an opinion. See Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd by an equally
divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (affirmingjudgment of infringement by Jack Benny of the
copyright in the motion picture Gaslight).
180. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
181. See id.
182. See id. at 442.
183. See id. at 447-50.
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would be presumptively infringing. Viewers in this case, however,
were using their Betamaxes for "time-shifting," so that they could
record broadcast programming for later viewing. The Court con-
trasted this use with "librarying"-recording programs for archival
purposes."" Neither "time-shifting" nor "librarying" was "commer-
cial" in the sense that viewers were reselling the tapes, but the
Court distinguished the former as fair and, by implication, the latter
as presumptively unfair.
The Court's discussion of the fourth factor clarified the difference:
"time-shifting" implicated no revenue loss for the copyright holders,
since advertisers could be assured that their programs would still
be watched and therefore would still be willing to pay market
prices.' "Librarying" entailed no equivalent assurance that pro-
grams would be watched, and it further threatened to interrupt a
nascent market for prerecorded tapes. Given this analysis of the
first and fourth factors, the Court discounted the effects of the third
factor (that the entirety of the programs were being recorded), even
though in traditional fair use analysis that factor ordinarily would
favor the plaintiffs.' The Court characterized the second factor, the
nature of the copyrighted work, as favoring fair use, since the view-
ing audience was recording and watching televisions programs that
it had already been invited to watch for free. 7
Sony offered two points of guidance to future courts and litigants:
that the law should distinguish sharply between "commercial" (pre-
sumptively unfair) use and "noncommercial" (fair) use, and that the
fourth factor should play a dominant role in the fair use calculus.
The Court sidestepped the question of constructing the appropriate
framework for relating an individual's use of the work to use of that
work on some larger scale.l'
184. See id. at 451.
185. See id. at 452-53.
186. See id. at 449-50.
187. See id. at 449.
188. See id. at 482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissentingJustices argued that isolated,
harmless uses may, in the aggregate, injure the copyright owner's interests, but they did not
suggest any particular point--other than the line between unproductive" and "productive"
use-at which such harmless use becomes infringing. See id Would it be the case that an
individual use must be "productive" in order to avoid the aggregation test, or would it be
sufficient to show that the aggregation was "productive" even if each individual's use might
not be?
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3. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises
The Court's decision the following year in Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises 9 largely reinforced both
points, while adding some others. Harper & Row was in the process
of publishing the memoirs of President Gerald Ford and had agreed
that Time magazine would have first serialization rights.19° The
Nation magazine covertly obtained a prepublication manuscript of
the book and published a short column highlighting details of Ford's
account of his negotiations with his predecessor, Richard Nixon,
over the terms of a possible pardon for Nixon's Watergate activities.
Time backed out of its deal with Harper & Row, and Harper & Row
sued The Nation to recover the unpaid fee.
The Court reversed the Second Circuit's ruling in favor of The
Nation, holding that the unpublished nature of the Ford manuscript
weighed heavily against a finding of fair use and that The Nation's
knowledge of the manuscript's unpublished nature, coupled with the
financial injury (the lost serialization fee) suffered by Harper &
Row, confirmed the inapplicability of the fair use defense. The Court
emphasized its statement in Sony that "commercial" use was pre-
sumptively unfair, if not per se infringing, and it emphasized that
the fourth fair use factor, addressing the scope of the plaintiffs
injury, was first among equals in applying the four fair use fac-
tors.' 9' The character of the copyrighted work (Ford's memoir) was
189. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
190. Harper & Row had obtained from President Ford the right to publish the work "in
book form," and it had licensed to Time the right to publish prepublication excerpts of the
manuscript, known as "first serial rights." Id. at 542. The Court's analysis of the case
characterized The Nation's distribution of an unauthorized prepublication excerpt as
infringement of the copyright owner's alleged exclusive right of first publication. See id. at
549, 552; supra note 126 and accompanying text (noting abolition by statute in 1976 of
publication as a prerequisite of statutory copyright and thus of the common law "right of first
publication"). The Court apparently understood the copyright owner's exclusive right to
distribute the work to embody a statutory "right of first publication." See Kate O'Neill,
Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use from the Right of First Publication, 89
CAL. L. REV. 369 (2001) (noting anachronistic character of Harper & Row's analysis and
suggesting alternative framework for preserving privacy interests of authors of unpublished
materials).
191. Though less important to the course of the fair use doctrine, the Court also dismissed
The Nation's argument that it had an independent First Amendment defense to the charge
of copyright infringement by virtue of its status as a news organization. Any First
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characterized as "creative" (rather than "factual") and therefore
deserved broad protection."9 Though the amount of the work repro-
duced was slight in quantitative terms, the Court agreed with the
district court that The Nation had taken "the heart of the book,"
that is, that portion of the memoir that had the greatest commercial
appeal. 93 Time's decision not to pay Harper & Row the balance of
the promised serialization fee constituted clear evidence of injury to
the market for the work."9 '
Although in these important senses Harper & Row mostly contin-
ued themes introduced in Sony, in one important sense the case
represents a departure. Sony understood the fair use problem as
how to deal with a social practice, though the Supreme Court did
not wrestle with the problem in an especially persuasive way. In
Harper & Row, for the first time the Court spent virtually all of its
analytic energy on the works of authorship themselves-both the
Ford manuscript that was the basis for the plaintiffs claim and the
magazine column that was the target of the suit.
4. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
The Court did not take up the fair use doctrine again for near-
ly ten years,' 95 but when it did, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Amendment interests implicated by The Nation's conduct and by copyright law generally were
subsumed in the fair use doctrine itself. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555-60. That the copyright
statute is essentially immune from examination under the First Amendment was confirmed
by the Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-19 (2003) (citing Harper & Row's
treatment of the First Amendment).
192. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65.
193. See id. at 565.
194. See id. at 567.
195. Fair use was argued in one intervening case, Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990),
but the Court's brief discussion there only reaffirmed its analysis in Harper & Row. The
primary issue in Stewart was whether the owner of the copyright in the short story on which
Alfred Hitchcock and Jimmy Stewart based the movie Rear Window was entitled to terminate
Hitchcock's and Stewart's authority to distribute that film. The initial license had been
negotiated with the holder of the initial copyright term. The litigation was brought by the
holder of the renewal term. The Court held that continued distribution of the film was
infringing, since the renewal term constituted a new copyright "estate" unencumbered by
licenses negotiated during the initial term. See id. at 230.
As part of its ruling, the Court considered and affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision on the
question of fair use, ruling that unauthorized preparation and distribution of the film could
not be considered to be "fair use" of the short story. See id. at 236-38. Exploitation of the film
amounted to a commercial use, which was presumptively unfair. The initial work was
1574
Inc., 19 6 it appeared to take some of the edge off of Sony and Harper
& Row. The plaintiff in Campbell was the owner of the copyright to
the song "Oh, Pretty Woman," originally recorded by Roy Orbison 19 7
and rerecorded and repopularized as the accompaniment to the
enormously successful movie Pretty Woman. The defendant was
Luther Campbell, known alternatively by his rap moniker, Luke
Skyywalker, front man for the rap trio 2 Live Crew. 9 2 Live Crew
released a rap version of "Oh, Pretty Woman," keeping the famous
introductory bass rift, the basic structure of the song, and most of
the initial stanza of the lyrics, but modifying the balance of the
lyrics: changing the benign description of the streetwalker's life in
the original to a blunt, explicit description of street life in the con-
temporary urban landscape. L" The district court granted 2 Live
Crew's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the defen-
dants' song constituted fair use.' The court of appeals reversed,
concluding (given its reading of Sony) that the commercial nature
of the song rendered it categorically ineligible for consideration as
fair use."o1 The Supreme Court reversed.'
The Court formally retreated from its earlier statements placing
the fourth factor at the apex of the fair use pyramid. All factors, it
ruled, should be considered together.' The Court confirmed that
parody, at least, is a legitimate form of fair use under the first fac-
tor, so long as the "parodic" character of the defendant's work,
creative, rather than factual, and substantially all of the story was used in the film. See id.
at 237-38. (The screenplay's addition of a major character, played by Grace Kelly in the film,
was found irrelevant.) And the fourth fair use factor, again characterized as the most
important of the four, clearly weighed against fair use, since a finding of fair use would
interfere with the copyright holder's ability to market adaptation rights under the renewal
term. See id. at 238. This argument has the ring of circularity to it, since at the time the case
was filed and decided it is doubtful that the copyright owner-which had purchased the rights
to the renewal term from the estate of the original author-had any credible interest in new
adaptations of the short story. With the expansion of the motion picture market in the late
1990s as a result of videotape sales, Hitchcock's Rear Window indeed was remade by
Hallmark Entertainment for television in 1998, in a version that was produced by and starred
Christopher Reeve.
196. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
197. Id at 572.
198. Id.
199. ld at 581-83.
200. Id. at 573.
201. See id. at 573-74.
202. Id. at 594.
203. See id. at 578.
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critiquing the plaintiffs work, can be reasonably perceived.2 °4
Putting this standard into a broader context, the Court noted that
the first factor would weigh more heavily in favor of the defendant
to the extent that the defendant had "transformed" the plaintiffs
work, and that such transformation could overcome a charge that
the defendant's work was otherwise "commercial."2 °5 The second
factor weighed in the plaintiffs favor, since a popular song would
be deemed to be "creative." The Court discounted the fact that the
defendant had copied the entirety of the song, under the third fac-
tor, since the amount of copying was dictated largely by the nature
of the parodic use.2' The Court noted that market harm that
resulted from legitimate criticism of an original work might be
substantial-a poor review can cause ticket or album sales to
collapse-but would not be relevant to market analysis under the
fair use statute.2 7 The market harm with which copyright law is
concerned is the harm that results from substitution of the defen-
dant's work for the plaintiffs. Criticism that depresses the plaintiffs
market without offering the defendant's work as a substitute is
irrelevant. Though in its tone the Court clearly signaled its sympa-
thy with the fair use defense, it remanded the case, indicating that
the plaintiff could yet introduce evidence that the parody version
had usurped a forecast market for a rap derivative of the Orbison
original.2"
5. Fair Use in the Circuits
The unsurprising result of the Court's emphasis on the case-by-
case character of fair use adjudication, and its insistence that the
doctrine focus so narrowly on the works of authorship themselves,
204. See id. at 582. This put to rest any possible uncertainty about the status of parody as
fair use remaining since the Court's affirmance of a judgment of infringement in Benny v.
Loew's, Inc. See supra note 179. The Ninth Circuit concluded in Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432,
435 (9th Cir. 1986), that the 1976 Copyright Act effectively trumped Benny when parody
appeared on the list of possibly protected "fair" uses in the statute's legislative history.
205. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-85. On the unhelpfulness of an abstract "transformative
use" standard as a unifying theme for fair use, see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More
Things Change, the Less They Seem 'Transformed": Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF THE U.S.A. 251 (1998).
206. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-89.
207. See id. at 591-92.
208. Id. at 593.
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is confirmation of the view that the doctrine today is so abstract that
it has virtually no content. Or, perhaps more accurately stated, the
doctrine appears to be so fragmented as to make it useless as a pre-
dictive device for copyright owners, copyright consumers, and for
courts. The text of the Court's fair use opinions signals to every
potential fair use claimant and defendant that theirs is a sui generis
situation, where the facts of the cases that have gone before have
little bearing on the right or even likely result in the next case.
Every fair use situation presents only an opportunity to scrutinize
the work itself and its market,2°9 and the statutory text is flexible
enough to accommodate nearly any result that a court might prefer.
In the next Part, I argue that this result is both at odds with con-
gressional intent and at odds with a better reading of both pre- and
post-1978 fair use case law. In the balance of this Part, I illustrate
this concern 210 by describing recent appellate cases that raise prob-
lems that appear to be nearly identical to those presented in the
Supreme Court cases discussed above. In each instance, the more
recent courts approach the fair use issue not as an opportunity to
elaborate on and refine the related Supreme Court cases, but as an
invitation to start from scratch with the four fair use factors.
a. Williams & Wilkins and Photocopying: American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. and Princeton University
Press v. Michigan Document Services
Treatment of the legitimacy of photocopying in Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States21x is compared frequentlywithhow pho-
tocopying in the academic and research communities has been treat-
ed more recently, in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,212
and Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services.2
The Court of Claims in Williams & Wilkins engaged in a cost-benefit
209. Judge Posner's opinion in Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002)
(determining book of information and photographs about stuffed "Beanie Baby" toys to be fair
use), relies on this theme in a particularly elegant way.
210. A similar proposition is illustrated with different evidence in Madison, Legal-Ware,
supra note 18, at 1100-05.
211. 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
212. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
213. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
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analysis in the context of a then-new technology.214 The clear bene-
fits of broad distribution of scientific and medical research were held
to outweigh the relatively nominal cost to the copyright holder be-
fore the court. In both of the more recent cases, courts not only in
effect refused to engage in a comparable analysis, but, more impor-
tantly, they implicitly rejected the premise that the Williams &
Wilkins case itself (and the photocopying practices examined in that
case) constituted a relevant data point that the more recent courts
should account for in their analysis of fair use claims.
In American Geophysical Union, the Second Circuit upheld a
copyright infringement claim by publishers who argued that scien-
tists at Texaco had photocopied entire articles from scientific jour-
nals for their convenience and, sometimes, for circulation within the
company.2"' In Princeton University Press, the Sixth Circuit held a
for-profit photocopying company liable for photocopying substantial
portions of scholarly books and the entirety of some scholarly arti-
cles while preparing coursepacks for university students, at the
behest of the students' professors but without the permission of the
relevant publishers.216
In both cases, the courts considered the defendants' fair use argu-
ments in detail but did so entirely within the context of the Supreme
Court's admonition that the doctrine is to be applied on a "case-by-
case" basis. Accordingly, and without reference to the defendants'
practices at issue in Williams & Wilkins, 7 both courts relied exten-
sively on case-specific analyses of the first and fourth fair use fac-
tors. In both cases, the use in question was deemed to be "commer-
cial" (in American Geophysical Union, because reading and relying
on scientific literature was part of Texaco's process of producing
commercial products;2 " and in Princeton University Press, because
the copy shop defendant was a for-profit enterprise).21 9 In both
cases, there was clear evidence of injury to a relevant publisher's
market because both defendants had credible opportunities to pay
214. See supra Part II.C.1.
215. See Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 915-16.
216. See Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1383.
217. Both courts cited Williams & Wilkins only to note that a licensing market for the
relevant works existed in the more recent cases, as it did not in Williams & Wilkins. See
Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1388; Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 924.
218. See Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 921-22.
219. See Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1383.
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per-copy or per-page licensing fees, or to buy entire new copies of the
works in question, and failed to do so.2"
b. Sony and Time-Shifting: A & M Records v. Napster
and Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond
Multimedia Systems
VTR users in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. 221 were characterized by Sony and ultimately by the Court as
engaged in legitimate "time-shifting" of broadcast television pro-
grams. The "shifting" element of that case has been neologized to
encompass alleged "space-shifting" by consumers of digital versions
of recorded music. The claim has been presented twice at the appel-
late level and accepted once, in Recording Industry Association of
America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 22' and rejected once, in A
& M Records, Inc. v. Napster." In both cases, as the description of
the Court's cases would predict, fair use analysis concentrated less
on the character of what the individual users were alleged to be
doing, as contextualized by history, tradition, or other cultural influ-
ence, and (formally, at least) concentrated more on the character of
the individual works in question.
"Space-shifting" received only the briefest of analyses in dicta in
Diamond Multimedia, but the court's reference is clear enough to
suggest both how the court would have ruled had the issue been
presented squarely, and the manner in which the court would have
reached its result.22 At issue in the case was whether a digital com-
puter device called the Rio, capable of storing and playing back
digital MP3 files, was required to comply with the technical require-
ments of the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA). 2 The AHRA re-
quires that certain digital devices (paradigmatically, digital audio
tape (DAT) players and recorders) embody a technical system that
limits making multiple reproductions of digital recordings." The
Ninth Circuit held that in light of definitional limitations of the
220. See id. at 1387-88; Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 929-31.
221. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
222. 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
223. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
224. See Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d at 1079.
225. See id. at 1075.
226. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 100110-10 (2000).
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AHRA, the statute did not apply.227 In so ruling, the court raised
and addressed the public policy behind both the AHRA and the
Copyright Act in general, noting that the Diamond Rio was aimed
at facilitating "personal use" of copyrighted works, via "space-shift-
ing" of prerecorded music by copying digital files from other (pre-
sumably less portable) media to the highly portable Rio.22 "Such
copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consis-
tent with the purposes of the [Audio Home Recording] Act," the
court wrote, citing Sony.22 9 Both that language and the court's cita-
tion to Sony strongly imply that had the court been asked to elabo-
rate, it would have concluded that moving a digital sound file from
a desktop computer to a Rio on a belt loop likely had no cognizable
effect on the copyright holder's potential income from that work.
Any other conclusion would mandate a result like the one the
same court reached in A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster. As noted
above,' ° the court's conclusion that use of Napster's MusicShare
software did not constitute fair use relied extensively on analysis of
the facts only of the case before it, as applied to the copyrighted
works in question. The court asked "whether the new work merely
replaces the object of the original creation or instead adds a further
purpose or different character" to the original work,"1 and "whether
the allegedly infringing use is commercial or non-commercial." 2
The court found that the district court did not err in concluding that
users' behavior neither transformed the underlying work because
each song was "merely retransmitted in a different medium,""3 nor
was it noncommercial, because each user uploading a song was "dis-
tributing" the work to an unknown and anonymous recipient, 234 and
each user downloading a song was getting something for free that
otherwise the user would have had to purchase.2
227. See Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d at 1075-79.
228. Id. at 1079.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
231. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (2001).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id. This begs the very questions that the court was asked to analyze: whether
users were reproducing or distributing acopies" of the plaintiffs' works, and whether they were
entitled to do so for free, as a matter of fair use.
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The court agreed with the district court that the creative nature
of the works (musical compositions and sound recordings) militated
against a finding of fair use. The court noted that both uploading
and downloading a work via the Napster system involved copying
the entire work, thus suggesting that a finding of no fair use was
warranted.' The court concluded that the district court had not
erred in finding the presence of an effect on the market for plaintiffs'
works in this case, partly on the basis of evidence that sales of com-
pact discs to college students had been affected negatively by
MusicShare use,237 and partly on the basis of the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the Napster system prejudiced the plaintiffs' ability to
decide whether and when to enter the market for Internet down-
loads of their copyrighted works.3 8 Napster also argued that the
district court erred in refusing to consider two possible "identified"
uses as "fair uses": sampling, which describes the practice of using
Napster technology to download music files in order to determine
whether to purchase a copy of the recording, and space-shifting, the
neologism coined in connection with Diamond Multimedia," to
describe the practice of downloading MP3 files via MusicShare that
the user already "owns" on a compact disc.2' The court of appeals
agreed with the district court that sampling failed to qualify as a
fair use because of its essentially commercial nature (thus reiterat-
ing its analysis of the first fair use factor) and because of its effect
on the market for online distribution of recorded music (thus reiter-
ating its analysis of the fourth factor)." ' The court of appeals sup-
236. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
237. See id. The district court excluded or disregarded evidence submitted by Napster that
use of its system either caused no net harm or was in fact associated with an increase in sales
of prerecorded music. Some subsequent research corroborated the material offered by
Napster. See Matt Richtel, Access to Free Online Music Is Seen as a Boost to Sales, N.Y. TIMES,
May 6, 2002, at C6 (reporting study by Jupiter Media Metrix that concluded that use of file
sharing networks led to increased spending on prerecorded music); Brad King, Record Biz Has
Burning Question (June 14,2002), at httpJ/www.wired.com/news/MP3/0,1285,53157,00.html
(reporting study by Ipsos-Reid suggesting that file sharing network use leads to increased
spending on compact discs).
238. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1018-19.
239. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text. A *space-shifting" defense was also
raised and rejected in the My.MP3.com litigation, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92
F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
240. Cf Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1072
(9th Cir. 1999).
241. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1018.
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plemented this analysis by rejecting a further argument, that music
sampling was likely to be "fair" because it has the effect of increas-
ing, rather than decreasing, sales of recorded music.242 The court
gave equally short shrift to arguments regarding "space-shifting,"
on the ground that "space-shifting" in Diamond Multimedia did not
involve the simultaneous distribution of the work to the general
public. "Space-shifting" did not constitute fair use in Napster be-
cause MusicShare users infringed by distributing, rather than sim-
ply "using," copyrighted works.2
c. Harper & Row and the News: The Los Angeles News
Service Cases
The uneven contemporary application of the Harper & Row, Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises2" framework journalism is exem-
plified by a series of cases involving different kinds of use of a single
copyrighted "work"-videotape footage of the beating of a truck
driver during the 1992 Los Angeles riots that followed the trial ac-
quitting white police officers accused of beating Rodney King. The
242. See id. The legal argument that unauthorized use tends to increase the income of
copyright owners has generally been rejected. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569,591 n.21 (1994) (noting that even if a"film producer's appropriation of a composer's
previously unknown song ... turns the song into a commercial success[,J the boon to the song
does not make the film's ... copying fair"); Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, 126 F.3d 70,
81 n.16 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Even if the unauthorized use of plaintiff's work in the televised
program might increase poster sales, that would not preclude her entitlement to a licensing
fee."); DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24,28 (2d Cir. 1982); cf N.Y. Times Co.
v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483,497-98 n.6 (2001).
More to the point, even if the dissent is correct that some authors, in the long
run, are helped, not hurt, by Database reproductions, the fact remains that the
Authors who brought the case now before us have asserted their rights under
§ 201(c). We may not invoke our conception of their interests to diminish those
rights.
Id. But see Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Intl Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 571 (7th Cir. 2002) (dictum) ("Book
reviews that quote from ('copy') the books being reviewed increase the demand for copyrighted
works; to deem such copying infringement would therefore be perverse, and so the fair-use
doctrine permits such copying."); Ndhez v. Caribbean Intl News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st
Cir. 2000); but cf Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Cornectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607-08 (9th
Cir. 2000) (finding fair use by competitor that produced video game consoles by reverse
engineering plaintiffs copyrighted computer code, where plaintiff suffered harm in market
for consoles but potential benefit in market for games).
243. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
244. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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videotape was shot by an independent news-gathering organization
and was broadcast simultaneously with its transmission by news
stations under contract with the independent producer. The initial
broadcasts were recorded, and tapes of the recordings were obtained
and rebroadcast, at different times and by different parties, without
compensation to the original producer. The plaintiff took three cases
to the Ninth Circuit, prevailing in two of the three. The plaintiff won
the two cases that appeared to involve legitimate "journalism," and
lost the case involving use of the tape for promotional purposes, the
case that initially appeared to support the weakest fair use defense.
In the first case, Los Angeles News Service v. KCAL-TV Channel
9,4 a competing local news station broadcast roughly thirty seconds
of the four-plus minute videotape and was sued by the original pro-
ducer for copyright infringement. The district court granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the first factor, nature of the use, suggested
that the defendant was effectively free-riding on the news-gathering
efforts of the producer, rather than engaging in legitimate journal-
ism, particularly since the defendant had asked the plaintiff for a
license and had been refused." Further, the court found that the
use took the "heart" of the original work and that the use, being
commercial, presumptively injured the plaintiff's market for licens-
ing the work.24 7
The same original work was before the Ninth Circuit again on a
similar claim in Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television
International, Ltd.,24 in which the defendants were accused of
rebroadcasting the tapes to international subscribers after acquiring
the images from an authorized broadcast on The Today Show on
NBC. In this case, however, the district court, relying on the Ninth
Circuit's earlier opinion, granted partial summary judgment in the
plaintiff's favor with respect to the defendant's fair use defense. 9
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court dismissed the
possibility that the defendant's use was anything other than com-
mercial (distribution or broadcast of the footage in exchange for a
245. 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997).
246. See id. at 1121-22.
247. See id. at 1122-23.
248. 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998).
249. L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1265 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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fee),2" as well as the possibility that the uses to which the footage
ultimately might be put were relevant in any sense to the fair use
calculus."1 The court discussed the remaining factors only briefly,
tracking its earlier ruling that the defendant's activities injured the
plaintiffs market in the sense that redistribution of the work with-
out payment would damage the ability of independent producers
such as the plaintiff to build a business. 2
The plaintiff was less successful in a third effort to pursue in-
fringement claims based on this footage, this time against the pro-
ducers of the CourtTV television program, which incorporated
several seconds of the original footage into its advertising of cover-
age of the trials of some of those accused of the beatings."3 In this
case, the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the defen-
dant's use was indeed fair. The court ruled that the promotional
use of the videotape was in fact more "transformative" than its mere
rebroadcast in reporting on the news, despite its more obviously
commercial context. 4 The court found the heart of the distinction
between this and the two prior cases in its analysis of the fourth
factor, the effect of the use on the market for the work.255 The court
noted that CourtTVwas not a competitor of the plaintiff, unlike the
defendants in the two prior cases, which were both in the news busi-
ness. 2 ' Further, the defendant made no effort to avoid paying a
license fee, since the absence of a competitor or distributor relation-
ship made a license structure for this kind of use unexpected. 7
Most important, the court found that the record suggested no likely
250. L. News Serv., 149 F.3d at 994.
251. See id. ("IT]he question of whether defendants' copying and transmission of the works
constitutes fair use is distinct from whether their subscribers' broadcasts of the works are fair
use.").
252. See id.
253. L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, 313 F.3d
1093 (9th Cir. 2003).
254. See id. at 938-39. The court noted that "It]he development of the [advertising] montage
at least plausibly incorporates the element of creativity beyond mere republication, and it
serves some purpose beyond news worthiness." Id. at 939.
255. See id. at 939-40.
256. Id. at 942.
257. Id.
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adverse impact on the character of the plaintiff's business if uncom-
pensated use of this sort were permitted,.even on a broader scale.2 58
d. Campbell and Parody: Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin
Books and SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.
Perhaps nowhere is the aridity of contemporary fair use analysis
more apparent than in the courts' treatment of claims that a given
use is protected "parody." In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,259
the court strongly suggested that a "parodic" use was likely to be
fair, since it was more likely to constitute a "transformative" use
under the first fair use factor.2" But the court seemed to draw a
conceptual line between "parody" as protected use, on the one hand,
and "satire," or use of the copyrighted work to criticize some unre-
lated phenomenon as an unprotected use, on the other hand.261 In
Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,"62 the own-
ers of copyrights in the works of Dr. Seuss sued the publishers of a
slim volume called The Cat Not in the Hat (a take-off on the Seuss
titles The Cat in the Hat and The Cat in the Hat Comes Back), which
satirized the criminal prosecution of O.J. Simpson for the murder of
his wife.2" On appeal from a preliminary injunction entered in favor
of the plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants' fair use
defense, drawing a definitive line between protected parody and
unprotected satire, and finding that the defendants' work fell on the
wrong side of that line.2 According to the court, the defendants'
work invoked, but offered no critical commentary on, the content or
258. Id. at 941-42. For a comparable set of contrasting results regarding use of apparently
similar material, compare Roy Exp. Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein, Black Inc.,
AG. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1143-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that
broadcast of film clips of Charlie Chaplin in connection with broadcast on his death did not
constitute fair use), affd on other grounds, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982), with Video-Cinema
Films, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 7128 IBSJ, 2001 WL 1518264 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 28, 2001) (upholding defense of fair use of movie clips in context of news report on death
of actor Robert Mitchum). There is no doubt that Chaplin's career, and his death, were far
more newsworthy than Mitchum's.
259. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
260. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
261. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 596-600 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
262. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
263. Id. at 1396.
264. See id. at 1399-1401.
2004] 1585FAIR USE
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
style of Dr. Seuss's classic books.2' It therefore involved no relevant
transformation of that work. The court reiterated that sense in its
evaluation of the second fair use factor, when it found the plaintiff's
work to be creative and original,2' and the third factor, when it
rejected as "post-hoc shtick" the notion that the amoral Cat could be
recharacterized as the amoral O.J. Simpson."' The defendants'
nontransformative and obviously commercial use (commercial in the
sense that the defendants were trying to sell books) permitted the
court to affirm the district court's inference of market injury as a
result of the use, and rejection of the fair use defense.2"
By contrast, a comparable fair use claim was enthusiastically
accepted in a case involving a "parody" of Margaret Mitchell's best-
selling novel Gone With the Wind. A version of the book, narrated by
a slave on the plantation Tara and entitled The Wind Done Gone,
attracted a preliminary injunction based on copyright infringement
in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 269 On appeal, the Elev-
enth Circuit reversed, finding that the defendant had established
the fair use defense by invoking the work's transformative charac-
ter.270 Rather than reject as "post-hoc shtick" the defendant's efforts
to characterize her own work as a "parodic" invocation of Gone With
the Wind's romanticization of the antebellum South, the Eleventh
Circuit embraced those efforts, along with an expansive interpreta-
tion of the Campbell standard requiring only that "a parodic charac-
ter may reasonably be perceived" in order to rely successfully on the
transformative character of the use.271
III. FAIR USE TRADITIONS AND PATERNS
Despite the small sample of cases reviewed in the last Part, the
point should be clear that across a range of fair use cases, the Su-
preme Court's formal jurisprudence has encouraged the courts of
265. See id at 1401.
266. See id at 1402.
267. See id. at 1402-03.
268. See id. at 1403.
269. 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
270. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
271. See id. at 1268-69 (requiring only that the defendant intend "to comment upon or
criticize a prior work by appropriating elements of the original in creating a new artistic, as
opposed to scholarly or journalistic, work").
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appeals, and presumably the district courts following their lead, to
abstract the fair use inquiry to the point of incoherence. Looking
solely at the courts' examination of the four fair use factors, there
is no principled distinction in law between parodies (or satirical
uses) of Gone With the Wind and The Cat in the Hat.272 Indeed, the
postmodern literary reverence for Dr. Seuss 273 suggests that his
work is more ripe for parody than Mitchell's faded classic. There is
no principled distinction between "unfair" use of an obviously news-
worthy videotape for news reporting purposes and the "fair" use of
that same tape for advertising purposes. Based on the four factors,
there is no principled distinction between fair and unfair uses of
electronic devices for copying and storing digital copies of musical
works. I do not argue that distinctions cannot be drawn, but only
that they cannot be drawn credibly based on the language of the
statute alone, as the Supreme Court has directed that the fair use
statute be used, and as the courts have characterized their own
work. To the extent that decisions have relied on fair use theorizing,
theory has tended to reinforce this overall direction, rather than
constrain it. 2
74
In this Part I begin the process of undertaking a new direction for
fair use, focusing closely on what the Supreme Court actually did in
the key cases described above, as contextualized in the judicial back-
ground to the statute established in the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. I suggest in this Part that the contemporary focus
on "case-by-case" adjudication of fair use disputes misunderstands
the properly contextual orientation of fair use decision making as it
developed historically, as Congress understood it when it enacted
the fair use statute, and as the statute has actually been applied
over the last twenty-five years.
Recovering this contextual sense requires departing from the
currently accepted focus on the plaintiff's "work of authorship" as
the sole relevant cultural artifact. Instead it requires focusing on
situating the work of authorship in the context of the cultural and
272. See supra Part II.C.5.d.
273. See, e.g., ALISON LURIE, BOYS AND GnIs FOREVER: CHILDREN'S CLASSICS FROM
CINDERELLA TO HARRY POTER (2003) (deconstructing children's literature via the lives and
personalities of the authors).
274. See supra notes 158 and accompanying text (noting reliance of courts in photocopying
cases on market theory of fair use).
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social patterns in which plaintiffs and defendants-both named
individually and implicit as groups-are embedded.
A. Fair Use Traditions: Folsom v. Marsh and Nineteenth Century
Copyright
Copyright scholars know that fair use is not timeless. As a formal
concept, fair use dates to a pair of lower federal court decisions writ-
ten in the middle of the nineteenth century by Justice Story, riding
the circuit: Folsom v. Marsh275 and Lawrence v. Dana."6 Of the two,
Lawrence is remembered chiefly for introducing the phrase "fair
use" to the vocabulary of American copyright law." The more im-
portant of the two, Folsom gave us the syntax of fair use. In this
Part, I propose to redescribe Folsom,2 s noting that the features
for which it is chiefly known-its formulation of what has come
down to us as the four statutory fair use factors-are in fact less
important than the narrative structures that Story used to frame
his opinion. In the next Part, I suggest that modern fair use cases
can and should be subjected to a similar interpretive inversion.
The plaintiffs in Folsom were the publishers of a twelve-volume
compendium of the papers of George Washington, including both
private and public material, letters, correspondence, and the like. 9
The defendants published a two-volume work, The Life of Washing-
ton in the Form of an Autobiography, intended to be marketed to
children and students.' Most of the defendants' work consisted of
the story of Washington's life ostensibly narrated by Washington, as
to which there was no claim of infringement. 81 What prompted the
suit was the defendants' inclusion of verbatim copies of some of the
letters included in the plaintiffs' work in order to punctuate and
illustrate the defendants' "autobiography."212 As Story noted, al-
275. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
276. 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136).
277. Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 44.
278. I have done so once before, from a different perspective, in Michael J. Madison, What's
My Copy Right?, 48 J. COPYRIGHT SOC Y OF THE U.S.A. 787 (2001).
279. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 343.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 345.
282. Id.
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though the quantity of material copied was relatively slight, both in
relation to the original work and in relation to the defendants' work:
It is a selection of the entire contents of particular letters, from
the whole collection or mass of letters of the work of the plain-
tiffs. From the known taste and ability of Mr. Upham, [the au-
thor of the accused work] it cannot be doubted, that these letters
are the most instructive, useful and interesting to be found in
that large collection.'
Did the defendants' copying thus infringe the plaintiffs' copyright?
To the modern reader, Story's decision that it did follows from appli-
cation of the nineteenth century version of the four statutory fac-
tors:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look
to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity
and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use
may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the
objects, of the original work.'
Reading the case in its entirety, however, makes clear that the
factors were neither drawn from an abstract sense of the plaintiff's
"property" interest or of the market for the original work, nor ap-
plied as such. The defense, as considered by Story, was more
nuanced. Story reviewed several possibilities, rejecting each in turn.
First, the defendants' work might have been considered to be an
abridgment of the plaintiffs'.2" If so, it would have been lawful, for
under the law as it existed at the time, "abridgment" was not an
exclusive right of the copyright owner.2 6 Alternatively, it might
have been a compilation of the plaintiffs' work and as such it would
constitute a fair restatement and not a piracy." As Story explained,
"[a] compilation of this kind (an encyclopedia) may differ from a
treatise published by itself; but there must be certain limits fixed to
283. Id. at 348.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 344-45.
286. See id. at 344-47; see also PATRY, supra note 97, at 3-27 (analyzing early "fair use* and
"fair abridgment" decisions in English and American law).
287. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 347-48.
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its transcripts; it must not be allowed to sweep up all modem works,
or an encyclopedia would be a recipe for completely breaking down
literary property." 2Io What Story referred to as "a collection of beau-
ties of an author" " was his third attempt at characterization; such
a defense likewise would have failed, for the defendant would have
appropriated merely the most valuable of the plaintiffs work and
have added nothing of his own.' The facts of this case, however, fell
somewhere between these extremes, since Story acknowledged that
the defendant author had copied letters from the plaintiffs' work in
the context of a longer narrative of Washington's life.291
Story focused on two meaningful possibilities, either of which, it
is clear, would have exonerated the defendants. The first was "that
the defendant ha[d] selected only such materials, as suited his own
limited purpose as a biographer."29 2 From this premise, Story ren-
dered his now-famous discussion of the character of the material
copied, the value of that material in the context of the original work,
and the extent to which that copying was likely to diminish the
profitability of the original. He concluded implicitly, but clearly, that
crediting the biographical motives of the defendant was more than
a little disingenuous; a true biography (and a true biographer)
would not have been intended nor would it in fact substitute for a
collection of primary source materials authored by the subject.293
But asking whether a given author is "really" a biographer, or
whether that author's work product is "really" a biography, is diffi-
cult.294 In context, it is clear that Story elucidated his "factors" for
fair use as a proxy for determining whether the defendants' work
was "really" a biography.
288. Id at 348 (quoting Roworth v. Wilkes, 170 Eng. Rep. 889, 890 (K.B. 1807)).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 347-48.
291. See id: at 345.
292. Id. at 348.
293. See id. at 348-49.
294. The art of biography goes back to antiquity, but until relatively recently it was used
more as a device to memorialize, commemorate, and morally instruct readers (and listeners)
than to narrate the events of a person's life. The word "biographer" (from the Greek
"bios'-life and "graphein-to write) was introduced in THOMAS FULLER, THE HISTORY OF THE
WORTHIES OF ENGLAND (1662) (arguing for a more "objective" or critical style of writing), and
"biography" was first used by John Dryden in 1683, writing about Plutarch. See CATHERINE
N. PARKE, BIOGRAPHY: WRITING LiVmS 13-14 (1996).
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The same conclusion comes through clearly in the second category
to which the defendants' work arguably belonged-the review. The
defendants might, in theory, have been reviewing or critiquing the
plaintiffs' work, rather than reviewing Washington's life. If so, they
were entitled to present quotations from the work, but only to the
extent that doing so was consistent with the reviewer's purpose."9
Otherwise, the defendants would not have produced a review (which
would be fair) but "in substance a copy, whereby a work vested in
another is prejudiced."2" "[N]o one can doubt that a reviewer may
fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and
truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable
criticism."2 7 Again, the economic injury worked by an effective sub-
stitution served as an analytic proxy for the determination of
whether or not the defendants' work constituted a "review": "It is
not a case, where abbreviated or select passages are taken from
particular letters; but the entire letters are taken
295. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348 (quoting Roworth v. Wilkes, 170 Eng. Rep. 889, 890 (KB.
1807)). The Nimmer treatise describes a similar "functional test" for evaluating the fourth
statutory fair use factor, under which "a comparison must be made not merely of the media
in which the two works may appear, but rather in terms of the function of each such work
regardless of media." NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1305(BX1), at 192-93. The "function" of each
version of the work is determined by the use to which the author apparently intends the
audience should put the work. See id. It is unclear, however, how this "functional" test (based
on the "intended" use of the original work) avoids the circularity of market-oriented fair use
analysis that arises in cases when failure to secure the author's permission weighs against
a claim of fair use. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
296. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348 (quoting Roworth, 170 Eng. Rep. at 890).
297. Id. at 344.
298. Id. at 349. At this point in the opinion, the court's economic logic runs away a bit from
its focus on the practice of biography and review:
But if the defendants may take three hundred and nineteen letters, included in
the plaintiff's copyright, and exclusively belonging to them, there is no reason
why another bookseller may not take other five hundred letters, and a third, one
thousand letters, and so on, and thereby the plaintiffs' copyright be totally
destroyed.
Id. This passage may be read innocently, as reaffirming what had already been stated. If each
of these hypothetical copyists were acting under mere "pretense" of biography or review, then
each, individually, should be held liable as an infringer, because the economic injury from
each would be clear and there would be no need to aggregate the injury as the court
hypothesizes. On the other hand, each of the hypothetical copyists might establish copying
in the service of legitimate biography-though the court was skeptical that wholesale copying
could thus be justified-and in that case, the economic injury presumably would be
subordinate to the biographer's interest.
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It is true, as others have noted,' that Folsom did not confront or,
in its four-factor formulation, appear to try to capture the broad
variety of potential fair "uses" that courts and copyright communi-
ties have wrestled with during the twentieth century and into the
twenty-first. IfFolsom were taken solely for its four-factor contribu-
tion, then it is fair to criticize the case-and courts and Congress, to
the extent that they have relied on it-for its narrowness. Here,
however, I suggest that Story's method was both broader and more
contextual than is commonly understood."c If the four factors do not
stand alone, but instead substitute analytically, when necessary, for
the related but prior question of the character of the defendant's
practice, then that analytic technique transcends the facts of Folsom
and related cases involving "biography" and "review." The practice
of biography or review in this instance was not a label to attach to
a successful defense, but the crux of the case itself.
This reversal of perspective can be seen both in the English ante-
cedents of Folsom, and in the nineteenth century cases that elabo-
rated on Story's analysis. The leading prior English case is Cary v.
Kearsley, °1 decided in the King's Bench in 1802. The plaintiff and
the defendant were each authors of books (really surveys) of roads.
On the question of infringement, Lord Ellenborough stated the issue
broadly as "Was the matter so taken used fairly with that view [for
the promotion of science and the benefit of the public], and without
what I may term the animus furandi [in effect, an intent to pi-
rate]?"112 and more narrowly, in this case, as
whether what [was] so taken or supposed to be transmitted from
the plaintiffs book, was fairly done with a view of compiling a
useful book, for the benefit of the public, upon which there has
been a totally new arrangement of such matter,--or taken
299. See Okediji, supra note 14, at 119-20.
300. See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431
(1998) (criticizing Story for applying natural law concepts to statutory copyright, in order to
expand the author's right). Though the American doctrine of "fair use' was in many respects
a narrowing of the English doctrine of "fair abridgement," even in English cases the law had
already begun a shift in favor of the author. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 18-25 (1967).
301. 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (KIB. 1802).
302. Id. at 680.
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colourable, merely with a view to steal the copy-right of theplaintifV?"°
That is, the defendant was either a compiler in the sense that the
defendant arranged the underlying public information in some man-
ner of his own design, or not a compiler, in which case he merely
appropriated the arrangement offered in the plaintiff's work. 4
The concept of animusfurandi concerned both English and Amer-
ican courts for decades and comes down to modern American copy-
right cases in the notion that a successful fair use defense must
incorporate credible evidence of "good faith." '°e In the context of
Cary, however, it seems clear that Lord Ellenborough intended that
element as a proxy for the same kind of practice examination that
Story pursued in Folsom. Based on the excerpt above from Cary, the
counterpart to animus furandi, sometimes referred to as a require-
ment that the defendant have made a "productive" use of the plain-
tiffs work and sometimes expressed in early English cases as the
notion that the successful defendant was engaged "in the fair exer-
cise of a mental operation,"3' had a similar function.
Lord Ellenborough had applied the approach relied on in Folsom
in Roworth v. Wilkes,"07 a case in which the publisher of an encyclo-
pedia copied under the letter "F" most (but not all) of the plaintiffs
pamphlet on fencing. William Patry discusses the case as demon-
strating that good faith, or the lack of intent to infringe, does not
insulate a defendant from an injunction, if the defendant has not
303. Id.
304. There was no holding on the merits. 'The counsel for the plaintiff consented to be
nonsuited." Id.
305. See PATRY, supra note 97, at 130 (noting English antecedent of modern "good faith"
requirement); Okediji, supra note 14, at 121-22 (arguing that at common law, the "good faith"
concept embodied both the concern that the defendant not have intended to deprive the
plaintiff of the value of his copyright, and the concern that the defendant genuinely have
intended to produce a work for the benefit of the public).
306. See Wilkins v. Aikin, 34 Eng. Rep. 163, 165 (K.B. 1810). Patry criticizes the English
cases to the extent that they appear to ascribe value to the labor implicit in the defendant's
.mental operation." See PATRY, supra note 97, at 10 n.17. The notion, however, may well not
have been (wrongly) to associate a virtuous defendant with a hard-working defendant, but
instead to associate a virtuous defendant with a particular virtuous practice. In that sense,
fair use has departed from its historical moorings. More recent discussions of "productive" use
appear to focus more on the defendant's product. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477-81 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
307. 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (KB. 1807).
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added material such that a new work has been created.3' This is
accurate up to a point; the issue was what the defendant had done,
not what the defendant intended to do. Lord Ellenborough wrote
that "[a] Review will not in general serve as a substitute for the
book reviewed; and even there, if so much is extracted that it com-
municates the same knowledge with the original work, it is an ac-
tionable violation of literary property." °9
In modern terms, the conventional reading of such a statement
would be that a review cannot go so far as to damage the market for
the original.310 A more accurate reading would be that the courts
were arguing that a review that goes so far is no review at all, for
reviews by their character and the manner of their preparation
complement, rather than substitute for, the works reviewed. The
point was not to investigate complementarity or substitution, but to
investigate the genuineness of the review.
Other American fair use cases of the nineteenth century were
decided in the same way. In Gray v. Russell,"' enjoining publication
of a pirated version of a Latin grammar, Story wrote, "[11f large
extracts are made ... in a review, it might be a question, whether
those extracts were designed bona fide for the mere purpose of criti-
cism, or were designed to supersede the original work under the
pretence of a review, by giving its substance in a fugitive form." 12
In Story v. Holcombe,3 Justice McLean enjoined publication of
commentaries on equity copied substantially from Justice Story's
work. McLean expressed his skepticism of the defendant's claim by
considering it as a form of review, indicating that quotation "may be
done to a reasonable extent by a reviewer, whose object is to show
the merit or demerit of the work,"" and further considering it as a
compilation, indicating that extracts cannot "be extended so as to
convey the same knowledge as the original work"3 ' if they use the
plaintiffs plan and arrangement.
308. See PATRY, supra note 97, at 12.
309. Roworth, 170 Eng. Rep. at 890. Story quoted this sentence in his opinion in Folsom.
See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
310. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Intl Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2002).
311. 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728).
312. Id. at 1038.
313. 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497).
314. Id at 173.
315. Id.
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Campbell v. Scott 1' rejected a fair use defense offered by a defen-
dant who included lengthy verbatim extracts of the plaintiff's poems
in a book that included an essay on poetry and biographies of poets
whose works were included. The court noted, "If there were critical
notes appended to each separate passage, or to several of the pas-
sages in succession, which might illustrate them and shew from
whence [the plaintiff] had borrowed an idea, or what idea he had
communicated to others, I could understand that to be a fair criti-
n317
cism.
In Lawrence v. Dana,318 the case that introduced the phrase "fair
use" to American copyright law, 19 the court rejected the fair use
defense where the defendant had copied and republished much of an
annotated volume on international law. As in the cases above, the
defendant failed to show that his extraction and reuse was in the
pursuit of any credible claim that he, himself, had engaged in a
process of collection and annotation.3 0 The defendant might have
produced a competing volume of annotated international law, and
might even have used the plaintiffs source materials in doing so, so
long as his "plan and arrangement" were novel to him. That process
would make him the author of a new annotated work, rather than
an infringer.321
316. 59 Eng. Rep. 784 (KB. 1842).
317. Id. at 787. English law in turn re-absorbed Folsom's borrowing from Cary v. Kearley,
170 Eng. Rep. 679 (XB. 1802), and other prior cases. In Scott u. Stanford, 3 L.R.-Eq. 718
(1867), the court rejected a fair use defense in a case where the defendant copied (with
acknowledgment) large portions of the plaintiffs work in preparing a different version of a
book recording mining activity in England. Rejecting the claim that the defendant, an
employee of the Museum of Practical Geology, was engaged in scientific research, the court
noted that the defendant had gone to none of the trouble that the plaintiff had incurred. The
plaintiff was a scientist; the defendant was not. (It is important to distinguish this analysis
from a general theory of copyright that assigns interests based solely on a labor theory of
value. The defendant in Scott lost not because the plaintiff had invested valuable labor and
the defendant had not. The defendant in Scott lost because the defendant was not acting in
a scientific mode, as the plaintiff had done.)
318. 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136).
319. Lewis v. Fullarton, 48 Eng. Rep. 1080, 1080-81 (K.B. 1839), used the term in English
law in 1839.
320. Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 58.
321. To the same effect are the decisions in Reed v. Holiday, 19 F. 325, 325-27 (C.C.W.D.
Pa. 1884) (rejecting fair use defense raised by author of teacher's manual for plaintiffs
textbook; analogizing defendant not to an educator but to an inventor who improves a
patented machine and claims a right to use the original invention); Farmer v. Elstner, 33 F.
494, 497 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1888) (enjoining publication of pamphlet derived from historical
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Particularly clear illustrations of holdings to the same effect are
found in two cases involving allegedly infringing use of the
plaintiffs copyrighted digests of legal decisions: West Publishing Co.
v. Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co. 22 and Edward Thompson
Co. v. American Lawbook Co."' In the former, the court rejected the
fair use defense. The defendant, in its digesting practices, failed to
distinguish between output of its own devising and that which it
copied from the plaintiff.3 24 The process was the focus of the court's
concern: not merely the labor saved as a result of reliance on the
plaintiffs work, but also the lack of genuineness about the character
of what the defendant had actually done. The defendant in Edward
Thompson Co., on the other hand, succeeded with the fair use de-
fense, in no small part because the defendant successfully described
the process by which it acquired source materials and ultimately
produced its digests. 25
B. How the Adoption of§ 107 Did Not Change the Law
The Supreme Court has made much of statements in the legisla-
tive history to § 107 that codifying the fair use doctrine was "in-
tended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."26 From this statement,
treatise on Detroit, Michigan; "There is no pretense that the compiler of this publication
resorted to the original sources himself for this information, nor that he procured it from any
other source than the plaintiffs book." The defendant, in other words, was no historian.); and
Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) (finding fair use by defendant, author of books
on physiognomy, of the plaintiff's works on the same subject).
William Patry criticizes the court's reasoning in Simms. See PATRY, supra note 97, at 39-40
(hypothesizing that the court implicitly understood that both parties necessary relied on much
of the same information). One need not be so skeptical; the court treated potential economic
injury to the plaintiff, which it found insufficient, to be a valid proxy for whether the
defendant had engaged in "a servile or evasive imitation of the plaintiffs work, or a bona fide
original compilation from other common or independent sources." Simms, 75 F.6 at 9 (quoting
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436)). The court engaged in
the analytic exercise that I propose be generalized today, using market effect, among other
things, to test whether the defendant was participating in the pattern that it claimed to be.
322. 79 F. 756 (2d Cir. 1897).
323. 122 F. 922 (2d Cir. 1903).
324. West Publ'g Co., 79 F. at 762-63.
325. Edward Thompson Co., 122 F. at 922-23.
326. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 62 (1975). The Court
quoted this language in each of its last three major fair use decisions. See Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,577 (1994); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
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the Court has concluded that the "equitable" nature of the doctrine
renders it incapable of precise definition except by reference to the
four factors stated in the statute.3" As the House Report that ac-
companied the final bill put the matter,
Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no gen-
erally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the
question must be decided on its own facts. On the other hand,
the courts have evolved a set of criteria which, though in no case
definitive or determinative, provide some gauge for balancing
the equities. These criteria have been stated in various ways,
but essentially they can all be reduced to the four standards
which have been adopted in section 107 .... 38
The formal factor-based reasoning of the Court in Sony, Harper &
Row, and Campbell thus relies heavily on this approach and resists
efforts to develop into a principled doctrine of fair use.
There is more to the legislative history than this, however. Con-
gress left the matter less open-ended than these quotations make it
appear. Congress codified the fair use doctrine at least in part in
order to encourage courts to render the doctrine more comprehensi-
ble. The House Report, for example, notes that the doctrine, as such,
is not stated in the four factors themselves, but in the first sentence
of § 107-what has come to be referred to as the preamble. Accord-
ing to the House Report, "[tihese criteria (the four factors stated in
the statute] are relevant in determining whether the basic doctrine
of fair use, as stated in the first sentence of section 107, applies in
a particular case."3" This basic statement-that the four factors
implement the doctrine, rather than define it-gives courts a con-
textual standard by which application of the four factors can be
measured. That standard is coupled with the statement later in the
House Report:
The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial
doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doc-
471 U.S. 539,549 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 476
(1984).
327. See supra Part II.A.3.
328. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65.
329. Id.
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trine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid techno-
logical change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of
what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the
courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations
on a case-by-case basis.33
As Jay Dratler noted in an early commentary on Sony and Harper
& Row, this language suggests that it is wrong for courts (or schol-
ars) to conclude that fair use was intended by Congress to remain
an open-ended invitation to fact-and case-specific equitable balanc-
ing:
In any event, one thing is manifest in both the statute and its
legislative history: Congress intended to replace the witches'
brew of equity and ad hoc policy balancing with more finely re-
fined elixirs, but without curtailing development of the doctrine
in the common law tradition. Now that the fair use doctrine has
been codified, equity and policy cannot be the sole basis for deci-
sion, or even a first resort. 1
330. Id. at 66. The Senate Report contains the counterpart definitional sentence, "In any
event, whether a use referred to in the first sentence of section 107 is a fair use in a particular
case will depend upon the application of the determinative factors, including those mentioned
in the second sentence." S. REP. No. 94-473, at 62. William Patry argues that the House
Report is misleading in its characterization of the first sentence of § 107 as representing "the"
doctrine of fair use, and that the Senate Report more accurately describes fair use as
embodied in the four factors themselves. See PATRY, supra note 97, at 363-64. The argument
may prove too much, on two grounds. First, as I have suggested, the historical doctrine of fair
use was less tethered solely to the four factors than Patty argues. Second, under my reading
of § 107, the Senate Report and the House Report are consistent with one another. The first
sentence describes the scope of the doctrine as a whole (in the pattern-oriented sense that I
argue had developed in the cases); the four factors describe how to situate a particular case
with reference to that scope. At the very least, Congress made clear in enacting the statute
that the list of illustrative types of fair use was relevant in considering all four of the fair use
factors, not merely the first. A formal proposal for an overall model of fair use along these
lines appears in M.B.W. Sinclair, Fair Use Old and New: The Betamax Case and Its
Forebears, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 269, 328-31 (1984); cf Okediji, supra note 14, at 164:
Where the purpose and character of use is consistent with the nature of the
medium, fair use should provide protection. Thus, the evolving norms of cyber-
behavior such as linking, forwarding, browsing, and in some circumstances
caching-all potential infringements under copyright law-would be excluded
from the reach of claims of infringement.
331. Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 233,260 (1988).
But Dratler may have been overly sanguine in his assessment of
the four factors themselves as giving courts the needed tools to de-
velop a common law of fair use." 2 Abstracting these factors from the
contexts in which they were developed may have misled courts into
concluding that context was not relevant. Congress was well aware
of its relevance, beginning with its earliest efforts, nearly twenty
years before the revision bill was passed in 1976, to enact a compre-
hensive update of the copyright statute.
Among the "Studies on Copyright" commissioned by Congress,33
the study on Fair Use of Copyrighted Works"4 reviewed the case law
of fair use by characterizing it as "The Problem in Context,"3. and
breaking the cases down into eight categories of uses: incidental use,
review and criticism, parody, scholarship, personal or private use,
news, use in litigation, and use for nonprofit or government pur-
poses.3 6 The study drew a conclusion that relies ultimately on the
same foundation as my own. Its author concluded that fair use could
be analyzed according to the question, "[W] ould the reasonable copy-
right owner have consented to the use?" 7 "Reasonableness" would
be determined, in part, by customary practice.' Neither the history
332. In an earlier article, I shared some of his optimism. See Madison, Legal.Ware, supra
note 18, at 1138-42 (proposing adoption of a statutory mandate that fair use claims be
adjudicated in accordance with principles of common law decision making).
333. The legislative process that produced the 1976 revision lasted for more than twenty
years. It would be an error, as Jessica Litman has demonstrated so vividly, to overlook the
effects of political economy on the result or to assign too much weight to its legislative history
as reflecting genuine congressional intent. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise,
and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987).
334. ALAN LATMAN, STUDY No. 14, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1958), reprinted in
2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 781 (Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition 1963).
335. Id. at 785.
336. See id. at 786-92.
337. Id. at 793.
338. See id. at 785, 793. The idea of fair use as a "customary" right influenced some pre-
1976 commentary. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,550-51
& n.4 (1985) (citing older commentary that referred to fair use as "reasonable and
customary'); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345,1350 (1973) (suggesting
that a scholar's handwritten copy of copyrighted article would be fair use as a "customary
factH of copyright-life"); Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 43, 50-51 (1955); Harry N. Rosenfield, Customary Use as 'Fair Use" in Copyright
Law, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 119, 128-40 (1975); Elizabeth Filcher Miller, Case Note, 15 S. CAL. L.
REV. 249, 250 (1942). Older cases and commentators evidenced hostility to copyright
defendants' efforts to rely on custom and usage to avoid liability for infringement. See Famous
Music Corp. v. Seeco Records, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 560, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (declining to excuse
defendant from compliance with terms of compulsory license statute); EATON S. DRONE, A
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of fair use as I have recast it above nor copyright policy support
posing the question of consent from the standpoint of the copyright
owner, but the study put the question of context clearly in front of
Congress.
The 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revi-
sion of the U.S. Copyright Law likewise characterized fair use in
contextual terms. The Report described the judicial doctrine of fair
use as providing "that a reasonable portion of a copyrighted work
may be reproduced without permission when necessary for a legiti-
mate purpose which is not competitive with the copyright owner's
market for his work."339 That the Report framed its summary in
terms of "reasonableness" and "legitimacy" confirms the importance
of context in its articulation of the history of fair use and therefore
in the material that Congress was relying on when it passed
§ 107. 340
To conclude that Congress was speaking contextually rather than
abstractly in § 107 is not to argue that Congress necessarily had any
particular contextualizing methodology in mind, or that any such
methodology is required by the text of the statute. What we do know
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 506 (1879); ARTHUR W.
WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 430-31 (1917). That theme continues, in some courts, to the
present. See Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197,
211-12 (3rd Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003). But see Maxtone-Graham v.
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, 366
F.2d 303,307 (2d Cir. 1966) (both suggesting that customary practices of biographers warrant
recognition in fair use context); Fisher, supra note 15, at 1678-82 (recognizing occasional use
of "industry custom" in fair use cases but arguing that its value is limited to industry-specific
contexts). One problem with "custom" as an analytic tool is that the quantum or type of
evidence necessary to sustain a claim of "custom" is rarely defined adequately. The extensive
debate prior to enactment of § 107 over the scope of fair use for educational photocopying
illustrates the point well. The House Report included a lengthy explanation of the background
of the debate over photocopying and of the compromise reached that enabled the bill to pass,
as well as a set of nonbinding "guidelines" for classroom photocopying that has proved
controversial ever since-due to the fact that the guidelines were developed before there
existed any common sense of what classroom photocopying might involve. See Kenneth D.
Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair- Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599,688-
89 (2001).
339. See 1961 REPORT, supra note 111, at 24.
340. The Report then illustrates the scope of fair use with examples of permitted uses that
closely parallel the list of "favored" uses listed in the preamble to § 107. See supra notes 108-
10 and accompanying text. Both this list, and the categories described in the 1958 Study, see
LATMAN, supra note 334, focus less on the characteristics of the original work of authorship
and a subsequent work that relied on it, and more on the character of the accused infringer's
activities.
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from the legislative history suggests that the abstract approach
adopted on the surface of the Supreme Court's (and later appellate)
opinions is at odds with this history, as well as with the judicial
tradition. The Supreme Court may be incorrect to conclude that fair
use must remain open-ended, but correct to emphasize that Con-
gress intended not to change its underlying conceptual framework.
The next section argues that a better reading of Sony, Harper &
Row, and Campbell reconciles these cases with congressional intent
and with the judicial tradition that began with Folsom v. Marsh.
C. The Judicial Response Revisited
In this section I return to the Supreme Court's fair use opinions,
in order to show that the analytic approach evident in the nine-
teenth century cases, if not frequently recognized as such, remains
alive today under § 107. Discussion of the large number of appellate
fair use cases decided after 1978 is reserved to the next Part.
Before proceeding further, some points should be restated. First,
my argument is not that courts, from Folsom onward, were aware
of their apparent practice of deciding cases in one way but describ-
ing their decision making in another way. Second, I do not suggest
that in so doing, courts were indulging unprincipled and instinctive
biases for and against certain kinds of expression or creativity. In-
stead, they were, as I describe in more detail in the next Part (but
highlight here for clarity), following instinctive but undeveloped
senses of social and cultural patterns.
In this section, I argue that the Supreme Court has followed
much the same course in its major fair use opinions, describing its
analysis in the framework of the four factors but in fact developing
ajurisprudence of social and cultural patterns. In Part IV, I general-
ize this framework across the breadth of fair use cases decided in
the courts of appeal during the last twenty-five years. In Part V, I
suggest that this reinterpretation of the law is both better suited to
the predictive function of copyright and better aligned with the
creativity-inducing function that lies at the core of copyright's incen-
tive policies.
As I previously described Folsom v. Marsh as a case about the
narrative of the defendant's activity, below I similarly redescribe the
major fair use opinions of the late twentieth century.
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1. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
A reconstruction of the Court's opinion in Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal Studios, Inc.341 suggests that the case is far less telling
about the scope of the fair use doctrine than might otherwise ap-
pear. The relevant context and narrative of the case focused not on
use (fair or otherwise) of the plaintiffs copyrighted works, but on
the patterns and practices surrounding the VTRs sold by the defen-
dant.
As noted above, in deciding whether or not Sony infringed indi-
rectly by selling VTRs capable of recording broadcast television
programs, the majority opinion indulged a lengthy analysis of
whether "time-shifting" by VTR users constitutes fair use. 42 While
this result has an intuitive appeal, especially to consumers now
inured to VTR viewing habits, the Court's formal fair use reasoning
has been criticized for both its substantive emptiness in the context
of the fair use doctrine s and for its relatively slapdash approach to
the realities not only of the VTR marketplace but of VTR use. As
Paul Goldstein has noted, the four Justices who dissented on the
ground that "time-shifting" did not meet their criteria of "produc-
tive" fair use were convinced, until late in the deliberative process,
that theirs would be the majority opinion.
It is the second of these criticisms, dealing with the character of
VTR use, that I wish to focus on here. The now well-known explo-
sion of consumer interest in VTRs occurred almost immediately
following the decision in Sony,' suggesting almost before the ink
was dry on the opinion that the Justices had been unable to give
appropriate weight to the ways in which VTRs were being used and
could have been used. At the trial level, both parties introduced
surveys purporting to show how VTR users were using their ma-
chines and concluding that "time-shifting" was the dominant use.' 4
341. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
342. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
343. See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 65
(1987) (Sony and Harper & Row are more sound in their results than in their reasoning.").
344. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 165, at 149-56.
345. See JAMES LAMDNEE, FAST FORWAiD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE VCR, 312-
28 (1987) (describing history of the videocassette recorder).
346. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 438-39 (C.D.
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Both surveys were conducted in 1978, six years before the Supreme
Court's opinion was released. What consumers were doing with
VTRs in 1984 was anyone's guess.
The opinion is noteworthy, then, for its apparent failure to grap-
ple with what was really the key fair use question before it. Embed-
ded in the Court's opinion is an account of the manner in which
VTRs were being absorbed by a relevant population of television
viewers, and more particularly, of the manner in which a given VTR
was absorbed in the experience of a given viewer. The Court de-
scribed the capabilities of each VTR.347 The Court recounted the
results of the parties' surveys regarding the dominant uses of each
consumer's VTR: a significant majority of the respondents surveyed
by the plaintiff indicted that they continued to watch as much tele-
vision after acquiring a VTR as they watched previously, and the
survey commissioned by the defendant did not suggest evidence of
decreased viewing.' At trial, Sony offered direct testimony of indi-
vidual VTR users (who were named as nominal defendants by the
plaintiff in order to procure favorable testimony), who testified to a
range of taping habits, including time-shifting for convenience,
time-shifting in order to avoid watching television commercials, and
building libraries of recorded tapes.' 9
But would taping of broadcast programming by an individual
television viewer-given that contextual evidence-constitute copy-
right infringement in any case? That is, would the individual televi-
sion viewer exercise one of the exclusive rights reserved to the copy-
right holder by recording a broadcast television program without the
holder's permission?
The court of appeals, which ruled in the plaintiffs favor, found
that it would. The Supreme Court was silent on this point, although
the conclusion is implicit in the overall framework of its opinion.
But the omission is telling. The Court did not clearly state that the
home taper is an infringer but for the broadcaster's authority or an
applicable defense. It skipped ahead, to the presence of authorized
copying and to the conclusory (but ultimately determinative) state-
ment that "the District Court's findings plainly establish that time-
Cal. 1979).
347. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,422-23 (1984).
348. See id. at 423-24 & nn.4-5.
349. See id. at 423-24; Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 437-38.
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shifting for private home use must be characterized as a noncom-
mercial, nonprofit activity." "S° More particularly, and despite the
Court's account of the evidence, it appears that the majority of the
Court did not much care what the typical VTR user did with the
machine. To be sure, the Court colored its fair use analysis with
asides that "time-shifting" might yield broader distribution of copy-
righted works and societal benefits in general, 51 but possible offset-
ting economic losses were dismissed as speculative.s2 Its factor-
based fair use analysis just does not withstand scrutiny.
Instead, the Court's result can be explained easily by its clear
sense that whether the viewer's "use" of the televised "work" is fair
or not, the use of the machine is clearly legitimate. That analysis
emerges from two facets of the majority opinion, its reliance on pat-
ent law for the "substantially noninfringing use" standard used to
exonerate Sony, and its rejection of the dissent's proposed "produc-
tive use" standard for determining whether "time-shifting" is fair
use of televised programming. As to reliance on patent law, the
Court noted: "When a charge of contributory infringement is predi-
cated entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by
the purchaser to infringe a patent, the public interest in access to
that article of commerce is necessarily implicated."' Going further,
"[it seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers
upon all copyright owners collectively ... the exclusive right to dis-
tribute VTR's simply because they may be used to infringe copy-
rights. That, however, is the logical implication of their claim."3 "
In the dissent, four Justices took the majority to task for failing
to apply what they discerned as the principle of "productive" use
that unifies the fair use statute and the tradition ofjudicial fair use
350. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449. Elsewhere the Court quotes the district court's findings
regarding "time-shifting" as the dominant use of the VTR. See id. at 424 n.4. The district court
found home recording and playback "of audiovisual material broadcast free of charge to
Betamax owners over public airwaves ... is noncommercial and does not reduce the market
for plaintiffs' works." Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 456. The district court held, as
an independent ground for its decision, that Sony would not be liable for secondary copyright
infringement even if use of the VTR for home taping were considered an infringing use. See
id. at 446.
351. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 454.
352. See id.
353. Id. at 440.
354. Id at 441 n.21.
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before it."'5 The relevant practice, in other words, was not the sale
of the VTR by a manufacturer and vendor that had no ongoing rela-
tionship with each purchaser, but the dynamic that occurs (or, to the
dissent, that fails to occur) in the VTR owner's living room.
The dissent's analysis of the issue began, then, not with the sale
of the VTR to the individual, but with the making of an unautho-
rized copy: "[Tihe VTR user produces a material object from which
the copyrighted work later can be perceived. Unless Congress in-
tended a special exemption for the making of a single copy for per-
sonal use, I must conclude that VTR recording is contrary to the
exclusive rights granted by § 106(1). "356 The dissent then dealt with
what it considered the heart of the matter-the reproduction (as
opposed to the performance, or display, or other use)f 7 of the copy-
righted television programming, even in the privacy of the home. It
rejected the possibility that there is a statutory or common law basis
for an exemption for "personal" or "private" use, and more impor-
tantly, it rejected the notion that there should be such an exemp-
tion. "Each of [the uses described in § 107 and the fair use case law]
... reflects a common theme: each is a productive use, resulting in
some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first
author's work."'
To the dissent, in short, the relevant pattern or practice was the
use of the work itself, rather than the acquisition of the VTR. The
dissent drew a sharp distinction between the "researcher" and the
"scholar," on the one hand, and the "ordinary user," on the other.
The television viewer recording programming with the VTR fell
categorically into the latter group. To the dissent, "[tihe making of
a videotape recording for home viewing is an ordinary rather than
a productive use of the studios' copyrighted works." 9
2. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises
As Glynn Lunney noted recently, the ostensible fair use rationale
of Sony-excusing possible infringement because of a lack of evi-
355. See id. at 477-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
356. Id. at 464 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
357. Id. at 469 n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 478 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
359. Id. at 480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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dence of economic injury-has been the undoing of that case as
precedent. 6 What might have been taken as a strong judicial state-
ment on the character of the individual defendants' activity instead
has been taken as a signal to focus extensively on market concerns.
In a different respect, however, that Court's approach set a tone
that has been followed in each of the later Supreme Court opinions
addressing fair use: formal attention is paid to the four factors of the
statute, and to comparative characterization of the relevant works
prepared by plaintiffs and defendants. But significant-even deter-
minative, albeit unrecognized-weight is given to how the Court
characterizes the relevant pattern or practice before it. The question
the Court has in fact answered has been: "What are the defendants
doing?," rather than "What have the defendants produced?"
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,361 The
Nation magazine published a short column detailing certain para-
phrases and a handful of brief quotations from the about-to-be-pub-
lished memoir of former President Gerald Ford. Virtually all of the
quotations concerned circumstances surrounding President Ford's
decision to pardon his predecessor, Richard Nixon. 2 Harper & Row,
the publisher of the memoir, had authorized the appearance of pre-
publication excerpts in Time.3" The victim of a journalistic scoop,"'
Time declined to go forward with publication of the authorized ex-
360. See Lunney, supra note 14, at 985-91.
361. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
362. See id. at 543. The Nation's 2250-word article consisted of"quotes, paraphrases, and
facts drawn exclusively from the manuscript." Id. Three hundred of those words consisted of
quotations from President Ford's memoirs, which the Court characterized as the "heart" of
President Ford's manuscript. Id at 564-65.
363. See id. at 542-43. Time had paid $12,500 to Harper & Row already and had promised
to pay an additional $12,500 upon publication of the excerpt. Id.
364. See id. at 543,562. The Court characterized the manuscript itself, in the hands of The
Nation, as "purloined." Id at 542. The norms and ethics of journalists have been of concern
to the Court at least since International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245-
46 (1918) (establishing limited liability of news service for misappropriation of competitor's
"hot news"). See also N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (rejecting argument that
the New York Times could include freelance articles in electronic databases without authors'
permission); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989)
("[A] public figure plaintiff must prove more than an extreme departure from professional
standards ...."); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (ruling that "right
of reply" statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
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cerpt and refused to pay the fee it had agreed to deliver to Harper
& Row.36
5
In rejecting The Nation's fair use defense on these facts, the
Court relied heavily on the circumstance that President Ford's
manuscript was unpublished, though protected by statutory copy-
right.36 Though this statutory change meant that publication no
longer signified an election of statutory copyright,"7 in Harper &
Row it remained an important sign of the author's intent to reveal
the work to the public.36 That intent, in turn, had significant conse-
quences for fair use. As to the purpose and character of the use, the
Court considered several arguments, one of which favored The Na-
tion (its article technically constituted news reporting, a favored
use), the balance of which favored Harper & Row. The Nation pur-
posely supplanted Harper & Row's right to control publication, did
so for commercial purposes, and knowingly relied on an unautho-
rized copy of the Ford manuscript. 69 The Nation copied portions of
a "creative" work that was not yet published.7 0 It had purposefully
selected portions that were "among the most powerful passages"37'
from book chapters that addressed the Nixon pardon, and that those
selections served as the "dramatic focal pointH "37 of The Nation's
article. 73 Time's refusal to pay the balance of the amount due under
its original agreement with Harper & Row confirmed the existence
of actual harm.3 7' The nature of the practice in which The Nation
engaged (competing for first serialization rights for yet-to-be-pub-
lished book manuscripts, without bidding fairly for those rights)
threatened to disrupt this established market as a whole.75
365. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 543.
366. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
367. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552.
368. See ia at 552-55.
369. See id. at 561-63.
370. See id. at 563-64.
371. Id. at 565.
372. Id. at 566.
373. The district court was even more clearly concerned with the fact that the unique value
of the "scoop" to The Nation lay in the ability to present what the court characterized as
"essentially the heart of the book." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F.
Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
374. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567.
375. See id. at 568-69.
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As in Sony, however, the Court's formal fair use analysis leaves
much to be desired. Clearly, The Nation did something which the
Court did not approve. But the Ford autobiography was hardly a
work of real literature; it was anticipated by the public (and thus
valuable to Time) not because of Ford's rhetorical skill, but because
he might disclose new information about the Nixon pardon. Given
the unprecedented character of the Watergate scandal, it could not
be argued reasonably that the public interest was disserved by the
earliest possible disclosure of information about Ford's role in the
end of the Nixon administration.
As to Harper & Row's injury, the Court's discussions376 of both the
"effect on the market" and the effect on the value of the copyrighted
work have a forced air. It is true that Time backed out of its promise
to pay Harper & Row for serialization rights, but the amount at
issue was minor, and the loss could have been avoided easily by
Time (in advance, by discounting the fee by the possibility of Harper
& Row's losing control of the manuscript) or by Harper & Row (by
taking better precautions to secure the manuscript, or acceding to
a request by Time that it advance the date of its serialization, even
before The Nation's activities came to light).377 More important to
the Court, The Nation tried "to profit from exploitation of the copy-
righted material without paying the customary price."3 78 This refer-
ence to the "customary" price might be taken as the license fee nego-
tiated between Time and Harper & Row, but it might equally-and
more plausibly--concern the bookstore price of the book. If The
Nation had bought a copy of the manuscript and published the story
that it did, it is difficult to imagine Harper & Row succeeding on its
infringement claim. The market injury at stake may not have been
injury to the market for the work, but to the market for the book.
How, then, did The Nation err? The Nation knowingly relied on
a copy of a manuscript that was provided to it under murky circum-
stances. 37 9 The manuscript, as The Nation also knew, was unpub-
lished.3' The Nation parsed the manuscript in order to locate the
376. See id at 566-70.
377. See PATRY, supra note 97, at 123 n.96 (describing negotiations between Harper & Row
and Time, which wanted to advance the publication date).
378. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
379. See id. at 543.
380. See id.
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"heart" of its literary and commercial appeal."1 It closely para-
phrased a selection of statements from that "heart" and published
that selection in the magazine.382 Finally, The Nation's publishing
of the paraphrases was calculated to conceal the fact that The Na-
tion's reportage originated with Victor Navasky (editor of The Na-
tion and author of the Ford article at issue) rather than with Presi-
dent Ford.3"
The Court seems to have been concerned partly at an ethical
level-ruling in favor of The Nation would amount to "judicially
enforced 'sharing,"' suggesting that such an outcome would have
been improper in and of itself, regardless of the economic injury
alleged by the plaintiff-and partly at an economic level.' But the
ethical dimension suggests that Time's "market" injury alone might
not have been enough to tip the scales in its favor.' s
The "published vs. unpublished" framework played a key role,
then, in connecting these two arguments-but not purely in the
sense that the Court acknowledged it formally."7 Instead, that
framework appears to have been based on the Court's (1) implicit
acceptance of the relevance of established practices in the book-
publishing industry and (2) explicit rejection of the possibility that
The Nation's conduct was consistent with journalistic practice. To
avoid the obvious conclusion that The Nation was acting journalisti-
cally in reporting such "news" as was contained in the book, the
Court characterized the relevant "news" as the publication of the
book (since the "new information" reported by The Nation was in
381. See id. at 543-44.
382. See id. at 564-66.
383. See id. at 565.
384. See id. at 553.
385. See, e.g., Lunney, Reexamining, supra note 163, at 558-60 (describing Harper & Row
as a debate over application of copyright's incentive-access paradigm).
386. By definition, and given the Court's formulation of the issues, the ethical breach did
not consist of the market injury itself.
387. Courts following Harper & Row picked up on the Court's distinction between
unpublished and published works, and in some noteworthy cases courts found that fair use
was no bar to a finding of infringement where the defendant had reproduced unpublished
letters of the author (in these cases, typically the subject of a biography who was not flattered
by the defendant's literary efforts). See New Era Publ'ns Intl, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873
F.2d 576,583-84 (2d Cir. 1989); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90,95-100 (2d Cir.
1987). But see Sundeman v. Seajay Soc'y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1998)
(permitting substantial copying of unpublished manuscript of biography subject without
copyright owner's permission).
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fact already in the public record),' a shift that allowed the Court
to reframe the issue as a competition between the authorized pub-
lisher and the unauthorized magazine in deciding when and how
this "event" should take place. 9 The contents of the book may have
been subject to claims by competing journalists, but the book itself
was off limits, just as any new novel could not be published preemp-
tively by an unauthorized printer.
To the Court, President Ford was an "author" in a publishing
world sense. Given the conventions of that world, "authors" get
compensated by receiving royalties from a variety of sources, and
serialization rights are a typical and an important source of those
royalties." ° The Court treated the dispute, in other words, as it
would have treated a case involving publication and serialization
rights to a new book by a well-known novelist."' 1
The Nation argued that its reportage consisted almost entirely of
revelation of additional facts surrounding President Ford's pardon
388. See PATRY, supra note 97, at 136.
389. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561. On the merits, this recharacterization tests the
limits of the distinction between the copyright-protected work of authorship, that is, the
author's expression, and the tangible medium in which the work was embodied. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 202 (2000).
390. This aspect of the Court's ruling is made clear by the principal arguments of the three
dissenting Justices in an opinion by Justice Brennan. The dissent first disputed the
characterization of The Nation's conduct as an appropriation of protected literary expression.
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 583-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It then argued that the
majority had misapplied the fair use doctrine, on the grounds that (1) the relevant "purpose
of the use" was news reporting, see id. at 590-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting); (2) the proper
characterization of the work was "factual" or "historical" rather than "unpublished," see id.
at 594-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting); (3) the amount of copying of President Ford's literary
expression was quantitatively appropriate in light of its news reporting purpose, see id. at
598-601 (Brennan, J., dissenting); and (4) any market injury suffered by Harper & Row was
precisely the sort of market injury suffered by any provider of news that is beaten to the
marketplace by a competitor, see id. at 602-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In short, the dissent
looked at the case as a matter of accepted journalistic practice. For a recent case
distinguishing the majority's reasoning in Harper & Row on this ground, see Ndfiez v.
Caribbean Intl News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2000).
391. This summary of Harper & Row deliberately omits two important aspects of the
opinion, neither of which bears directly on the issues addressed in this Article. First, The
Nation argued, in part, that its actions were privileged under the First Amendment. The
Court held that the First Amendment offered no defense to copyright infringement that was
not otherwise available under fair use or copyright's distinction between unprotectable and
protectable material. See Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 556-60. Second, The Nation argued that
its use of material from President Ford's memoirs was privileged on the ground that President
Ford was a "public figure," and that news coverage of a public figure was entitled to special
treatment under copyright law. The Court rejected this argument. See id
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of President Nixon, and that the newsworthiness of these facts
should weigh heavily in a fair use analysis.3" The district court
rejected the argument, largely on the ground that the facts were
already in the public record.393 The Supreme Court noted that it was
not concluding that a fair use defense should stand or fall based on
the newsworthiness of the defendant's article."9 ' Though the Court
argued that it was not judging newsworthiness, it nonetheless im-
plied that The Nation had weighed the two, sometimes competing,
demands of journalism (get it right, but get it first) improperly.39
The claim of "journalism" was dismissed as an "alleged practice"3"
that was completely discounted by the fact that The Nation had
"knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript."3'
3. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.398 is sometimes thought to
have restored order to the Court's fair use thinking,39 because the
Court decided a fair use case unanimously, because the Court de-
cided the case in a way that clearly favored a claim of fair use, and
because the Court gave its stamp of approval to claims to legitimate
parody and "transformation." A closer look at the case, however,
suggests that it was decided along much the same narrative lines
that framed the Court's opinions in Harper & Row and Sony: a dec-
laration of the pattern of use into which the defendant fell, rather
than a principled analysis of the defendant's work and a comparison
with the plaintiffs work.
392. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1070-71
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
393. See id.
394. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561.
395. See id. at 564 ("While the copyright holders' contract with Time required Time to
submit its proposed article seven days before publication, The Nation's clandestine publication
afforded no such opportunity for creative or quality control.").
396. Id. at 562.
397. Id. at 563. See Weinreb, supra note 152, at 1308 (1999) ("As the Court perceived the
facts, the editor of The Nation was a chiseler, a category only a little removed from crook or,
in the nineteenth century idiom, pirate-not so much because of the use itself but because of
the manner in which he obtained the manuscript.").
398. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
399. Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1464-66
(1997).
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The Supreme Court's decision in favor of the "parody" rap version
of "Oh, Pretty Woman" typically is characterized as reversing the
Sony and Harper & Row presumption disfavoring "commercial" fair
use, installing a presumption favoring "transformative" fair use, and
otherwise mandating that all four factors be weighed together. The
first factor weighed in favor of fair use because the 2 Live Crew
version of"Oh, Pretty Woman" was credibly perceived as a parody,
a form of "transformative" use that offset the otherwise influential
commercial character of the song. The second factor weighed in
favor of the plaintiff because the original song was creative. The
third factor weighed slightly in favor of the defense. The parody
version borrowed more than a small amount, yet not the entirety of
the original--enough to conjure it up in the minds of listeners but
not so much as to displace it entirely. The Court left the fourth fac-
tor for reconsideration on remand, indicating that the plaintiff
would have one more chance to introduce evidence of market
injury."
A closer reading of Campbell suggests that its restatement and
application of the statutory factors is no more credible than the
Court's earlier application of the statute in Sony and Harper & Row.
The entirety of the analysis hinges on the Court's conclusion that 2
Live Crew's work was perceived reasonably as a parody. That
caused the first factor to flip in the defendant's favor and, as in
Sony, caused the second and third factors to become far less impor-
tant. The Court's treatment of the fourth factor, harm to the plain-
tiffs market, is inconsistent: if the defendant's song really was a
parody, as the Court concluded, then its critical character rendered
its market impact by definition nonsubstitutional. The Court then
should have remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the
judgment in the defendants' favor. Instead, it remanded the case
with instructions to consider possible substitutional harm..°1
400. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
401. The Court's rationale on this point was that the song was both "parodic" and "rap" in
character, so the latter might have had recognized market effects. In this respect, the Court
punted by trying to distinguish parody (possibly fair use) from satire (not fair use), see supra
notes 259-61 and accompanying text, and it punted backwards. 2 Live Crew's "parodic"
version of "Oh, Pretty Woman" is part of the social and critical context of rap music, which
includes a musical movement during the 1980s by black artists to reclaim rock 'n' roll and
R&B as dance music for black audiences following white audiences' rejection of disco. This
evolution is chronicled in Sean Ross's liner notes to STREET JAMS: ELECTRIC FUNK(PARTS 1-4)
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What the Court appears to have been up to, then, is the same
sort of characterization exercise that dominated both Sony and
Harper & Row. The Court characterized the defendant's output as
"parodic74' and possibly "transformative," ° but what the Court
really appears to have concluded was that the defendant was en-
gaged in an activity that fairly could be characterized as "creating
a parody":
For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions [of
parody], and the heart of any parodist's claim to quote from ex-
isting material, is the use of some elements of a prior author's
composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments
on that author's work.4°4
Satire, by contrast, "merely uses [the plaintiffs work] to get atten-
tion or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.' 5
Concluding, then, that a "parodic character" could "reasonably be
perceived" in the defendant's work, the Court was formally engaged
in the classic fair use exercise of comparing one work to another. In
substance, however, the Court was evaluating the process by which
2 Live Crew had come to that result:
In parody, as in news reporting, ... context is everything, and the
question of fairness asks what else the parodist did besides go to
the heart of the original. It is significant that 2 Live Crew not
only copied the first line of the original, but thereafter departed
(Rhino Records 1994). (My thanks to Henry Huffnagle for this suggestion and reference.) See
also SrvA VAiDHYANATHAn4, COPYRIGHTS AND CopYwRoNGs: THE RIsE OF INTELLEcTUAL
PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CRATIVIPY 132-40 (2001) (discussing the criticism of rap
music as being a comment on white musical appropriation of black artists). In this sense, 2
Live Crew was participating in an established pattern of recasting white rock and pop music
for black dance audiences. In the context of the Court's framework in Campbell, 2 Live Crew
belongs in the satire" camp (using the Orbison song to make a broader social comment), a fact
that weakens their claim to fair use. But the recasting phenomenon arguably makes critics
of 2 Live Crew. If 2 Live Crew were to make a critical version of "Oh, Pretty Woman," the
result would sound (both literally and metaphorically) in rap. Their "parody" of Oh, Pretty
Woman likewise sounds in rap. The question then ought to have been whether 2 Live Crew
were in fact reasonably understood to be acting critically, not whether their record was
predominantly "parodic" or 'rap." I generalize this point infra at Part III.C.4.c.
402. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.
403. Id. at 589.
404. Id at 580.
405. Id.
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markedly from the Orbison lyrics for its own ends. 2 Live Crew
not only copied the bass riff and repeated it, but also produced
otherwise distinctive sounds, interposing "scraper" noise, over-
laying the music with solos in different keys, and altering the
drum beat.'
Note how the Court characterized the issue in terms of what 2 Live
Crew did, rather than in terms of 2 Live Crew's work. In effect, 2
Live Crew was engaged in the practice of parody. So long as they did
so, the character of the work parodied was irrelevant (second factor),
the amount borrowed was legitimate (third factor) since a true par-
ody would take only so much as to make its object recognizable, and
no more, and the market effect (fourth factor), if any, was irrelevant.
4. Fair Use and Patterns in the Circuits
That fair use jurisprudence can be reorganized around social and
cultural patterns is evident not merely by recasting the Supreme
Court's three opinions and Justice Story's seminal opinion in
Folsom. The leading appellate opinions reviewed above likewise are
susceptible to being reshaped along the same lines.
a. The Photocopying Cases
In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,"7 decided before codi-
fication of fair use, the majority concluded that the defendant's pho-
tocopying practices amounted to fair use on the premise that the
photocopying in question amounted to the functional equivalent of
the standard scholarly or research practice of note taking.' The
defendant, the court concluded, was engaged in a research enter-
prise (in this, it no doubt helped their case that their research was
undertaken within, and was not merely sponsored by, a federal
agency) and a successful copyright claim likely would damage the
character of that enterprise."°*
406. Id at 589 (footnotes omitted).
407. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973).
408. See id. at 1350.
409. Id. at 1362.
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In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. 0 and Princeton
University Press v. Michigan Document Services," the Second and
Sixth Circuits each reached the opposite conclusion. The individual
beneficiaries of unauthorized photocopying inAmerican Geophysical
Union were characterized nominally by the court as "researchers,"
but the photocopying was regarded as a "factor of production" for the
corporate defendant."' The corporate defendant was not considered
to be a "research" or scholarly enterprise, and the individual re-
searchers, whose use of the copyrighted material was questioned,
were not using this material as researchers or scholars, in some
"classic" sense, would use it. 413 Requiring an author's or publisher's
permission for reproduction would cause little or no damage to the
corporate hierarchy.414
Princeton University Press can be understood on the same terms.
The photocopying defendants were neither university faculty nor
their students, either of whom would have had a credible claim to
stand on the same footing as the researchers in Williams & Wilkins.
The defendant was a photocopying services company, which had no
"standing" (pragmatically speaking) to assert researcher or scholar
interests by proxy or agency. In effect, the court examined the aca-
demic/scholarly/research enterprise and determined that photocopy-
ing services stood outside that enterprise. The photocopying was not
itself part of a recognized pattern of research, teaching, or scholar-
410. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
411. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
412. Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 921-22.
413. The dissent in American Geophysical Union captured and responded to precisely this
argument, noting that the anthropologist Bruno Latour, studying scientific research practices,
had observed individual scientists collecting and managing research data in precisely the way
that the individual scientists had done for their employer, Texaco. See id. at 934-35 (Jacobs,
J., dissenting). The dissent, however, used Latour's research to argue that the act of
photocopying was integral to the scientific method, see id. (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (citing
BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC
FACTS 49 (1986)), when it may be the case that Latour was more concerned with the
documents themselves, and how they are used by individuals to construct social networks,
than with the manner in which they were created. See id. at 52-53; cf. John Seely Brown &
Paul Duguid, The Social Life of Documents, 1 FIRST MONDAY, No. 1 (May 6, 1996) (expanding
on the notion of documents as social instruments), at http'/www.firstmonday.dk/issues/
issuelindex.html.
414. But see Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J. 369, 406-23 (2002) (describing peer-to-peer computer networks as mechanisms for
coordinating production that do not depend on traditional hierarchical firm).
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ship by the individual or entity doing the copying.415 The court's
conclusion may be challenged as inhibiting some notion of scholarly
or research "Progress," since the parts of a university are interde-
pendent. No scholar or student succeeds without the assistance of
an extensive (and growing) administrative infrastructure, and the
scope and scale of the academic community evolves over time. None-
theless, the court quite clearly rejected such an expansive view of
the research and teaching process, and its fair use determination
seems clearly motivated by that rejection, rather than by the judg-
ment that markets for permission and licensing of photocopies were
well-developed by the time these cases were decided.41
b. The News Reporting Cases
Earlier, I noted that the three cases involving reuse of broadcast
footage of the 1992 Los Angeles riots could be distinguished from
one another based on the Ninth Circuit's reworking of the commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction and its handling of the market im-
pact of the unauthorized reuse.417 I also suggested that these dis-
tinctions have an unreal aspect, in that they largely ignore the jour-
nalistic context of both the original collection of the tape by the
plaintiff and the claims to journalistic reuse that were offered by the
first two defendants (held liable for infringement)41 but not by the
third (which prevailed).419
A more persuasive synthesis of the cases merges market/ commer-
cial perspectives with the journalism context. Restated, then, the
defendants' claims of fair use failed in Los Angeles News Service v.
KCAL-TV Channel 9 and in Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters
International because the news organizations accused of infringe-
ment, while journalistic in overall demeanor, were not acting as
journalists when they obtained and used the plaintiffs copyrighted
work. Journalists investigate and research, they interview subjects
and sources, and they assemble something we call, broadly, "news."
415. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1389.
416. See supra Part II.C.5.a.
417. See supra Part II.C.5.c.
418. See L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Int'l, 149 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 1998); L.A. News
Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 1997).
419. See L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 938-40 (9th Cir. 2002).
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This argument echoes that of the Harper & Row majority:4 20 Jour-
nalists do not simply borrow or copy the work of others. The defen-
dants in the first two cases, KCAL and Reuters, are organizations
or institutions of journalists, but in these cases they were not prac-
ticing journalism.
What then of CBS Broadcasting, which copied a much smaller
piece of this same videotape (a total of approximately thirty seconds)
and used it in promotions for CourtTV?42 One could argue that CBS
is, at least in part, a journalistic enterprise and the CourtTV cover-
age of the trial of some of those accused in the beating was a recog-
nized form of "news." Using a small clip from the videotape as part
of promoting that coverage, when the tape itself was certain to be
introduced and played as evidence in the trial, could be character-
ized justly as practicing journalism, even while it also served a pro-
motional purpose. It might be regarded as little different than a
newspaper's use of a large photograph both to illustrate a front-page
story and to attract prospective newsstand purchasers.
The argument cannot prove too much. At best, CourtTVlies at the
fringes of traditional "journalism." Perhaps CourtTV could be re-
garded as an extension of the trial itself, and the use of the video-
tape regarded as a mass extension of the privileged use of copy-
righted works as evidence in a court proceeding. Or perhaps, if no
relevant and persuasive pattern could be found to support the use,
then the Ninth Circuit erred, at least on the fair use question. Cer-
tainly, its conclusion regarding the lack of market effect of the unau-
thorized use of the videotape is not persuasive. CourtTV's use of the
segment was deliberate, and there was ample time to secure a li-
cense. As an entertainment entity, CourtlV was well-positioned to
work with the extensive system of rights clearances that character-
ize most broadcast television. Its failure to observe industry customs
regarding clearances might have indicated that infringement was
the better finding. 22 That infringement was not found might indi-
cate not that the use was "fair," but that the use was so trivial that
it did not constitute a prima facie case of infringement in the first
420. It also echoes the theme that the law will step in, occasionally, to manage the norms
and practices of journalists. See supra note 364.
421. See CBS Broad., 305 F.3d at 940.
422. Cf Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (dismissing possibility that motion
picture based on copyrighted short story might constitute fair use).
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place. Los Angeles News Service may simply have overreached in its
argument that each second of its videotape was, in effect, a sepa-
rately copyrighted work.
c. The Parody/Satire Cases
The contrasting results in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin
Books USA, Inc.423 and SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.424
sometimes are used to illustrate both conceptual and functional
inconsistencies in parody and satire cases. The line between the
two, if one really exists, is sufficiently porous that one could, and
likely should, argue that any credible claim of parody, including
satire, ought to be accepted as a form of social criticism.4" Perhaps,
then, the Ninth Circuit should have accepted the parody defense
offered by the authors of The Cat Not in the Hat."' Reading the two
opinions, one might wonder not why the Ninth Circuit failed to give
the authors of The Cat Not in the Hat sufficient copyright leeway to
make their point, but instead why the Eleventh Circuit was so gen-
erous to the author of The Wind Done Gone. In both cases the defen-
dants argued that their work was consistent with literary theorists'
constructions of parody, that is, work that comments (wholly or
partly) on the work that now complains of alleged infringement. It
is at least equally plausible that Dr. Seuss and Margaret Mitchell
were unwilling accomplices in broader missions of social criticism.427
The claim of Seussian parody was thus properly rejected and the
claim of Mitchellian parody improperly accepted.
The difference between the two cases may not lie in the character
of the defendants' respective end-products. The problem lies in the
lack of self-awareness on the part of the Seuss defendants and the
comparative standing of the author of The Wind Done Gone. The
court dismissed the Seuss defendants' claim of parody, accusing the
defendants of making up their literary theory after the fact in order
423. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
424. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2000).
425. See Ochoa, supra note 166, at 559-64.
426. See supra notes 262-68 and accompanying text.
427. The attack on Gone With the Wind was equally an attack on the cultural tradition that
the book represents. But the author of The Wind Done Gone submitted expert testimony
supporting her claim of parody. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d
1357, 1737 & nn. 8-9 (N.D. Ga.), rev'd, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
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to suit the needs of their legal argument.4" Alice Randall, the au-
thor of The Wind Done Gone, by contrast, presented colorable evi-
dence that she understood and accepted the critic's role while she
was writing the book.42s In the infringement suit, she argued that
she was practicing parody, or at least literary criticism, under the
broad definition of parody adopted by the Eleventh Circuit. Whether
she understood she was practicing parody at the time she was writ-
ing, she did understand that she was practicing criticism, and her
product was consistent with that understanding.
d. The Time-Shifting and Space-Shifting Cases
Given this focus on pattern and practice, rather than merely on
the works themselves, it is hardly surprising that the Ninth Circuit
should distinguish A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 40 from Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc."' If Sony was a
company engaged in the merchant's practice of selling products to
anonymous consumers and then effectively walking away from
them, then Napster was doing something more. Even after distribu-
tion of Napster's technology, millions of anonymous "users" jointly
engaged, with the defendant, in massive anonymous transmission
of "copies" of the plaintiffs' works to one another. Napster did not
distribute technology to "users" who then used the software inde-
pendently. Rather, Napster remained deeply embedded in the
"users' activities. From the standpoint of conventional patterns and
practices, Napster was distributing the plaintiffs' works as much as
the individual end-users were distributing them.
This explanation accounts for the odd combination in the Napster
opinion of unequivocal condemnation of the behavior of both
MusicShare users and of Napster (the actual defendant), as well as
the uncertain analysis of precisely what each, separately, had done
wrong. Doctrinally, Napster was accused only of contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement. The individual end-users were
accused in absentia of direct infringement. But the court blended its
rhetorical and argumentative energy, leading to a failure to distin-
428. See Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1402-03.
429. See SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269-71.
430. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
431. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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guish among Napster, the company, Napster, as the court some-
times referred to the music sharing software and system, each indi-
vidual user, and the collective of all users (including the company).
The conventional understanding of "file sharing" and of the product
name "MusicShare" is that individual music listeners are "sharing"
the music with one another. But it is clear that the court instead
addressed the proposition that in effect, Napster, the firm, was en-
gaged in improper "sharing," along with Napster users taken as a
whole." 2 In the court's words, the fourth fair use factor favored the
plaintiffs, and a finding of infringement, because
the record supports the district court's finding that the "record
company plaintiffs have already expended considerable funds
and effort to commence Internet sales and licensing for digital
downloads." Having digital downloads available for free on the
Napster system necessarily harms the copyright holders' at-
tempts to charge for the same downloads. 8
The court thus framed the issue as the effect of all MusicShare us-
ers taken together and their equivalence with the Napster system. 4
It did not deal with the appropriate way to aggregate individual
Napster users and the manner in which Napster, the company,
interacted with those users.
Further, "the district court made sound findings related to
Napster's deleterious effect on the present and future digital down-
load market.' From a doctrinal perspective, the court's argument
amounts to a form of double counting in fair use. The fair use de-
fense formally applies to users themselves. Whether they are "fairly
using" the plaintiffs' copyrighted works informs the court as to
whether Napster is liable under theories of vicarious or contributory
liability. Yet by examining the market effect of Napster itself, the
court proceeded as if Napster had asserted a fair use defense to its
own potential liability for secondary infringement.'
432. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019-24 (discussing Napster's liability for contributory
copyright infringement).
433. Id. at 1017 (quoting A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 915
(N.D. Cal. 2000)) (citation omitted).
434. Id. at 1016.
435. Id. at 1017.
436. The appellate court's citations also support this interpretation. To support its "no fair
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The way to make sense of this somewhat confused argument is
not to debate whether individual users were exercising rights to
"personal" or "private" use of "their" music, and to accuse or to de-
fend Napster as a contributory infringer based on the vagaries of
whether its system design gave the company "knowledge" of user
behavior.4 7 The better route is to situate both Napster and individ-
ual users within the context of relevant patterns and practices.
Individual users, as music consumers, had access to established and
traditional patterns of sharing recorded music and other forms of
recorded entertainment. Listening to a compact disc in one's own
home, apartment, dormitory room, or in the company of a few
friends, is acceptable "sharing" among individuals, even if only one
person among the group actually has bought and paid for the record-
ing.' If the audience is expanded too broadly, even if all members
use" argument, the court relied on L.A Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453 (C.D. Cal.
2000) and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), both
of which held defendants (operator of a website that hosted unauthorized "copies" of
newspaper articles, in LA Times, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1469-71; the proprietor of a website that
hosted unauthorized "copies" of music files for download via the Internet, in UMG Recordings,
92 F. Supp. 2d at 350, 352) directly liable for copyright infringement. See Napster, 239 F.3d
at 1017. In both cases, the defendants raised (and the courts rejected) fair use arguments
directed to their own conduct-rather than that of users who accessed and downloaded
material from their respective sites. See L.A Times, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1459-72; UMG
Recordings, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350-53. In a similar vein is the Napster court's argument,
again under the first fair use factor, that Napster use is likely not to be "fair" if it is
"commercial." It is "commercial" because, in the aggregate, Napster users get free songs that
otherwise would be purchased. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015. The court equated "economic
advantages" for Napster users with "commercial use" of the plaintiff's works in a bit of
doctrinal sleight of hand that attributed Napster's commercial activity to individual Napster
users. Id. The court supported its conclusions with a citation to Sega Enterprises Ltd. v.
MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994), which held the operator of a computer
bulletin board liable for direct and contributory copyright infringement where copies of the
plaintiffs computer games were made available to bulletin board users to download for free.
Napster, 293 F.3d at 1015. In Sega, however, the court explicitly found the defendant liable
for direct copyright infringement (by contrast, Napster was accused only of contributory and
vicarious infringement), and its conclusion regarding "commercial use" of computer users in
response to the defendant's fair use argument clearly was influenced by its sense that the
defendant itself (the bulletin board operator) was reaping clear "economic advantage." Sega
Enters. Ltd., 857 F. Supp. at 683-84 (describing defendant's profits from operating the bulletin
board).
437. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035-
39 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding file sharing service not liable for users' copyright infringement
and distinguishing Napster on the ground of different technical design).
438. It is probably legally acceptable even if none of the audience members has purchased
a copy of the recording. One might locate additional support here in a sort of communal
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of that audience are physically present, at some point the work has
been shared too broadly. It is no longer an accepted pattern of
sharing-it becomes a concert. With respect to "copies" of the works
rather than the music itself, a given user becomes not only a con-
sumer of each recording, but also a distributor of multiple copies.
Redistribution of a single copy conforms to a pattern recognized
socially and legally under the "first sale" doctrine. 39 The Napster
system permitted music consumers to step outside a pattern regard-
ing material that could be shared among themselves.' 0
IV. A PATTERN-ORIENTED RECONSTRUCTION OF FAIR USE
Having described how the doctrine of fair use might be under-
stood more profitably as addressing the intersection of copyright law
and social and cultural patterns, in this Part I attempt to formalize
the approach. In the first section that follows, I review what social
and cultural patterns are and describe how an emphasis on those
phenomena can be reconciled with the language of the current fair
use statute. The second section below compares the generalized
patterns model developed in the first section and applies it more
broadly to fair use case law since enactment of the current copyright
statute. My goal is to test whether the model developed from the
leading cases adequately describes a broader class of cases. In the
third section, I describe how implementing a focus on patterns
would encourage a positive change in both the dynamics of copyright
implied license. See, e.g., Am. Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146, 147 (S.D.N.Y.
1941):
It is true that the form that [the defendant] copied was the largest, and ... the
most important, of the forms in the plaintiffs album, but fair use is not
determined by quantity alone. When the plaintiff put on the general market a
book of forms, he implied the right to their private use. This conclusion follows
from the nature of a book of forms. No one reads them as literature; their sole
value is in their usability.
Id. But my argument does not rest on the copyright owner's consent or on formal privileges
extended by Sony or (for audio recording in an analog environment) the Audio Home
Recording Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
439. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
440. The court appeared to link unauthorized sharing among Napster users to an argument
that users themselves reap "economic advantages" from Napster use, in the sense that users
get something for free that ordinarily they would pay for. Idc at 912. But this interpretation
is misleading, for not only did the court not argue that music consumers cannot listen to
music without paying for it, but such an argument would defy common knowledge.
[Vol. 45:15251622
litigation and the dynamics of copyright counseling, particularly
from the standpoint of an institution or even an individual faced
with the prospect of complying with a license demand or asserting
a claim of fair use."' This third section also uses the pattern-ori-
ented approach to address some of the most vexing conceptual prob-
lems embedded in contemporary fair use discourse.
A. Patterns and the Sources and Uses of Creativity
1. The Pattern-Oriented Approach
Part III attempted to redescribe the leading cases interpreting the
fair use doctrine, in both historical and contemporary terms, as
decisions about whether the defendants' uses of copyrighted mate-
rial fell appropriately within or beyond recognized social or cultural
patterns. In some cases, courts' rulings reflect these patterns with-
out recognizing this standard as the basis for decision. The pattern-
based argument, however, is implicit and at times even explicit in
the opinions themselves. In other cases, courts are so bound to the
four-factor standard supplied by the current statute that the
pattern-oriented approach can be applied only retrospectively, sup-
plying what may be a more persuasive justification for a result that
is nominally but unhelpfully grounded in the statutory text."2
Courts should recognize explicitly, then, what some have been
undertaking implicitly. Decisions regarding whether any given un-
authorized "use" of a copyrighted work is "fair" under § 107 should
be judged by whether that "use" is undertaken in the context of a
recognized social or cultural pattern, and the four statutory fair use
factors should be interpreted and applied as part of an overall
pattern-oriented framework.
The proposal goes beyond arguing merely that fair use ought to
have a formally coherent dimension; it argues that social and cul-
tural patterns represent the sorts of things that courts affirmatively
ought to look for in assessing the merits of a fair use argument. We
know that all too often, fair use serves as little more than a stopping
441. See generally Kenneth D. Crews, Copyright at a Turning Point: Corporate Responses
to the Changing Environment, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 277 (1996) (describing results of
interviews with institutional users of copyrights).
442. See supra Part II.
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point in infringement analysis. Even when it is argued that fair use
serves a balancing function in copyright law, where the interests of
"Progress" are better served by allowing the unauthorized use of
copyrighted material than by forbidding it, lest the law stifle the
very creativity that copyright is designed to promote," neither law
nor policy supplies an account of what the affirmative case for fair
use represents. At present, the law of fair use (as I summarized in
Part II) cannot explain how it actually promotes either "creativity"
or "Progress." It is said that fair use exists to supply creativity
that the market economy fails to induce.44' It is also said that fair
use consists of balancing (in economic terms, or in broader social
welfare terms) the interests of the individual copyright holder
against the interests of "society" or "the public."" 5 The individual
defendant stands in for "the public," but the individual's claim to
"creativity" or "Progress" in his or her output standing alone is a
flimsy basis for distinguishing fair and unfair uses. We have no
stable notion describing what "creativity" consists of at a social
level, or how "creativity" arises either individually or socially."
Consequently we have no coherent understanding of why the "bal-
ance" theory should work. Rather than despairing of ever defining
"creativity" or "Progress" or even "social value" adequately with
reference to the quality of the output itself-a task that federal
courts have themselves long disclaimed- I suggest defining it with
reference to process or, as I refer to them, patterns. A use is "fair"
under § 107 if it falls within the boundaries of a recognized social or
cultural pattern.
What, then, are these patterns? The phrase is almost inevitably
opaque, given its dependence on the richness of social organization
and behavior. Generally speaking, patterns are structures-social
structures and cultural structures-that involve relatively stable
sets of beliefs and practices grouped around individuals, institu-
tions, and (often) goals. A "pattern" in this sense can be recognized
using tools of sociology, psychology, and anthropology, including
443. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
444. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing market failure account of fair use).
445. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing broader social welfare approaches to fair use).
446. To the extent that "creativity" is deemed to be a proxy for broader social values, such
as autonomy, privacy, or an informed citizenry, see supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text,
the vagueness of those concepts renders fair use even more indeterminate, rather than more
affirmative.
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linguistics. (I hasten to add that only rarely should lawyers or
judges be required or expected to go through the trouble of employ-
ing social scientists as experts, though there is no reason based on
the doctrine that they should not be permitted to do so.)
Sociologically, the pattern should be recognized by the identifica-
tion of individual and institutional roles, by the goals that both seek
to achieve, and by some rule-based specification of relationships
(practices) among pattern participants and among those partici-
pants and goals to be achieved. Linguistically, a pattern may have
a vocabulary and syntax that defines participants in the pattern and
how they are expected to behave.
As a practical matter, and for fair use purposes, not any pattern
will do; the decided cases suggest that the pattern should have a
pedigree of tradition and history such that the practices embedded
in the pattern are characteristically recognized as "creative" or at
least as tending to promote some form of "progress" that does not
depend on the market economy. These sorts of patterns are likely to
have a presumptive legitimacy simply by reason of legal and cul-
tural precedent. Moreover, in most cases, the central distinguishing
feature of such a pattern will be a norm, convention, or practice that
involves some form of reciprocal or donative interest or obligation." 7
447. On the appeal of reciprocity as an independent criterion, see MICHAEL POLANYI, THE
STUDY OF MAN 68 (1959) (observing "growth of knowledge dependent on complex sets of social
relations based on largely institutionalized reciprocity of trust among scholars and
scientists"); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MICROBEHAVIOR 127-28 (1978)
(arguing that social institutions based on reciprocation can bridge gaps between individual
and collective interests); Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The
Case of Scientific Research, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POLY, No. 2, at 145, 163-65 (1996) (noting
productive potential of informal groups, with boundaries policed by reciprocity); Dan M.
Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 335-40 (2001). In another
article, Kahan argues:
When [individuals] perceive that other individuals are voluntarily contributing
to public goods, most individuals are moved by honor, generosity, and like
dispositions to do the same. When, in contrast, they perceive that others are
shirking or otherwise taking advantage of them, individuals are moved by
resentment and pride to withhold their own contributions and even to retaliate
if possible.
Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and Social
Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 367, 368-69 (2002). See generally Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm
of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 Am. Soc. REv. 161, 174 (1960) ("Mhe norm of
reciprocity is a concrete and special mechanism involved in the maintenance of any stable
social system.").
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But formally, reciprocity need not be an explicit norm, and nei-
ther it nor "creativity" is an absolute requirement of a given pattern
or of the model as a whole. The key evidentiary concern should be
the presence or absence of a pattern as such, not whether the pat-
tern is qualified as "reciprocal" or "creative" or "productive." The
balance of this Part is devoted to explaining how such patterns
might be identified, and to showing how courts have used them in
their decisions. Omission of "reciprocity" and "productivity" as for-
mal criteria is explained further via the argument offered in Part V.
(The brief justification is that the existence of the pattern itself
supplies boundaries that limit interference with legitimate market-
oriented expectations of copyright producers, and the internal dy-
namics of patterns are themselves likely to generate creative re-
turns.)" 8 Use that is consonant with patterns of this sort should be
distinguished from transactions defined by market-based exchange,
that is, transactions defined by price, and by buyers and sellers."9
This use of "patterns" also should be distinguished from a linguistic
use that focuses not on a collection of practices and beliefs, but on
some essential definition of the valid "thing." A use may be "fair" if
it comes within the boundaries of the pattern; it need not match a
social or cultural "ideal.' s Established patterns of language use are
448. Could a group of computer "hackers" assert membership in a relevant pattern? Likely
not, if the argument is made only in an incredible effort to avoid copyright prosecution. See
United States v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003). But perhaps they can, if the evidence
of a genuine and independent social structure is sufficiently strong. See STEVEN LEVY,
HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION (1984) (discussing ethics of early computer
users). Extra-copyright norms could be invoked at the extremes to bar claims of fair use by
criminal conspiracies of other sorts.
449. To the extent that both "fair use" patterns and patterns of market exchange are
"economies" of a sort, the distinction drawn here echoes the the distinction that Karl Polanyi
drew between an older economy "embedded in social relations" and a newer economy of social
relations "embedded in the economic system." KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION:
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 57 (1944). "Fair use" consists of use
consistent with the older sort of economy. For more on how the model deals with market
concerns, see infra notes 617-25 and accompanying text.
450. For summaries by legal scholars of the case against essentialism in language, see, for
example, James Boyle, Thomas Hobbes and the Invented Tradition of Positivism: Reflections
on Language, Power, and Essentialism, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 383, 408-19 (1987); Steven L.
Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 652-53 (1990). A given
pattern necessarily embraces a range of practices rather than a single paradigm:
The organization of the linguistic category hand can be understood as a radial
category. It has a central case and certain conventionalized extensions. Each
extension is related to the central case by means of an experientially-grounded
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likely to reflect substantive patterns of social organization,45 ' so
linguistic evidence will often be relevant. "Pattern" as used here is
part of a family of related concepts, including practices, customs,
norms, and conventions,452 and evidence of each should also be rele-
vant to fair use analysis under the framework that I propose.5 3
In both social and linguistic respects, the pattern-oriented ap-
proach echoes the notion of "fields" of practice proposed by the
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Though in a very different and
specific context, Bourdieu offered the idea of the habitus to define
the formal and informal processes-the knowledge base, the inter-
nalized codes of thought and action, and manners of thought, or in
sum, the feel for how things are done, or the activities and concepts
that both unify and produce practices and representations-that
constrain action within a given domain. 5' (Bourdieu himself re-
metaphor or metonymy, although the various extensions may have little in
common with each other besides their connection to the central case. The radial
structure of the category is itself conceptualized metaphorically using the center-
periphery schema. The use of this schema to organize and categorize our
experiences has a powerful experiential grounding in our necessarily egocentric
perception of the world around us.
Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes
for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1150 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, Transcendental Nonsense].
Our linguistic frameworks and our social frameworks mirror one another. Cf. GEORGE LAKOFF
& MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 36 (1980) (characterizing metaphor as "a way of
conceiving one thing in terms of another," and metonymy as a way of "usting] one entity to
stand for another"); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD
GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR 100-06 (1989) (distinguishing literary use of metaphor from
metonymy, but classifying both as forms of conceptual schemas).
451. Implicit here and explicit below is the expectation that patterns count only to the
extent that they define (or are defined by) practices at some level of social organization.
Cultural patterns fall within this measure in the sense that they depend on and are generated
by distributed social groups that share norms or conventions. Individual consumption and use
is only "fair," ordinarily, to the extent that it feeds some broader, defined pattern that
encompasses others.
452. See H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 15 (2d ed. 1994).
453. See Solove, supra note 18, for a related arguments regarding "families" of cultural and
social phenomena that underlie legal concepts.
454. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRrTIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT
OF TASTE (1987); PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., 1990)
[hereinafter BOuRDIEu, LOGIC OF PRACTICE]. Bourdieu's larger project is to expose how social
classifications of things, and particularly art and culture, are related to social classifications
of individuals and groups, and then to suggest the transformation of the modern economy
based on these classifications. The concept of "field" and of habitus feeds that classification
system; patterns of cultural production are essentially fixed based on an alleged "objective"
socioeconomic structure. The idea of "mental habits" influencing social and cultural patterns
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ferred to the habitus concept primarily in the context of membership
in social class, but the concept need not be so limited.) 5 A given
"field," then, is the domain in which an individual, via his habitus,
constructs and reconstructs his social position. The field consists of
the social arena, the construct or network of "objective" social rela-
tionship structures that operate more or less autonomously within
society as a whole, with its own set of codes and rules. Fields may
be narrow (high fashion, commercial real estate), or broad (econom-
ics, literature, politics). In Bourdieu's broad sociology these fields
are subject to redefinition by the process of social contests (in which
habitus plays a key role) for the social capital that is the object of
any given field.'56 Field constructs habitus, and habitus constructs
field.
I do not suggest that the pattern-oriented approach to fair use is
or should be wedded to Bourdieu or specifically to the concept of the
field. Equally helpful analytic resources here are the broad concepts
of the institution, which encompasses individuals, groups, relation-
ships, and cognitive schemes and frames for constructing them;57
the community of practice, groups of individuals united informally
by shared normative expectations, habits, customs, and group iden-
tity;' and "practice" itself, defined as a shared but informal set of
can be traced to Erwin Panofsky's thesis that elements of Gothic design derive from
comparable elements in Scholastic philosophy. See ERWIN PANOFSKY, GOTHIC ARCHITECTURE
AND SCHOLASTICISM 21 (1951) (defining mental habit as "a 'principle that regulates the act')
(citation omitted).
455. I do not mean to import the full depth and durability of the habitus concept, nor of
Bourdieu's sociological theory as a whole. As my inclusion of other work on social and cultural
patterns suggests, my analysis is intended to be more evolutionary than merely reproductive.
456. See BOURDIEU, LOGIC OF PRACTICE, supra note 454, at 108-10.
457. See Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 263, 263 (1997)
(reviewing "cognitive presuppositions behind theories of what culture does and what people
do with it"); Roger Friedland & Robert Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices,
and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONALANALYSIS
232-63 (Walter W. Powell & Paul DiMaggio eds., 1991); Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions,
Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism, in THE NEW INSITrvTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS, supra, at 143-63. Lynne G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural
Persistence, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra, at 83-107.
458. See JEAN LAVE & ETIENNE WENGER, SITUATED LEARNING: LEGITIMATE PERIPHERAL
PARTICIPATION 98 (Roy Pea & John S. Brown eds., 1991) (defining "community of practice [a]s
a set of relations among persons, activity, and world, over time and in relation with other
tangential and overlapping communities of practice .... [I]t provides the interpretive support
necessary for making sense of its heritage"). See also Thomas C. Grey, What Good Is Legal
Pragmatism2 , in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 9, 12 (1991) ("[Tlhought always comes
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practical understandings, with a normative component, embedded
in social structures." 9 The underlying point is that the existence
and content of a given pattern cannot be determined entirely or
even primarily within the analytic framework supplied by the fair
use doctrine itself. Though we necessarily begin with the law, inevi-
tably the law must look outside itself.
Accordingly, use of a copyrighted work in a way that is consistent
with such a pattern, that is, in process terms, a use that is substan-
tiated by the role played by the work and by individuals and institu-
tions in that pattern, ordinarily ought to be considered "fair." The
list of favored purposes in the preamble of § 107 is, among other
things, a nonexclusive list of such patterns: "criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching ... scholarship, or research.'5 ° Inevitably,
there will be contests over the "correct" pattern to use as a measure
of a given defendant's use and contests over whether a given use
properly resides within or without that pattern. I cannot suppose
that this approach is outcome-determinative in every case. I do
suggest, however, that it is a more sensible and ultimately more
coherent approach from which the fair use question should be inter-
rogated.'
For example, where currently courts (and litigants) investigate
claims of fair use by querying whether the work produced by a given
defendant is "commercial" or "noncommercial," "transformative" or
embodied in practices-culturally embedded habits and patterns of expectations, behavior, and
response."); David McGowan, From Social Function to Social Meaning: What Expressive Uses
of Code Tell Us About Free Speech, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1515, 1524-33 (2003) (arguing that First
Amendment jurisprudence requires sensitivity to social practices).
459. See DAVID STERN, THE PRACTICAL TuRN, BLACKWELL GUIDEBOOK TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (Stephen P. Turner & Paul A. Roth eds., 2003) (characterizing practice
theory as paying close attention to particular practices and the context in which they are
located); Theodore R. Schatzki, Introduction. Practice Theory, in THE PRACTICE TURN IN
CONTEMPORARY THEORY 2-4 (Theodore R. Schatzki et al. eds., 2001).
460. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
461. It is part, therefore, of a broader theoretical approach that situates the foundations
of stable law in large part in social conventions rather than solely in legal institutions. See,
e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER:
SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 211-46 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981); see also Gerlad
J. Postema, Conventions in Law, in 1 THE NEWPALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 466-67 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describing social conventions as regularized
manifestations of social patterns defined by mutual expectations and interest in solving
coordination problems and serving as part of the foundation of law). See generally Lon L.
Fuller, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964) (collecting accounts of the role of social conventions in
law).
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"imitative," and/or complementary or substitutional with respect
to "the market" for the work, under a pattern-oriented approach
courts should determine whether the process used by the defendant,
framed by language, by social role, and by the place of the subject
material in that process, fits some recognized pattern. Both the
existence of the pattern and the defendant's place within it must be
proved, and that proof ordinarily should consist of mostly objective
considerations of language and social or cultural structure. The de-
fendant's subjective beliefs may be relevant, but not determinative.
Among sociologists and anthropologists, the fact that such social
and cultural patterns exist appears to be uncontroversial, although
their role with society and culture more generally is debated. The
sociologist Robert Merton noted "a tendency for, not a full deter-
mination of, socially patterned differences in the perspectives,
preferences, and behavior of people variously located in the social
structure."' 2 Merton himself famously characterized "science" as
one such pattern.' Anthropologists proceed from a related premise,
that patterns exist (embodying both meaning and rules for behav-
ior),' and a subdiscipline within anthropology-ethnography -has
grown up around methods of investigating them.'
It is one thing to declare that patterns exist; it is another to iden-
tify them with sufficient precision to make them usable in a model
of legal analysis.' At a practical level, lawyers and judges have to
462. Robert K Merton, Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge,
77 AM. J. Soc. 9, 27 (1972).
463. Robert K Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science II: Cumulative Advantage and the
Symbolism of Intellectual Property, 79 Isis 606,622-23 (1988) (describing "science" as defined
by a set of "socially patterned incentives," distinct from incentives supplied by formal
intellectual property law.).
464. See JERomE BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, PossmLEWORLDS 123 (1986); CLIFFORD GFJrZ,
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELEcTED ESSAYS 12 (1973); DAViD M. FEFrERMAN,
ETHNOGRAPHY: STEP BY STEP 27 (2d ed. 1998). See also Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 42 (2001) (describing culture as "any set of shared, signifying
practices); Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV.
1121, 1152-53 (1983) (describing culture as patterns of and for behavior within a group,
together with attached values).
465. See, e.g., David S. Caudill, Ethnography and the Idealized Accounts of Science in Law,
39 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 269 (2002) (suggesting ethnomethodological approach to characterizing
"scientific" evidence in legal proceedings).
466. Cf Sidney Verba, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword, 91 AM. POL. ScI.
REV. 192, 193 (1997) ("The evidence for a cultural pattern is often hard to come by, and it is
even more difficult to deploy such evidence in a causal argument....-).
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work with evidence, not theory. The model needs to account for
practical difficulties in distinguishing between genuine and incredi-
ble claims that "patterned" use is at work, difficulties that include
conflicts in the evidence; differences in characterization based on
levels of abstraction and perspective; and burdens of proof. While I
cannot specify a response to every contingency, the following sec-
tions offer some possible solutions.
a. Language
One important source of evidence of a pattern should be the
ways in which we talk. A relevant social or cultural pattern
should be characterized by a vocabulary and syntax recognized
both by participants in the pattern, and by outsiders. Patterns
are cognitive, as well as behavioral." 7 Language maps deeper
cognitive structures and thus mirrors cultural patterns and so-
cial structures of which they are a part.' Our initial intuition
may be that we experience the world as we do and behave in
certain ways because at an important level the semantics and
syntax of our language predisposes us to do so. 9 But at a deeper
467. See MARK TURNER, COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 144-45, 159-62 (2001)
(describing the functions of conceptual schema in thought and action); EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL,
SOCIAL MINDSCAPES: AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SOCIOLOGY (1997); DiMaggio, supra note
457, at 269-74 (describing a tentative synthesis of cognitive arguments in sociology that
conclude that behavior results from interaction between external rituals and internal mental
structures); Paul M. Hirsch, Sociology Without Social Structure: Neoinstitutional Theory Meets
Brave New World, 102 AM. J. SOC. 1702, 1718-21 (1997 (book review) (noting difficulty of
distinguishing between internalized norms, cognitive "scripts," and social structure in
accounts of behavior).
468. See Dan Hunter, Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY L.J.
1197, 1208.10 (2001); Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in
Corporations Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 782-89 (2002).
469. In its strongest form, this argument is known as the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, after
the two men most closely associated with it. See EDWARD SAPIR, LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF SPEECH (1921); EDWARD SAPIR, SELECTED WRITINGS, IN LANGUAGE, CULTURE
AND PERSONALITY (David G. Mandelbaum ed., 1949); BENJAMIN LEE WHOlF, LANGUAGE,
THOUGHT, AND REALITY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF (John B. Carroll ed.,
1956). The "universalist" or strongest form of the hypothesis has not been supported
empirically, but its weaker form, known as "linguistic relativity," argues that manners of
speech influence habits of thought and behavior and has been supported in some experimental
settings. See Paul Kay & Willett Kempton, What is the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis?, 86 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 65 (1984) (reviewing the history of empirical research relating to the Sapir-
Whorf Hypothesis); Alan Rumsey, Wording, Meaning, and Linguistic Ideology, 92 AM.
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level, language,470  and in particular, metaphorical uses of
language' 7' are as reflective of thought and behavior as they are
determinative; established and shared uses of language are espe-
cially telling because they tap into tacit but shared conceptual struc-
tures. In short, we talk as we do because of how we think and act:
Most [semantic) categorization is automatic and unconscious,
and if we become aware of it at all, it is only in problematic
cases. In moving about the world, we automatically categorize
people, animals, and physical objects, both natural and man-
made. This sometimes leads to the impression that we just cate-
gorize things as they are, that things come in natural kinds, and
that our categories of mind naturally fit the kinds of things there
are in the world. But a large proportion of our categories are not
categories of things; they are categories of abstract entities. We
categorize events, actions, emotions, spatial relationships, social
relationships, and abstract entities of an enormous range: gov-
ernments, illnesses, and entities in both scientific and folk theo-
ries, like electrons and colds.
472
Our semantic categories and our metaphors are not mere by-prod-
ucts of, and inputs for, political and legal rhetoric. They are built
largely on our experiences,473 including their normative dimen-
ANTHROPOLOGIST 346, 357 (1990) (concluding "in short, language structure and linguistic
ideology are not entirely independent of each other, nor is either determined entirely by the
other").
In any event, there is a strong intuitive sense that our formal linguistic classifications are
related to, and likely influence, our legal classifications. On the role of metaphor in shaping
the law, see generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 189-92
(2000) (describing the Supreme Court's repetitive use of a new word in different contexts until
its meaning is shaped). On the institutional influence of classification, see generally ISAIAH
BERLIN, CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (Henry Hardy ed., 1979);
GEOFFREY BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1999).
470. See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987).
471. See, e.g., LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 450; LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 450. For
a useful recent synthesis of research on metaphor and its application to legal reasoning see
Joo, supra note 468. On Lakoffian theory and the Internet in particular, see Don Hunter,
Cybrspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 469-72
(2003).
472. LAKOFF, supra note 470, at 6.
473. This view of language and metaphor does not deny the significance of the Sapir-Whorf
Hypothesis, but it limits the argument that the Hypothesis confirms the directionality of
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sions.'7 ' George Lakoff proposes that metaphoric meanings are
mapped to experience on a one-to-one target (metaphor) to source
(experience) basis. This thesis has been elaborated by Gilles
Fauconnier, with Mark Turner, who argue that we experience over-
lapping metaphorical frameworks.475 Each of these frameworks
comprises a "mental space" constructed by a listener or reader and
consisting of elements, roles, strategies, and relationships, all of
which the listener uses in reasoning and creating meaning. Overlap-
ping "mental spaces" are linked via the process of "cognitive blend-
ing," which accommodates dynamism in the process of understand-
ing. 76 Querying the extent and stability of a linguistic practice that
supports a given pattern is a way of testing the authenticity and
depth of the pattern itself.
b. Social Structures
Social and cultural structures can be interrogated directly, of
course. Language-based evidence should be corroborated by evi-
dence that the pattern in question has recognized sets of expecta-
tions, practices, structures, and roles that exist largely independent
of either state-sanctioned coercion or the market itself. The issue
here is the extent of limitations on discretionary behavior within a
specified social or cultural network, limitations that might be inter-
nalized via socialization or professional training, or that might be
imposed externally via participation in the pattern, or both. Social
"norms" as guides to individual behavior are thus relevant, but they
are neither the necessary beginning nor the end of the question. A
language influencing nonlinguistic behavior. See id. at 330-34.
474. See id. at 65 ("We not only import entities and structure from the source domain to the
target domain, we also carry over the way we evaluate the entities in the source domain.");
Pierre Schlag, Commentary: The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1050
(2002) (arguing that "the aesthetic pertains to the forms, images, tropes, perceptions, and
sensibilities that help shape the creation, apprehension, and even identity of human
endeavors, including, most topically, law'); Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 457,
at 1143-46.
475. See Mark Turner & Gilles Fauconnier, Laughing At and Laughing With: The
Linguistics of Humor and Humor in Literature, in THE WORKINGS OF LANGUAGE: FROM
PRESCRPTIONS TO PERSPECTIVES 181, 186-99 (Rebecca S. Wheeler ed., 1999).
476. See GILLES FAUCONNiER, MENTAL SPACES ASPECTS OF MEANING CONSTRUCTION IN
NATURAL LANGUAGE 16-22 (1985); GILLEs FAUCONNIER, MAPPINGS IN THOUGHTAND LANGUAGE
21-23, 149-92 (1997); Turner & Fauconnier, supra note 475, at 186-89.
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social or cultural pattern may be defined by informal expectations,
customs, and habits, by norms, by more formal organizations, insti-
tutions, or hierarchies, by communications and coordination net-
works, or by a combination of these. 7 Relevant sorts of evidence
may consist of individual practices and behaviors themselves, struc-
tures of formal and informal groups, and descriptions of cognitive
structures, such as schemata and scripts. 7" Evidence may be purely
contemporary, or may incorporate history and tradition. It is inevi-
table that the character of such evidence will vary from case to case,
and that the influence of law throughout such evidence cannot be
removed entirely. But law-and-norms scholars have long concluded
that these obstacles provide no insuperable barriers to analyzing
law and social structures as distinct phenomena.479
In at least one important respect, however, the pattern-oriented
approach differs from some common accounts of social norms in law.
The approach does not require evidence that the pattern be mapped
to repeat-play situations in small, homogeneous, stable communi-
ties.se Indeed, scholars note the existence of widely observed prac-
tices that likely qualify as norms that arise in nonrepeat-play situa-
477. See Steven A. Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create a Privacy Entitlement in Cyberspace,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 892 n.53 (2001) (adopting a definition of "norm" that is
comparable, descriptively, to my use of pattern"). Cf W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUtnONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH 33 (1995) (defining institutions as cognitive,
normative, and regulative structures and activities); Jepperson, supra note 457, at 145
(characterizing institutions as social patterns that are relatively self-activating).
478. See ROBERT ABELSON & ROGER C. SCHANK, SCRIPTs, PLANS, GOALS, AND
UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTUREs 36-68,222-37 (1977). For
an application of the notion of scripts to the domain of corporate finance, see Manuel A. Utset,
Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-
Financed Firms, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 45,88-91.
479. Since norms are informal by definition, definitions are likewise somewhat "slippery."
Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of
Decentralized Law, 14 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 215, 224 (1994) ("When a public consensus forms
that people ought to cooperate, and when enough people internalize the obligation to punish
noncooperators effectively, a social norm exists in a community."); Eric A. Posner, Law,
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996) ("Norms are fuzzy.");
see also Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal
Community, in SOCIAL NORMs 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001); Richard
H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338, 340
(1997) ("Roughly speaking, by norms this [law and norms] literature refers to informal social
regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty,
because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both.").
480. See ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 67-83.
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tions or in communities that are too diffuse to qualify as small or
homogeneous."' As I use the concept, therefore, social norms are
understood more broadly-as a framework that emphasizes norms
as sustaining cooperative social arrangements, rather than as pro-
viding extralegal sources of coercion. As noted above," 2 norms of
reciprocity may provide compelling evidence of a relevant pattern.
But the pattern-oriented approach does not require evidence of re-
ciprocal behavior as such in all cases. It requires commonality of
behavior and expectation.
That is, the pattern-oriented approach is concerned partly with
the existence of rules governing a group's behavior, ' but it is pri-
marily concerned with the existence of a pattern itself:'.4 Some iden-
tifiably, if sometimes loosely, defined set of professional standards
or common expectations, with some form of implicit or explicit gov-
ernance mechanism (paradigmatically, norm-based obligations of
reciprocity), and a set of commonly understood objectives. Members
of a pattern ordinarily behave in accordance with expectations de-
481. See W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and
the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 8-11 (2002). Interrogating rational choice under
non-close-knit circumstances, Richard McAdans and Eric Posner supply explanations that
account for some non-repeat-play norms. See McAdams, supra note 479, at 342-43, 355-433
(arguing that norms are created from individuals' esteem for one another); Posner, supra note
479, at 1705-10 (arguing that norms in closely knit communities are based on their signaling
function). The best-known account of social conventions posits a similar account of
conventions as coordination equilibria for rational individuals. See DAVID K LEWIS,
CONVENTION: A PHiLOSOPHiCAL STUDY 14-23 (1969).
482. See supra note 447 and accompanying text (describing role of reciprocity norms).
483. Investigating the substance of the rules too deeply risks ranking contested versions
of "the good life." See Wendel, supra note 481, at 53 (2002) (citing CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES
OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 80-88 (1989)). In his proposal to
reconstruct the fair use doctrine in copyright law in support of a "vision of the good life,"
William Fisher rejects the strongest forms of this "paternalistic" objection, at least for
contexts in which the risks of the errors of paternalism (misidentification of the good life,
whether or not in good faith) are low, and its benefits (increasing the scope of access to the
good life, taking account of individuals' opportunities for self-determination) are high. See
Fisher, supra note 15, at 1762-66.
484. Some philosophers query the extent to which social practices, as a conceptual category
with normative content, are distinct from social behaviors, the manifestations of action. See
Michael Esfeld, What are Social Practices?, in 1 INDAGA: REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE CIENCIAS
SOCTALES Y HUMANAS 19, 19-43 (2003). Esfeld posits three possible relationships: that the two
are identical; that practices are mediated by norms, becoming behaviors; or that practices are
irreducibly distinct from behaviors. Id. To the extent that my argument suggests that I should
choose among these, the first position seems to be the most likely to be consistent with a
pragmatic focus on the relatedness of thought, language, and behavior.
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fined by the pattern and can ordinarily make normative claims upon
one another by virtue of their being part of the pattern.
The task in any given case, then, is to query the existence of
rules, norms, scripts, customs, institutions, hierarchies, and coordi-
nation mechanisms, and so forth, that substantively track the vo-
cabulary and syntax that are linguistically established. In the vast
majority of fair use cases, much of this foundational work is already
complete; there is a rich literature and an abundance of expert wit-
nesses available to testify to the character of research, teaching,
scholarship, criticism, journalism, parody, and satire, for example.
The question in such cases will not be whether the pattern exists,
but whether the use in question is consistent with the established
usages and practices of the pattern. The discussion of leading cases
in Part III suggests that this is the analytic question on which
courts have, in fact, labored the hardest, often without recognizing
that they are doing so. Indeed, it is precisely such evidence that the
court found lacking in the Aimster litigation,'6 and that was present
and persuasive in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 6
It is important to note that the proposed focus on patterns ac-
knowledge its epistemological limitations. Patterns, norms, and so
forth may evolve, and the law-and-norms literature has debated at
length whether the law of a given discipline should formalize a rela-
tionship with social norms." 7 As a practical matter, there is concern
that the law's reliance on norms may tend to freeze the law in its
own existing patterns, and may stifle the development of new social
patterns and of individual variation.' Equally important, there is
485. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
486. See supra note 429 and accompanying text.
487. Law that relies on norms is accused of interfering with effective regulation by norms.
See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1796-1815 (1996). Different legal rules
may evoke different norm responses, presenting choices for policymakers that norm-based
systems cannot evaluate alone. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on
Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OF. L. REV. 1 (2000); Eric Posner, supra
note 480. Scholars have invoked norms to explain and predict behavior both in light of
changes to legal rules, and in the absence of legal rules, suggesting that we know less than
we believe we do about the actual dynamics of their interaction. See Robert E. Scott, The
Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603,1628-30 (2000);
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
488. From a social welfare perspective, there is the risk that confirming norms as law risks
recognizing and rectifying inefficient or at least nonwelfare-maximizing rules. See, e.g.,
Gordon, supra note 15, at 1621-22 (arguing that recognizing a custom of uncompensated use
1636 [Vol. 45:1525
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the question of whether it is logically possible to distinguish law and
norm.4 9 Patterns are not purely exogenous to the legal systems that
they inhabit.' ° But as social scientists have done, I assume here
that there is some identifiable extent to which cultural patterns and
practices exist autonomously in society, and that there is a mean-
ingful extent to which they are both stable enough to be relevant
referents in this context and sufficiently flexible to be useful in re-
sponding to particular fair use issues as they arise,491 and adaptive
might inhibit the creation of new markets for copyrighted works); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design
and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377,383 (1997); McAdams, supra
note 479, at 412-16; Posner, supra note 479, at 1743. Compare Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized
Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996) (suggesting that efficiency of norms justifies
embodying them in commercial institutions) and Richard A. Epstein, International News
Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA.
L. REV. 85, 124-28 (1992) (arguing that courts should enforce stable industry custom in the
intellectual property context), with Bernstein, supra note 487, at 1794 (claiming that
efficiency of norms commends noninterference by the legal system) and Stephen L. Carter,
Custom, Adjudication, and Petrushevsky's Watch: Some Notes From the Intellectual Property
Front, 78 VA. L. REv. 129, 131-32 (1992) (expressing skepticism regarding prescriptive
implications of Epstein's argument).
In other circumstances, legal enforcement of a social norm might conflict with relevant
policies of a legal system based on respect for individual self-determination, or idiosyncrasy.
See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems,
15 HARV. J.L. & TEcH. 41,58 (2001):
Norm-based fair use defaults, however, are subject to many of the same
criticisms as negotiated fair use defaults. Such defaults still would be inflexible
at the margin, and still would not encompass the full range of uses that a court
would hold fair. Thus, if norm-based controls were regarded as implementing a
fair use ceiling rather than a fair use floor, users of digital works would enjoy far
less fair use than they have enjoyed in traditional media.
Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1193, 1216-17
(1998) (warning that excessive conformity to social norms may result in suppression of ability
to challenge "the status quo and to experiment with alternative conceptions of the good life");
see also Okediji, supra note 14, at 121-24 (expressing skepticism of custom-based fair use
arguments).
489. Margaret Radin, Polk Wagner, and others have reprised the foundational objection
to legal ratification of social norms, arguing that such norms often depend on enforcement of
underlying contract and property entitlements and thus ought not to be regarded as truly
independent of a legal system that interrogates their existence as informal sanctions. See
Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal
Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1295 (1998). True and complete independence
is not required here, even if it is possible.
490. See Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive
Perspectives on the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 475, 492 (noting the
weakness in institutional arguments about law that accept the law as "just is").
491. For example, it is likely not the case that every individual who is part of a given
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
enough to support and respond to changes in both law and society
over time.4 02 Pragmatically speaking, the influence of law and norms
on one another is inevitable. The question is how to make rational
sense of this relationship. In Part I, I quoted Robert Post, a First
Amendment scholar, on the point that law should be understood
with reference to communities of practice, on which it depends and
which it shapes.4 93 I take Professor Post to suggest that it is inevita-
ble that the law validate certain forms of social organization and not
others, and not that forms of social organization have no identity or
validity without the imprimatur of the law. Journalism, scholarship,
and criticism are organized into communities of practice that would
be surprised by the suggestion that they rely on the legal system for
legitimacy. Yet by the same token, many of the informational privi-
leges they enjoy are indeed validated by the law. With fair use,
among other doctrines, the law identifies which patterns and prac-
tices to recognize."'
The inevitable interdependence of law and social and cultural
patterns is not a complete answer here, however, because some
philosophers and social scientists question the conceptual integrity
of the notion that there exist patterns (or practices, or social struc-
tures) that are meaningfully distinct from individual belief and
action.495
pattern has an equivalent interest in the kinds of uses of expressive works that the pattern
encounters. See, e.g., Peter H. Gray & Darren B. Meister, Task and Technology Fit: Lessons
from Knowledge Sourcing Technologies, Minnesota Knowledge Management Symposium
(2003) (describing different knowledge sourcing interests of individuals at different levels of
employment hierarchy).
492. At least some norm-based regulation may not be as inflexible as some fear. Many
scholars have dealt with the question of whether incorporation of custom into law tends to
promote rigidity or flexibility. Compare Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms,
78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate), 83 VA. L. REV. 713
(1997); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNEIL L.
REV. 608 (1998); and Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw.
U. L. REV. 847, 867-68 (2000) (all arguing that reliance on custom tends to promote rigidity),
with Omri Ben-Shahar, The Erosion of Rights by Past Breach, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 190,227-
29 (1999), and Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 781 (1999), and Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usages
for International Sales, 39 VA. J. INVL L. 707, 732-40 (1999) (all suggesting reasons why
flexibility will be preserved).
493. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
494. See supra Parts II.C.3, II.C.5.c, II.C.2, II.C.4.b.
495. See JOHN R. SEAmE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SocIETY: PHILOSOPHY IN THE REAL WoRLD
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A defense of the pattern-oriented approach thus requires a brief
survey of scholarship that tries to resolve tension between the al-
leged primacy of the actor, and the alleged primacy of the pattern.
In short, there is persuasive evidence that it is indeed meaningful
to look to social and cultural phenomena. Anthony Giddens does so
with his "structuration" thesis, positing that individuals (particular
actions) and groups (rules) are functionally inseparable because
they are in the ongoing process of simultaneously constructing each
other.4 9 Margaret Gilbert argues that we can and do meaningfully
ascribe purposes and beliefs to social groups, consistent with every-
day understanding, so long as members of a social group genuinely
refer to themselves as "we" (the linguistic dimension) and make
normative claims upon each other by virtue of group association (the
sociological dimension).'97
The cognitive perspective offered above, in connection with the
relevance of language connects this abstract argument with the
pragmatic problem at hand. Individual preferences are not objec-
tively given and relied upon via acts of individual intent to build
larger social structures. Intentionality is itself contextual, making
social groups and structures (patterns) an inherent part of social
analysis. Mark Johnson explains in terms that crystallize the
patterns-approach for fair use purposes:
(1998) (integrating philosophical and linguistic analyses in concluding that individuals, via
shared intents, use language to construct society); supra note 18 (listing observations on the
problems of endogenous preferences). Efforts by philosophers to reconcile the focus on the
individual with the intuition that group action is relevant have produced related theories
describing "collective intentionality' ascribed to social groups. See RAImo TUOMELA, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL PRACTICES: A COLLECTIVE ACCEFrANCE VIEW 2 (2002) (arguing that
social practices, including customs, traditions, and norms, develop and evolve via a weak form
of "collective intentionality"); cf THEODORE R. SCHATma, SOCIAL PRACTICES: A
WrrrG.ENSTEIAN APPROACH TO HUMAN ACTVrITY AND THE SOCIAL (1996) (arguing that social
practices are the fundamental phenomenon in social life).
496. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTrTUToN OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF
STRUCTURATION 162 (1984). Cf TALCoTr PARSONS ON INSFITTIONS AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION:
SELECTED WRITINGS (Leon H. Mayhew ed., 1983) (describing 'action" theory); supra notes 454-
55 and accompanying text (describing Bourdieu's concept of the habitus). The "structuration"
thesis may not adequately explain the process of changing social structures, but for present
purposes it provides a helpful account that distinguishes and integrates the idea of
independently significant social structures. Giddens' critic Margaret Archer argues for two
distinct levels of reality-the self and (external) social structure-that are linked via individual
actions. See MARGARET S. ARCHER, REALLsF SOCIAL THEORY: THE MORPHOGENETIC APPROACH
(1995).
497. See MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 205, 380-81 (1989).
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[A]ny statements we make, any directives we give, any rules we
lay down are applicable, not because the concepts specify their
own determinate conditions of satisfaction, but rather because
we understand these concepts and rules relative to shared ideal-
ized cognitive models, scripts, and narratives that are tied to
embodied experiences, communal histories, practices, and val-
ues. The rules can work, when they work, precisely because of
these framing cognitive models and practices. They are not ...
merely non-propositional, non-semantic background assump-
tions. Rather, they are part of our conceptual apparatus by
which we make sense of and act purposively within concrete
situations."'
The question is not whether the action of the individual is the result
of individual intent or is constrained completely by social influences,
but instead the character of the cognitive framework within which
the individual is acting. To what extent are the individual's actions
consistent with, inconsistent with, or otherwise connected to that
framework? The cognitive perspective, including its linguistic com-
ponent, confirms that social patterns can be identified and made
relevant to analysis of social questions. The fact that courts have
implicitly been doing much of this confirms that it can be done.
Recognizing it explicitly means teaching courts to accept their role,
and teaching lawyers to more systematically collect and introduce
both expert and lay evidence that tracks the language, structure,
and practices of a given pattern. There is skepticism in some quar-
ters about the competence of the judiciary to identify and interpret
social practices meaningfully 4 9 Courts certainly could do a better
498. Mark Johnson, Law Incarnate, 67 BRoo&. L. REv. 949, 957 (2002); see also Andrew J.
Cappel, Bringing Cultural Practice into Law: Ritual and Social Norms Jurisprudence, 43
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 389, 394 n. 10 (2003):
[Too sharp a dichotomy between methodological individualism and holism
appears problematic under careful analysis.... [Blecause virtually everything
that we do in the course of everyday task-performance reflects a division of
cognitive labor within society, in many ways it makes little sense to sharply
distinguish individual cognition ... from more systemic forms of cognitive
processing ...; what needs to be explained is the complex interrelationship
between the two.
Id.; see also ZERtrhAVEL, supra note 467, at 5-6.
499. Stephen Carter developed the metaphor of "judge as anthropologist" in order to
criticize it. See Carter, supra note 488, at 132.
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job of this than they have done in the past."° But the admonition
that this is not a judicial function is off the mark; weakness in deci-
sion making arises not because judges are institutionally incapable
of identifying and interpreting social practices, and in any event,
judges ordinarily ought not to be asked to do so without help. The
investigation that I suggest be pursued ought, in the first instance,
to be the task of the parties. Judges rarely need to be anthropolo-
gists. Lawyers do, and they do so all the time. Creating a proper
record is, among other things, an anthropological or archaeological
exercise. A proper record goes a long way to good judicial decision
making, and having a coherent set of questions to ask goes a long
way toward making a proper record.
This point may seem to beg the question of how courts are sup-
posed to evaluate this pattern-oriented evidence. Problems of char-
acterization and generality cannot be avoided. Good lawyers are
masters of storytelling, and what I argue should be objective evi-
dence of genuine patterns and practices may be treated as mere
stories. Or (perhaps) worse: mere stories may be presented in the
guise of "objective evidence."
I confess to being untroubled by either possibility, given the state
of fair use law and argument today. Copyright law is full of stories,
and compelling accounts of patterns may indeed be presented us-
ing rhetorical and narrative flourishes.5 ' From an argumentative
500. The need to look more critically at distinctions between technological artifacts and
social patterns in which they are embedded is not limited to fair use, or to copyright law. See
Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX L. REV. 99 (2000) (regarding software patents);
Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal
and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2003) (regarding technological
access controls for copyrighted works); Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the
Integration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2002) (regarding electronic
contracts); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REv. 1139
(1999) (regarding business methods patents). Although arguments of this sort may be
associated most often with efforts to sustain the legality of various technologies, they also
appear in contrary arguments. Compare Alfred C. Yen, What Federal Gun Control Can Teach
Us About the DMCA's Anti-Tampering Provisions, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 649, with Peter Biddle
et al., The Darknet and the Future of Content Distribution, available at http'//crypto.stanford.
edu/DRM2002/ darknet5.doc (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (arguing that technologically focused
regulation of P2P systems is likely to fail).
501. See Michael J. Madison, Where Does Creativity Come From? And Other Stories of
Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747 (2003); cf Jaber F. Gubrium & James A. Holstein, At
the Border of Narrative and Ethnography, 28 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 561, 568-69 (1999)
(describing challenge for ethnographers in balancing objective analysis with legitimate
narrative analysis, since narratives themselves are socially patterned).
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standpoint, it is better that proponents of fair use defenses be as
well-armed as proponents of copyright enforcement. From an ana-
lytic standard, connecting the patterns approach to conventional
narrative techniques gives extra weight to the former and structure
to the latter. The bottom line is this: A fair use defense advanced in
good faith under a banner of conformity with a social or cultural
pattern input, ordinarily, ought to be accepted.
2. Patterns and § 107
Even as a descriptive matter, the pattern-oriented approach does
not succeed if it cannot be reconciled with the language of § 107.
Part II of this Article opened with a description of the analytic co-
nundrums that the statute presents. Part III described how a
pattern-oriented approach was consistent with Congress' intention
in enacting § 107. Here, I suggest that the pattern-oriented ap-
proach offers a plausible route to reconciling the problems of the
statutory text itself.
Beginning with the preamble and continuing through each of the
four factors of the statute, the pattern-oriented approach offers a
method of synthesizing differences in perspective and accepting
their apparent redundancies. With respect to the preamble's list of
apparently favored uses, each of these, as I suggested above, repre-
sents the type of traditionally recognized patterns that can be de-
scribed credibly if not definitively according to the linguistic and
sociological arguments reviewed above.' Justice Blackmun's pro-
posed reconciliation of those uses, that "productive" use should
guide fair use decisions,' is thus off the mark, but only slightly.
The relevance of the list""' is that each of the uses describes a pat-
tern, rather than an inherently "productive" use. All of us as read-
ers, viewers, and listeners know that there is an abundance of un-
productive journalism, criticism, scholarship, and teaching floating
around in the world. The difference between deterministically "pro-
ductive" use and probabilistically "creative" use is subtle but impor-
tant, particularly as I develop it further in Part V. For present pur-
502. See 8upru Part IVA.1.
503. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 479.80 (1984).
504. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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poses, note the consistency of the pattern-oriented approach with
the language of the preamble.
Justice Blackmun's proposal is correct in a different sense, in
suggesting that the preamble be read together with all four factors
of the statute, rather than simply with reference to the first fac-
tor.' 5 That concern, the purpose and character of the use, should be
read as an inquiry into whether the particular use of the work en-
joyed by the defendant is consistent with the social or cultural pat-
tern in which the defendant is engaged. If the defense is that the
use is fair because it is "journalistic," for example, there are two
related questions: first, is the defendant engaged in the practice of
journalism, and second, is the use of the work a credibly "journalis-
tic" one?
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, should be
viewed not as an invitation to pass independently on the "creativity"
inherent in the plaintiffs work (with its concomitant but inappropri-
ate implication that more "creative" works are somehow deserving
of "more" copyright protection), but instead as a basis for under-
standing the nature of the resources that typically are consumed in
different patterns. A novel may or may not be more "creative" than
an insurance claim form, but the comparison involves apples and
oranges. One needs to know whether the "creative" novel is being
used in the preparation of a news story or feature article, a book
review, or a film. Critics presumably have a greater interest in the
unauthorized excerpting of novels than do either most journalists or
movie producers. Criticism rarely passes for criticism if it is licensed
by the author of the work(s) criticized; journalists rarely draw on
fiction as source material; and film producers typically are no worse
off if they must rely on the market for access to material on which
to base feature films.
The "amount and substantiality"5'6 of the portion used, the third
factor, can now be treated distinctly: even a critic, who is credibly
engaged in a critical practice, must abide by the norms of criticism
in quoting from the work under study. Reproducing too much of
the material at stake violates the "amount and substantiality"
standard, °7 measured not solely quantitatively or even qualitatively
505. See id. § 107(1); Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 495-99.
506. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
507. Id.
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against the plaintiffs work, but on a comparative basis, against
both the plaintiffs work and the defendant's process.' A book that
might be quoted extensively and fairly in a book review might be
"quoted" fairly to a much smaller extent in a film or song.
How to interpret the market impact of the use, the fourth factor,
also becomes clear. Recall the flaw in the reasoning of the Court in
Campbell, that market injury from parody or criticism should not
count in the fair use calculus,6' but that credible market injury
might nonetheless be discerned from the rap parody of "Oh, Pretty
Woman."510 Credible evidence of market injury in that case would
demonstrate not the existence of infringement despite a confirmed
claim of parody, but that the work was not really a parody at all.
Credible evidence of substitution of the defendant's work for the
plaintiffs, in whole or in part, might demonstrate that the defen-
dant's claim to be following an established practice rings hollow.
The corollary, then, is that the plaintiff should always bear the
burden of proof with regard to substitutional injury, just as the
plaintiff ordinarily bears the burden of demonstrating injury from
infringement in the first place.
Using the pattern-oriented approach to link the different strands
of § 107 also helps to frame the scope of the evidentiary challenge
that the approach presents. It should be clear from the foregoing
review of the statute that much of the evidence and argument with
respect to each of the separate factors will remain relevant, though
its ultimate use will be refrained in light of the overall thrust of the
approach. Searching for linguistic and structural clues to social
patterns, as the approach requires,51" ' may seem daunting in the
abstract. The approach makes relevant some evidence that might
not have been canvassed previously, but much of existing practice
regarding the types of information to collect under § 107 should
remain the same.
508. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565-66 (1985)
(noting that the amount and importance of copyrighted material must be evaluated in both
the plaintiff's and defendant's works when deciding if there has been actionable copyright
infringement).
509. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-92 (1994).
510. See i& at 592-93.
511. See supra notes 499-500 and accompanying text (describing character of evidence
made relevant under the approach, and noting the limited "anthropological" burdens that the
approach imposes on courts and lawyers).
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B. The Pattern-Oriented Approach and Patterns in the Law
To this point I have argued that the fair use doctrine, properly
understood in terms of the leading cases and its statutory form, is
explained best as an analytic tool that focuses on social and cultural
patterns. This section briefly considers whether that explanation is
consistent with a broader group of decided cases. I conclude that it
is, with some important exceptions.
I reviewed published, final decisions concerning fair use issued by
courts of appeal after the fair use statute came into effect in 1978
and before the end of 2003. I included sixty-seven opinions in all,
excluding appellate opinions rendered in the Harper & Row, Sony,
and Campbell cases themselves,512 with the goal not of reaching a
statistically rigorous analysis but of sampling enough opinions to
obtain a rough gauge of the adequacy of the pattern explanation. 513
I examined each case to determine whether the outcome of the case
with respect to a fair use claim could be predicted from the court's
characterization of a relevant pattern of conduct in which the defen-
dant(s) were engaged. Though in some respects the analysis resem-
bles examining each court's review of the first statutory fair use
factor, it turns out that in the vast majority of the cases, the court's
pattern analysis (even if rarely acknowledged in those terms) differs
slightly but importantly by focusing not only on the end product of
the defendant's efforts but also on the processes that the defendant
used. That approach, which seems to be entirely consistent with the
label fair "use," colors judicial approaches to all four statutory fac-
tors. Finally, I should make clear that the pattern-oriented ap-
proach is related to but does not depend on arguments about the
existence of customs within or without a given industry or whether
fair use should be treated as a "customary" right. A handful of
courts in fair use cases, particularly those involving the preparation
of unauthorized biographies, have weighed biographers' customs in
512. I discuss these at length elsewhere in the Article. See supra Part II.C.1-3.
Additionally, all three of the cases were ultimately decided by the Supreme Court.
513. I focused on appellate opinions and excluded (the much larger number of) trial level
opinions on the ground that in traditional jurisprudential terms, the former are intended to
be and are likely to be treated as precedential to an extent that is unlikely for most trial level
opinions. In the main, a large number of appellate opinions addressing fair use have had
significant analytic impact on later cases; the same cannot be said of most trial level opinions.
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favor of fair use. As I discuss below, the pattern-oriented approach
would recharacterize the equivalent question as a matter of pattern
and thus a question of potentially broader scope than custom.
Each of the subsections below collects and describes fair use cases
that can be measured against a social or cultural pattern that is
capable of definition with sufficient specificity to make judicial ap-
plication of a pattern-oriented approach credible and sensible. That
is, I argue, that each of the categories identified below consists of a
definable pattern existing at least largely ex ante and without refer-
ence solely to fair use cases that take it as a reference-even where
it is inevitable that the pattern is reinforced by its reception by law.
"Journalism," the first category, embodies widely recognized
norms ("All the News That's Fit to Print"), practices (get it right, but
get it first), and roles (reporter, editor, publisher) associated with
and disseminating "news."514 The practice of parody and satire, the
second category, has been defined by scholarly analysis going back
centuries." Scholarship itself, the third category, has been ana-
lyzed as a distinct discipline.51 The roles of "critic," and "reverse
engineer" have been distinguished within the traditions of study."'
As for the final categories discussed, norms, roles, and practices
associated with legal and political argument, and with narrative
construction, extend to ancient Greece. 18 Of the patterns re-
viewed here, "comparative advertising" seems to have the shallow-
est pedigree-though marketing and advertising education are both
professionalized in the university setting (a social structure suggest-
ing the existence of a pattern or practice-based curriculum), and are
514. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 57 n.18 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting that
Internet gossip columnist was not entitled to benefit of "news gathering exception" to long-
arm statute).
515. See Ochoa, supra note 166, at 548-64.
516. The copyright status of the university professor has been analyzed in pattern-oriented
terms. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1988) (concluding that
applying the work-made-for-hire doctrine to university professors would wreak "havoc" on
"the settled practices of academic institutions").
517. See, e.g., DAVID KIRBY, WHAT IS A BOOK? (2002) (discussing "What is a Critic?); Iyad
Zayom & Timothy C. Lethbridge, A Cognitive and User Centric Based Approach for Reverse
Engineering Tool Design, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2000 CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRE FOR
ADVANCED STUDIES ON COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH (2000) (describing proposal to design
software tools for use in reverse engineering by tracking engineers' practices).
518. The classic and obvious original sources here are Aristotle's RHETORIC and PoETIcs.
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the object of legal regulation (suggesting the existence of a body of
norms).
One might break out any of these categories--or patterns-and
elaborate on these summary descriptions. The result of such an
exercise would likely be to reinforce the notion that these represent
one set of socially, culturally, and legally relevant patterns. Other
patterns are recognized elsewhere in copyright law,519 and there is
evidence-described in Part IV.C.5, that additional patterns are
developing and being recognized.
1. Journalism and News Reporting
The discussion of the three Los Angeles News Service cases cap-
tures the way in which one court treated different claims of "news
reporting" as fair use.5 2 In other cases, courts have been equally
skeptical that "news reporting" uses of copyrighted material consti-
tuted fair use, unless the invocation of the "journalism" label was
accompanied by other contextual suggestions that real journalism
was afoot. Reproduction of a model's photograph on a newspaper's
front page was held to be fair use in NWfez v. Caribbean Interna-
tional News Corp. because the photograph was necessary to tell a
story in which the paper's readers had a substantial and legitimate
interest.5 2' The argument that the defendant was acting as a pub-
lisher of the news, in selecting, editing, and presenting information,
justified findings for the defense in Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing
Corp.5 2 2 and Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Sig-
519. See Brandir Intl, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145-47 (2d Cir.
1987) (deciding question of "separability" under copyright's useful article doctrine based on
evidence of "artistic judgment" involved in object's production).
520. See supra Parts II.C.4.b, II.C.5.c.
521. See Ndflez v. Caribbean Intl News Corp., 235 F.3d 18,22 (1st Cir. 2000), noting that:
Puerto Ricans were generally concerned about the qualifications of Giraud for
Miss Puerto Rico Universe, as is demonstrated by the several television shows
discussing the photographs. This informative function is confirmed by the
newspaper's presentation of various news articles and interviews in conjunction
with the reproduction. Appellee reprinted the pictures not just to entice the
buying public, but to place its news articles in context; as the district court
pointed out, "the pictures were the story." It would have been much more
difficult to explain the controversy without reproducing the photographs.
522. 745 F.2d 142, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting copyright claim against magazine that
edited the plaintiffs letter to the editor).
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nal Corp.523 By contrast, cases rejecting fair use defenses raised by
news gathering and distributing organizations did so almost univer-
sally on the ground that the use in question exceeded the scope of
"legitimate" or "credible" journalism.524
2. Parody and Satire
As in Dr. Seuss Enterprises and SunTrust Bank, virtually all of
the decided cases involving claims of parody as fair use have relied
heavily on whether the steps leading to preparation of the allegedly
infringing work could be situated fairly within a tradition of parody.
Parody brings its targets down to earth. In some circumstances,
therefore, courts have noted that where the plaintiff's work takes on
an air of exaggerated self-importance, the preparation of a parody
is virtually inevitable. In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,"
the court found that the defendant's take-off on the plaintiffs posed
523. 724 F.2d 1044, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting copyright claim against advertiser
that reproduced product rating information without rater's permission). Though the claim
nominally concerned use of the copyrighted work in an advertising context, the court's
decision adopted the language of the news:
CU cannot prevent Regina from accurately reporting facts about the results of
CU's independent testing, irrespective of Regina's motive in doing so. Regina
wants to communicate CONSUMER REPORTS' favorable rating of its product.
Regina uses CU's words in the interest of accuracy, not piracy. Where an
evaluation or description is being made, copying the exact words may be the only
valid way precisely to report the evaluation.
Id.
524. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.
1999) (finding that "the abstracts [prepared by the defendant] are for the most part direct
translations of Nikkei articles; defendants added almost nothing new in their works"); L.A.
News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 993-94 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Reuters
copies footage and transmits it to news reporting organizations; Reuters does not explain the
footage, edit the content of the footage, or include editorial comment.'); L.A. News Serv. v.
KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 1997); LA. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973
F.2d 791,797-98 (9th Cir. 1992); Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984)
("The purpose and character of TV News Clips' use of WXIA's work heavily influences our
decision in this case. TV News Clips copies and distributes the broadcast for unabashedly
commercial reasons ...."); Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 83-84 (1st Cir. 1981)
(rejecting "journalism" defense where magazine merely reprinted the findings of plaintiffs
dissertation research); Iowa State Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60-
61 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The fair use doctrine is not a license for corporate theft, empowering a
court to ignore a copyright whenever it determines the underlying work contains material of
possible public importance.").
525. 137 F.3d 109, 112-15 (2d Cir. 1998).
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nude photograph of the actress Demi Moore constituted a
noninfringing parody, largely on the ground that "[a] photographer
posing a well known actress in a manner that calls to mind a well
known painting must expect, or at least tolerate, a parodist's de-
flating ridicule." 26 Similarly, in Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Productions,27 the court affirmed a summary judgment of nonin-
fringement against a photographer whose "Food Chain Barbie" pho-
tographs took aim at a target that was "ripe for social comment."5 ~
The defendant bolstered his contention that he intended to parody
Barbie with expert testimony that his photographs fell within the
traditions of twentieth-century artists.5 9 The court's weighing of the
fair use factors reflects a strong sense that the defendant had in-
voked a recognized pattern of parody and was operating genuinely
within it.3 0
Often, but not necessarily, parody is simply funny. In Fisher v.
Dees"' and Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 2
courts rejected infringement claims on the ground that the parodies
were sufficiently funny (the lyrics to "When Sonny Sniffs Glue"
substituting for the original pop tune "When Sonny Gets Blue" in
the former, 3 and "I Love Sodom" for the advertising jingle "I Love
New York" in the latter 34) that parodies of the original works must
have been intended by the defendants.' Cases that rejected claims
that the defendant's work constituted a parody of the plaintiffs did
so on the basis that the invocation of the "parody" label was not
526. Id. at 114-15.
527. 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
528. Id. at 802.
529. See id. at 797.
530. See i& at 801-04.
531. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
532. 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
533. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 436, 438.
534. Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253.
535. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 436 ( "Although we have no illusions of musical expertise, it
was clear to us that Dees's version was intended to poke fun at the composers' song, and at
Mr. Mathis's rather singular vocal range.*); Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253 n.1 ("A parody is
entitled at least to 'conjure up' the original. Even more extensive use would still be fair use,
provided the parody builds upon the original, using the original as a known element of
modern culture and contributing something new for humorous effect or commentary."). The
court in Elsmere Music did not engage in an extended discussion of fair use but instead relied
heavily on the opinion of the district judge, finding no infringement. See Elsmere Music, 623
F.2d at 253.
2004] 1649FAIR USE
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
enough, without credible compliance with norms and traditions
associated with parody, to avoid an infringement claim. 6
3. Criticism and Comment
Parody is in many respects merely a specialized version of criti-
cism and comment. Its recognition as a distinct pattern of "fair use"
has emerged only relatively recently. A separate group of cases
classed as criticism and commentary, without the specialized "par-
ody" label, itself divides along lines gauging whether or not the
defendant has engaged in "real" criticism. The recent case of Ty, Inc.
v. Publications International, Ltd. ruled that a guidebook collecting
pictures and descriptions of the plaintiffs' stuffed Beanie Baby toys
constituted fair use of the works embodied in those toys.3 7 The court
concluded that the guidebook amounted to valid evaluation or criti-
cism of the toys:
Indeed, a collectors' guide is very much like a book review, which
is a guide to a book and which no one supposes is a derivative
work. Both the book review and the collectors' guide are critical
and evaluative as well as purely informational; and ownership
of a copyright does not confer a legal right to control public eval-
uation of the copyrighted work.'
536. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting Jeff Koons'
argument that his 'Puppies* sculpture was a postmodern commentary on the kitsch of
plaintiffs "String of Puppies" photography, since Koons did not do enough to signal
independence of original and parodic works); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 184-85 (2d
Cir. 1981) (rejecting fair use defense on the ground that the "parody" argument was a post-hoc
rationalization of the composition 'rhe Cunnilingus Champion of Company C'); Walt Disney
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting parody defense where
defendant copied more than parodist would have needed to conjure the original work). One
might justly criticize the results in some or all of these cases, along with the more recent
decision in Dr. Seuss Enterprises, on the ground that the decisions offer an overly narrow view
of parody itself, even taking the parody/satire distinction at face value. Dr. Seuss shows,
however, that even the intervening decision in Campbell would not necessarily have led to
different outcomes in any of them. Dr. Suess Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109
F.3d 1394, 1399-400 (9th Cir. 1997).
537. 292 F.3d 512, 518-21 (7th Cir. 2002).
538. Id. at 520-21.
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The court distinguished the case from two previous decisions reject-
ing fair use claims raised under color of critical or evaluative use," 9
Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc.4
and Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications International,
Ltd.,541 each of which concluded that the claim of criticism was not
credible. In Castle Rock Entertainment, the court decided that the
argument was (as in Dr. Seuss Enterprises) a post-hoc rationaliza-
tion.542 In Twin Peaks, the court noted that the defendant had copied
far more of the plaintiffs work than typically would be appropriate
for a review or commentary."' Judge Posner's opinion in Ty, Inc.
goes further and criticizes the reasoning of Castle Rock, in particu-
lar, for indulging judicial sensibilities regarding the aesthetic merit
of the defendant's work. Judge Posner reiterated this theme in Chi-
cago Board of Education v. Substancem Inc.,6" in ruling that a critic
of copyrighted standardized tests could not publish tests wholesale
under a claim of fair use:
[Tihe fair use copier must copy no more than is reasonably nec-
essary (not strictly necessary-room must be allowed for judg-
ment, and judges must not police criticism with a heavy hand)
to enable him to pursue an aim that the law recognizes as
proper, in this case the aim of criticizing the copyrighted work
effectively." s
In so doing, he offers a pungent summary of the case against charac-
terizing legitimate criticism too narrowly.' In the end, however, it
is important to note that the case for fair use in Ty, Inc. is the same
as the case against fair use in Castle Rock. In each, the decision
turned on what the court determined to be (or not to be) "real" criti-
cism.
539. Id at 522-23.
540. 150 F.3d 132, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1998).
541. 996 F.2d 1366, 1374 (2d Cir. 1993).
542. See Castle Rock Entm't, 150 F.3d at 142 (finding that the challenged book's "purpose,
as evidenced definitively by the statements of the book's creators and by the book itself, is to
repackage Seinfeld to entertain Seinfeld viewers").
543. See Twin Peaks Prods., 996 F.2d at 1376.
544. 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003).
545. Id at 629.
546. See Ty, Inc., 292 F.3d at 523.
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The focus on critical process rather than result is also evident
in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., in which Jerry
Falwell was exonerated of a charge of copyright infringement when
his Moral Majority newsletter reproduced the Hustler cartoon that
Falwell previously (and unsuccessfully) had used as the basis for a
libel suit. This case has been characterized as perhaps the leading
example of the maxim, "what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the
gander." 7 But the court's analysis itself, while clearly susceptible
to that interpretation, on its own terms relies heavily on the defen-
dant's process of preparing and conducting a commentary on his
accuser.
Less colorful examples of the criticism pattern supporting a
fair use argument are Association of American Medical Colleges v.
Cuomo, in which the court sustained the validity of a New York
state law that required disclosure of test questions by publishers
of standardized educational tests,549 and Maxtone-Graham v.
Burtchaell, in which an anti-abortion advocacy group was permitted
to use material prepared by a pro-abortion group in writing an anti-
abortion book.5 ° Answering the argument that copyrights in the
tests would be infringed by public disclosure of the questions, the
court in Association of American Medical Colleges concluded that
such disclosure would amount to criticism or comment, protected as
fair use. 1 The court in Maxtone-Graham likewise characterized the
defendant as having acted properly in the mode of critic:
Burtchaell's work takes portions of the [plaintiff's] free form
interviews and organizes them into a topical framework to make
the case against abortion. One need not agree with the merit,
methodology or conclusions of [the defendant's work] Rachel
Weeping to recognize that Burtchaell applied substantial intel-
lectual labor to the verbatim quotations, continually offering his
own insights and opinions."
547. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, 796 F.2d 1148, 1151-56 (9th Cir. 1986).
548. See id at 1153.
549. 928 F.2d 519, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1991).
550. 803 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1986).
551. Ass'n ofAm. Med. Coils., 928 F.2d at 524.
552. Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1260.
1652 [Vol. 45:1525
It has been said both that the fair use inquiry sometimes wrongly
balances the relative "creativity" offered by the two parties, and the
Supreme Court in strong terms has condemned reliance on labor-
based arguments in copyright.5 3 Yet the rhetoric of this brief ex-
cerpt seems the exception rather than the rule: fair use courts es-
chew examination of the criticism in favor of the credibility of the
critic.
4. Scholarship and Research
What I categorize here as claims of fair use in support of scholar-
ship and research cuts even more broadly than the section heading
suggests; defendants have invoked the interests of teaching, educa-
tion, and research in a wide variety of contexts. In almost every
instance, however, they have succeeded only where the court agreed
that their claimed categorization matched the court's understanding
of the genuineness of the individual defendant's conduct in the con-
text of the asserted pattern.
That distinction has been observed already in the context of the
photocopying cases, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc."5 4
and Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 55 in
which courts rejected defendants' attempts to characterize their use
of the plaintiffs' works as educational or research in orientation,56
A group of cases involving biographers' attempts to use unpublished
material authored by their subjects reveals a similar pattern.
Sundeman v. Seajay Society, Inc. concluded that a biographer's use
of unpublished work produced by Margaret Rawlings constituted
fair use, where the defendant "attempted to shed light on Rawlings'
development as a young author, review the quality of [Rawlings']
Blood of My Blood, and comment on the relationship between
Rawlings and her mother."5 7
The Second Circuit's opinions in New Era Publications Interna-
tional, ApS v. Carol Publishing Group5" and New Era Publications
553. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1991).
554. 60 F.3d 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
555. 99 F.3d 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
556. See id. at 1388-89; Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 918-19.
557. 142 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 1998).
558. 904 F.2d 152, 161 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding fair use in a biographer's use of the subject's
work).
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International, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co."' can be reconciled on their
face by looking to the court's own descriptions of the defendants'
activities. In the former case, "as the author explained in detail in
an affidavit submitted below, discussing the reason why he included
each quote, the author uses [the copyrighted] works for the entirely
legitimate purpose of making his point that [the subject] Hubbard
was a charlatan and the Church a dangerous cult."' The defen-
dant, in short, was practicing the true craft of biography and could
substantiate that claim. In the latter case, according to the court, no
such argument could be made: "The public would not necessarily be
deprived of an 'interesting and valuable historical study,' but only
of an infringing one. "  That court's earlier opinion addressing a
biographer's use of unpublished materials of J.D. Salinger can be
measured by the same standard. 62 Rejecting the claim of fair use,
the court noted, in an oft-criticized passage, that the defendant was
not truly engaged in the practice of biography, at least as the court
understood it:
The biographer who copies only facts incurs no risk of an injunc-
tion; he has not taken copyrighted material. And it is unlikely
that the biographer will distort those facts by rendering them in
words of his own choosing. On the other hand, the biographer
who copies the letter writer's expression of facts properly faces
an unpleasant choice. If he copies more than minimal amounts
of (unpublished) expressive content, he deserves to be enjoined;
if he "distorts" the expressive content, he deserves to be criti-
cized for "sacrificing accuracy and vividness." But the biographer
has no inherent right to copy the "accuracy" or the "vividness" of
the letter writer's expression. Indeed, "vividness of description"
559. 873 F.2d 576, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1989) (denying a biographer's claim of fair use, in dicta).
The court ultimately ruled out an injunction on the ground of laches. Id. at 584.
560. Carol Publg Group, 904 F.2d at 156. To the same effect are Wright v. Warner Books,
Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 736-37 (2d Cir. 1991) (ruling in favor of a biographer's claim of fair use on
the ground that the defendant's work in fact consisted of a scholarly biography, and the
defendant had not misused the plaintiffs copyrighted (but unpublished) journal entries and
letters), and Arica Institute, Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1077-78 (2d Cir. 1992)
(characterizing one researcher's reuse of a predecessor's work as fair use because the
defendant "builds upon [the predecessor's] work to further develop our store of knowledge in
this area.").
561. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d at 584 (quoting from the district court's opinion) (citation
omitted).
562. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1987).
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is precisely an attribute of the author's expression that he is
entitled to protect.m
Other claims to scholarly research and/or educational use test
some of the limits of this category, but results in these cases still
can be viewed as acknowledging or rejecting individual claims to
participation in this pattern. In Greenberg v. National Geographic
Society, the court concluded that reproducing the plaintiffs photo-
graphs as part of a montage included in a CD-ROM reproduction of
back issues of National Geographic magazine did not constitute an
"educational" use of the photographs.5 6' In Elvis Presley Enterprises,
Inc. v. Passport Video,' the court affirmed an injunction against
distributing a "biography" of Elvis Presley on the ground that the
defendants' inclusion of photographs, film clips, and songs of Elvis
was more consistent with commerce than scholarship. "Passport
is not advertising a scholarly critique of historical analysis, but
instead seeks to profit at least in part from the inherent enter-
tainment value of Elvis' appearances on [various television pro-
grams]."' Courts in Weissmann v. Freeman,57 Educational Testing
Service v. Katzman,' and Marcus v. Rowley 9 each concluded that
the defendants' activities were not truly "educational," in the sense
that educators and/or their students did not, as a matter of partici-
pation in an educational enterprise, typically use copyrighted mate-
rial as the defendants had done in each of these cases.570 The court
in Weissmann captures both the facts of that case and the tone of
the relevant pattern:
Dr. Freeman stood to gain recognition among his peers in the
profession and authorship credit with his attempted use of
Weissmann's article; he did so without paying the usual price
563. Id. at 96.
564. 244 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2001).
565. 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003).
566. Id. at 628.
567. 868 F.2d 1313,1323-24 (2d Cir. 1989) (involving reproduction ofa teaching colleague's
course syllabus).
568. 793 F.2d 533, 543 (3d Cir. 1986) (involving the use of Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)
questions in conducting an SAT preparation course).
569. 695 F.2d 1171,1175-76(9th Cir. 1983) (involving the uncredited reproduction of a cake
decorating booklet in conducting a baking course).
570. See Educ. Testing Serv., 793 F.2d at 543; Marcus, 695 F.2d at 1175-76.
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that accompanies scientific research and writing, that is to say,
by the sweat of his brow. Particularly in an academic setting,
profit is ill-measured in dollars. Instead, what is valuable is
recognition because it so often influences professional advance-
ment and academic tenure. 571
5. Reverse Engineering
It should be apparent that the classification of appellate fair use
cases decided since 1978 not only veers in and out of the categories
suggested by the text of § 107, but also veers between broad and
narrow classifications themselves. One could locate additional
smaller categories, taking biography cases, for example, from the
scholarship/research group. The analytic point made by the differ-
ences in scope is that the categories are prone to evolve as patterns
themselves evolve. The parody classification offers some support for
this argument. A better example is the group of cases that emerged
from scholarship/research over the last ten years under the heading
"reverse engineering." It currently appears to be the case that a
genuine, good faith claim of "reverse engineering" of a copyrighted
computer program will justify a finding of fair use, regardless of the
purpose of the reverse engineering or of the scope of the reproduc-
tion of the program that occurs during the "reverse engineering"
process.572
Generally, "reverse engineering" is a label that lawyers and
courts have attached to a variety of technical processes involved in
disassembling a computer program in order to determine how it is
constructed.573 In both technology and copyright terms, this often
571. Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1324.
572. It is instructive to compare the doctrinal development of what amounts to a fair use
privilege to reverse engineer copyrighted works for certain purposes, largely consistent with
industry custom, with the rejection of much of that development for purposes of claims made
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Compare Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne
Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1582-94
(2002), with 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000) (granting reverse engineering exception to liability for
circumvention of technological protection system protecting copyrighted works that applies
solely in the context of interoperability research), and Philip J. Weiser, The Internet,
Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 560-64 (2003) (arguing
that enforcing sharing rules such as privilege for reverse engineering may needlessly dampen
incentives to innovate if rules are imposed too early in the development of a technology or
industry).
573. See, e.g., Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 572, at 1577 & n.1. Samuelson and
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requires making at least one reproduction of a copy of the program.
The results of the reverse engineering process are useful for deter-
mining the uncopyrightable "ideas" on which the copyrighted "ex-
pression" of the program is built, which in turn may be useful for
designing programs that work together with, or even substitute for,
the original program.
The "reverse engineering" exception was conceived in the context
of research and study. The seminal "reverse engineering" fair use
case is Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc. ,7 litigation between com-
peting manufacturers of video game systems and games, in which
the Ninth Circuit held that reproduction and disassembly of a copy-
righted computer program built into each copy of the plaintiffs
game cartridges did not infringe the plaintiffs copyright: "Where
there is good reason for studying or examining the unprotected as-
pects of a copyrighted computer program, disassembly for purposes
of such study or examination constitutes a fair use."75 In that case,
the "good reason" consisted of the defendant's legitimate interest in
accessing unprotectable ideas embedded in the plaintiffs computer
program.5
76
Though the doctrine has been described as being limited to neces-
sary access to "ideas," and rooted in policy injunctions against copy-
right holders unfairly extending the competitive advantage granted
by a software copyright, practical application of the "reverse engi-
neering" exception has been guided not by these policy concerns but
by an increasingly developed sensitivity to the actual practice of
reverse engineering. In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America,
Inc.577 and in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix
Corp.,171 claims of "reverse engineering" as fair use were sustained 79
via descriptions of the defendants' processes that made abundantly
Scotchmer define reverse engineering in its broadest sense, as the "process of extracting
know-how or knowledge from a human-made artifact," a definition that is not inconsistent
with my analysis of the computer program cases.
574. 977 F.2d 1510, 1522-23 (9th Cir. 1992).
575. Id. at 1520.
576' Id. at 1520-21.
577. 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
578. 203 F.3d 596, 603 (9th Cir. 2000).
579. In Atari, the fair use argument was accepted but its proponent lost the case on other
grounds; Atari obtained the computer code that it reverse engineered by misleading the
Copyright Office as to its intentions. See Atari, 975 F.2d at 841-42. Atari's error "tainted" the
code in which its reverse engineering argument was based.
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clear that they had met burdens of demonstrating the practice of
"legitimate" reverse engineering-even while the courts focused
nominally on interests in distinguishing"idea" from "expression.' s
Similarly, the two appellate cases that have rejected "reverse engi-
neering" arguments in the context of fair use, DSC Communications
Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc."' and Triad Systems Corp. v.
Southeastern Express Co.," 2 did so because they concluded that the
practices in question could not be described credibly as "reverse engi-
neering."m Notably, in both of these cases, as in Sony v. Connectix,
580. According to the court in Atari:
Atari chemically removed layers from Nintendo's chips to reveal the
[copyrighted] 1ONES object code. Through microscopic examination of the
.peeled" chip, Atari engineers transcribed the 10NES object code into a
handwritten list of ones and zeros. While these ones and zeros represent the
configuration of machine readable software, the ones and zeros convey little, if
any, information to the normal unaided observer. Atari then keyed this
handwritten copy into a computer. The computer then "disassembled" the object
code or otherwise aided the observer in understanding the program's method or
functioning. This "reverse engineering" process, to the extent untainted by the
1ONES copy purloined from the Copyright Office, qualified as a fair use.
Id at 844. The court in Connectix was less descriptive but equally direct: 'The question then
becomes whether the methods by which Connectix reverse-engineered the [copyrighted] Sony
BIOS [which included reproduction of the Sony program] were necessary to gain access to the
unprotected functional elements within the program. We conclude that they were." Connectix,
203 F.3d at 603. Cf Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996)
(characterizing Sega as "persuasive," in dicta).
581. 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
582. 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).
583. DSC Communications Corp., 170 F.3d at 1363; Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1336. As
the Federal Circuit was descriptive on this point in accepting a "reverse engineering" claim
in Atari, it was equally descriptive in rejecting an equivalent claim in DSC Communications:
DSC's evidence showed that Pulsecom representatives made copies of the POTS-
DI software on Pulsecom POTS cards as part of the ordinary operation of those
cards, not as part of an effort to determine how the Litespan system worked.
Rather than being part of an attempt at reverse engineering, the copying
appears to have been done after Pulsecom had determined how the system
functioned and merely to demonstrate the interchangeability of the Pulsecom
POTS cards with those made and sold by DSC.
DSC Communications, 170 F.3d at 1363. For another example of this claim, see Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990), in which
the defendant argued that his sale ofunauthorized cable television signal de-scrambling chips
involved fair use of the computer program controlling the scrambling/descrambling function
on authorized chips, but did not characterize the defense in "reverse engineering" terms. 1d
at 844. The defendant's program decoding/recoding practice was consistent with such an
argument, and the court's rejection of the defense (on the ground that the defendant was a
pirate) was consistent with the rulings in DSC Communications and Triad Systems.
for example, the original argument in favor of "research and study"
of computer programs evolved quickly into a claim in favor of the
practice of "reverse engineering."
6. Legal and Political Argument
A trio of cases suggests that use of copyrighted works either in
the context of rules regulating litigation and trial, or in political
argument, will be considered fair. In Bond v. Blum, the plaintiffs
work was reproduced and disclosed as a piece of evidence in the
context of pending litigation; the use was ruled fair.5 ' In Religious
Technology Center v. Wollersheim, the plaintiff's work was repro-
duced and disclosed to an expert witness in the course of pretrial
activities; again, the court ruled the use fair.' And in National
Rifle Association of America v. Handgun Control Federation of Ohio,
an antihandgun advocacy group copied a list of local legislators
originally prepared and distributed by the prohandgun plaintiff, and
then redistributed the list with a request urging recipients to con-
tact the legislators and oppose NRA proposals.' The court colored
its ruling with the rhetoric of the First Amendment in a way that
suggests that the manner of the defendant's use was consistent with
time-honored traditions of political debate: "The document was used
primarily in exercising HCF's First Amendment speech rights to
comment on public issues and to petition the government regardinglegislation." "8
7. Storytelling
"Reverse engineering" cases suggest the emergence of a newly-
recognized pattern. Storytelling cases suggest the disappearance of
a previously recognized pattern. In Narell v. Freeman, the court
noted that a defendant novelist who had borrowed material from a
plaintiff historian likely had engaged in fair use: "Part of the fasci-
584. 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 103 (2003).
585. 971 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1992).
586. 15 F.3d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1994). The case represents perhaps another illustration of
the "goose and gander" maxim, suggested above in connection with Hustler. See supra notes
547-48 and accompanying text.
587. Natl Rifle Aas'n, 15 F.3d at 562.
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nation fiction holds for writers and readers is its ability to inter-
weave real and invented details. [The defendant] Freeman used [the
plaintiff] Narell's work to provide context for her novel, just as sto-
rytellers throughout time have used history as source material for
works of imagination."' s In the very different context of computer
games, but using similar reasoning, a later panel of the same court
concluded in Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. that
individual game players were entitled as a matter of fair use to
modify the game displays of games that they had lawfully pur-
chased.'
Distinguishing Galoob, however, the Ninth Circuit more recently
decided that any new "stories" to be told concerning the plot and
characters of video games could be told only with the permission of
the copyright owner. In Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., the court con-
cluded that the defendant's distribution of supplemental computer
files that functioned in tandem with the plaintiff's computer games
constituted unauthorized distribution of derivative works-stories
based on plaintiff's copyrighted characters.5"
One might reconcile this small group of cases on the ground that
Narell is badly reasoned. Before reaching its fair use discussion, the
court concluded that there was no infringing similarity between the
works of the plaintiff and the defendant. Moreover, as history, the
plaintiff's work would be entitled conventionally only to the thinnest
of copyrights to begin with, as a factual work. Alternatively, the
court might be distinguishing between creating of a new story
(Narell) and copying of what amounts to the same story (Micro
Star). But the trend seems to extend beyond such conventional dis-
tinctions; at least in the Ninth Circuit, the court seems to be send-
ing the message that narrative construction is a function of authors
and publishers rather than readers. What may once have been a
social or cultural "storytelling" pattern is now apparently regarded
as a collection of practices by idiosyncratic authors. The Micro Star
588. 872 F.2d 907, 915 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
589. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). As in Sony Corp., Galoob was accused by Nintendo of
contributory infringement. Id. at 967. Galoob sold the "Game Genie," a device that could be
attached to Nintendo's video game console that caused video displays generated by the console
to change. Id.
590. 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998). The court noted that these new stories were
"anything but" transformative without beginning to explain what it meant by that conclusion.
Id. at 1113 n.6.
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court is in line with the Supreme Court's opinion in Stewart v.
Abend, which concluded that the producers of the film Rear Window
were not entitled, as a matter of fair use, to distribute their film
without the permission of the holders of the renewal term of the
copyright in the short story on which the movie was originally
based.591
8. Comparative Advertising, Information Merchants, and the
Ordinary (Personal) Use
The final group of cases highlight both the strength and the chief
drawback of the pattern-oriented approach. Its strength, as I have
emphasized above, lies in its relative predictability. Once the defen-
dant's activity is placed properly in the context of some relevant
pattern, the outcome of the fair use inquiry can be resolved with
little additional difficulty. The drawback is that the set of relevant
patterns seem to be relatively limited, may be resistant to change,
and apparently are not supported by a normative structure justify-
ing the particular set identified in the cases, or identified anywhere
else. 92 There is always a risk that the court will get the classifica-
tion wrong. Indeed, I should confirm again at this point that while
my efforts in this section to reconcile the last twenty-five years of
appellate fair use decision making may seem strained to some read-
ers and at least some points, I do not endorse the results reached in
each of these cases. Some of them were decided under now-out-
moded authority. Others betray an unnecessarily crabbed view of
the patterns on which they purport to rely. It must be remembered,
then, that the pattern-oriented approach is an analytic technique
that depends, as any fair use analysis must, on the records built by
the parties as well as on the strength and persistence of the pat-
terns invoked by the parties and courts.
591. 495 U.S. 207 (1990). The case might be out of step with the more recent opinion in the
Wind Done Gone litigation, SunTrust Bank u. Houghton Mifflin Co. See supra notes 269-71
and accompanying text. But the court in the latter case intimated that had the author not
engaged in a parodic retelling of Gone With the Wind, but instead had merely told or extended
the original novel from the perspective of one its original characters, her claim of fair use
would have been far weaker. See SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1279 & n.3.
592. I take up this question in more depth in the next Part, where I suggest that in the
context of copyright policy broadly understood, reliance on processes embedded in social or
cultural patterns are in fact a proper route to promoting creative expression.
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That concern may be evident nowhere more than with this group
of cases, in which a sizeable number of fair use cases have been
decided both in favor of and against what appears to be simple re-
production and redistribution of the plaintiff's works. On closer
inspection, as above, it appears that the group can be broken down.
On the one side lie cases in which the defendant is characterized by
the court as acting as a merchant in precisely the kinds of goods (or
works) offered by the plaintiff. This kind of "use" is unfair. These
include Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood,593 in which the defen-
dant offered access to radio broadcasts via telephone "listen lines;"
Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Board of Real-
tors,594 in which the defendant reproduced the plaintiff's real estate
listings in a supermarket brochure; Financial Information, Inc. v.
Moody's Investors Service, Inc.,595 involving the reproduction of the
plaintiff's financial market data; Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista
Home Entertainment, Inc.,5" in which the defendant produced and
sold online access to "clip previews" of the plaintiff's motion pic-
tures; and United States v. Slater,"9 in which the court confirmed
that a criminal copyright defendant convicted of software piracy was
not entitled to a jury instruction on the fair use doctrine.598
The premise that the defendant's use is unfair because the defen-
dant was acting not as a participant in some recognized or defined
social or cultural pattern, but instead as a mere market actor, either
selling without permission or buying without paying, extends fur-
ther. It led to the rejection of fair use arguments in United Tele-
phone Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Publishing Co., Inc.,5  involving
the unauthorized reproduction (pre-Feist) of telephone directory
listings; Micro Star v. Formgen,'" the case of the unauthorized
video game "sequels;" Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 1 in which the defen-
593. 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
594. 786 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1986).
595. 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984).
596. 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003).
597. 348 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003).
598. The Slater opinion is particularly clear in its characterization of the defendants' piracy
ring as consisting of a large-scale business dealing in unauthorized copies of copyrighted
computer programs. See id. at 669.
599. 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988).
600. 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
601. 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001).
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dant used the plaintiff's copyrighted sunglass design in an adver-
tisement; Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc.,' where
the defendant decorated the set of a television program with a
poster depicting the plaintiff's copyrighted quilt; and two recent
cases involving unauthorized distribution of copies of copyrighted
religious materials or prayer books. °3 The premise that the defen-
dant was simply a market participant, as either consumer or mer-
chant, and not a member of some distinct cultural pattern, also
dictated findings of no fair use in the two appellate cases to date to
deal with peer-to-peer file sharing services on the Internet, A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,' and In re Aimster Copyright Litiga-
tion.' 5 I return to the problem of new uses and new technologies in
the next Part, but here it should be noted that courts treated fair
use questions in both cases as relatively straightforward, because
in both it appeared to courts that the defendants were simple mer-
chants and the users of their technologies were simple consumers.
Yet there is a parallel class of "information merchants" that have
succeeded on fair use claims where these "ordinary merchants" have
failed, and it appears that the most sensible way to distinguish the
two groups is according to the courts' characterizations of the pat-
terns into which the defendants' practices fall. One cluster of these
latter cases involves comparative advertising. It appears that so
long as the plaintiff's work is used by the defendant to advertise
some other product or service offered by the defendant, that use
should be fair so long as it can be described credibly as "comparative
advertising." Such a characterization carried the day for defendants
in Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Bleem, LLC,6' in
which the defendant advertised its computer product using a screen
shot taken from the plaintiffs program, Consumers Union v. Gen-
eral Signal Corp., involving reuse of a Consumer Reports product
602. 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
603. Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94,98-99 (2d
Cir. 2002) (noting that defendants copied plaintiffs' prayer book and used it exactly as the
plaintiffs would have); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110,
1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that defendants copied and distributed religious text to church
members).
604. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
605. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
606. 214 F.3d 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 2000).
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review, 6 7 and Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspa-
pers, Inc., °8 in which the defendant advertised its television pro-
gramming guide by including a photograph of the cover of plaintiffs
competing publication. In each of these cases, "advertising" was
deemed to be noninjurious to the health of a copyright. One might
say that these courts concluded that the defendants were not acting
in the market for the plaintiffs product but were one level removed,
part of a pattern of offering information about that market to con-
sumers considering whether and how to enter it.
If that distinction sounds incredible (these meta-information
providers easily could be classed as profiting from derivative works,
and the cost of permissions built into advertising expenses gener-
ally), consider that it seems to extend more broadly, to support fair
use decisions favoring other distributors of "information about
information." So long as the defendant is engaged in compiling and
distributing information about other parties' copyrighted works-
a function related to, but conceptually distinct from, criticism or
evaluation-it appears to be part of a protected pattern. This ex-
plains the results in Ty, Inc. v. Publications International Ltd. (the
Beanie Baby case, in which Judge Posner explicitly compared the
creators of the collectors' guide to critics or evaluators),' and Kelly
v. Arriba Soft, Inc., concluding that an Internet search engine offer-
ing results consisting of thumbnail reproductions of the plaintiffs
photographs would be engaged in fair use, but offering full-size
copies would not be.610
That leaves the paradox of the "ordinary use," or what some
courts (in the cases cited above) characterize as the "intrinsic func-
tion" of the copyrighted work. In the main, invoking the "intrinsic
function" standard means that a court is disinclined to find a given
use fair, since the defendant is using the work in the same way that
the plaintiff intended that it be used, and for which the plaintiff
likely expected to be compensated." The paradox is what the law
607. 724 F.2d 1044, 1046 (2d Cir. 1983).
608. 626 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1980).
609. 292 F.3d 512, 517-20 (7th Cir. 2002).
610. 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003).
611. See Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94,98-99
(2d Cir. 2002); Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 174-76 (2d Cir. 2001); Marcus v. Rowley,
695 F.2d 1171, 1173 (9th Cir. 1983); supra note 295 (describing Nimmer's "functional" test for
the fourth fair use factor).
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should make of an "ordinary" use that is simultaneously and plausi-
bly characterized as a fair "personal" or "private" use. Recall that in
Diamond Multimedia Systems, the Ninth Circuit intimated strongly
that it regarded digital reproduction of recorded music onto portable
MP3 players to be noncommercial, private, personal use, deserving
of protection as fair use.6" Yet it could also be said that this is pre-
cisely the kind of "ordinary" use for which compensation (and per-
mission) is expected.
In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, the court argued
that the defendant's unauthorized use of a poster depicting the plain-
tiff's quilt to decorate the set of a television production was compa-
rable to a homeowner's use of a poster to decorate a home, conclud-
ing (reasonably, under the facts of the case) that compensation was
owed in both cases. 1' The positions in Diamond Multimedia Sys-
tems and in Ringgold seem to be conceptually incompatible. One
possible resolution is to accept the relevance of a type of time- or
space-"shifting" argument that the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Sony and that the court in Diamond Multimedia Systems seemed
willing to entertain. A second resolution is to accept the correctness
of Ringgold and the error of the court in Diamond Multimedia Sys-
tems; the "ordinary use" approach seems to take both cases out of
the realm of relevant social or cultural patterns.
C. Fair Use Problems and Solutions
In this section I discuss some of the more picturesque flaws in the
fair use doctrine and suggest that the pattern-oriented approach
addresses those flaws more successfully than competing schemes.
The first of these is a strategic or tactical dimension that is often
underappreciated in fair use analyses: the problem of ex ante deci-
sion making. The remaining four are conceptual questions floating
atop contemporary fair use jurisprudence: the role of markets, the
question of "transformative" use, the "commercial/ noncommercial"
distinction, and dealing with emergent practices, including file
sharing and what some refer to as "transformative critical ap-
propriation." This final topic raises a particularly acute question: To
612. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079
(9th Cir. 1999).
613. 126 F.3d 70, 79-80.
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what extent can the pattern-oriented approach accommodate social
and cultural evolution?
1. Improving Fair Use Decision Making: The Ex Ante Problem
Perhaps the most serious flaw in the fair use doctrine is that it
functions almost entirely as a creature of judges. Fair use is an ex
post determination, a lottery argument offered by accused infringers
forced to gamble, after the fact, that they did not need permission
before. Lawyers bemoan the unpredictability that reliance on the
four fair use factors brings. As many have noted, two of the three
Supreme Court decisions on fair use were reached on closely divided
votes.614 All three involved reversals at the intermediate appellate
level and again at the Supreme Court level.6"
This cannot be the way anyone intends the copyright system to
function. The rest of copyright law, as practitioners and scholars
both know, is largely a matter of planning. A would-be "fair user
who asks counsel for advice on whether to seek permission or to
seek refuge under § 107 inevitably is counseled to seek permission.
Over time, this has the inevitable effect of training both producers
and consumers of copyrighted works, and counsel, judges, and even
members of Congress, that permission is not only a norm but a com-
pelling norm. Fair use becomes not merely the exception but an
extraordinary exception, to be dispensed only rarely and even then
only by the grace of unpredictable authority.
If, by contrast, the fair use doctrine is to mean something sub-
stantial, and if Congress and the Supreme Court are to be held to
their word regarding the benefits of research, scholarship, criticism,
journalism, and the like, there must be a means for those planning
to use copyrighted works in those ways to have some confidence that
614. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571 (1994) (deciding nine to zero);
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 541 (1985) (splitting six to
three); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 418 (1984) (splitting
five to four).
615. Acuff-Rose Music v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev'd, 972 F.2d
1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enter., 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd in part and rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429
(C.D. Cal. 1979), affd in part and rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S.
417 (1984).
1666 [Vol. 45:1525
they will not be challenged unexpectedly by copyright owners.6 16 The
pattern-oriented approach offers not a perfect solution to that di-
lemma, but a solution that is superior to one that calls only for bal-
ancing the respective benefits of authorized and unauthorized use,
or to a solution that looks primarily, if not exclusively, to the avail-
ability of purchased permission. Appeals to "fairness" or to some
cabined form of "the good life" are, like appeals to market failure,
difficult enough for scholars and judges to manage. Practitioners
have little patience for such abstractions. The pattern-oriented ap-
proach, however, gives system participants at both front and back
ends a framework for the fair use inquiry that, while never as cer-
tain as obtaining express permission, offers a prospective "fair user"
the possibility of far better than even odds. If that person can "talk
the talk" (describe the practice in terms that connect to a defined
cultural or social pattern) and also "walk the walk" (demonstrate
that his or her conduct and practice are consistent with the roles
and practices of that pattern), the odds of successfully asserting a
fair use claim should increase significantly.
2. Fair Use and Markets for Copyrighted Works
The fourth statutory fair use factor commands courts to consider
the effect of the defendant's use on the market for and the value of
the plaintiffs work. The Court in Sony added the now-accepted gloss
that this factor should take account not only of the defendant's ac-
tivities but of the possibility that many more would follow in the
defendant's footsteps.617 If the defendant's practice were universal-
ized, what would the character of the plaintiff's injury be? In Harper
& Row, the Court offered the suggestion that a use was unlikely to
be fair if the defendant was attempting to avoid payment of a "cus-
tomary" fee,61" and in Campbell the Court noted that while the
fourth factor was undoubtedly first among equals in the fair use
616. This proposition is based on considerations of efficiency. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601
(2001) (describing the role of ex ante entitlements in designing optimal property rights
scheme, and fairness); see also JESSIcA LrrMAN, DIGrrAL COPYRIGHT 178-80 (2001) (arguing
that copyright rules need to be easy to understand, if we expect individuals to obey them).
617. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451.
618. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
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calculus, some market effects simply did not count.619 On the whole,
the Court has been unhelpful in explaining the meaning of the mar-
ket in the context of fair use.
Suppose a copyright holder develops the interest and the ability
not only to distribute reproductions of a copyrighted work in its
entirety, but to collect a royalty for any conceivable reproduction,
distribution, display, performance, or derivative of both the entire
work and any lesser-included portion of the work. Does that ability
to collect royalties define "the market" for the work, so that any use
of the work without paying the royalty constitutes "market injury"
that disfavors fair use? The American Geophysical Union and
Princeton University Press courts come close to that conclusion;620 in
their judgment, avoidance of such a market renders a fair use claim
unlikely to succeed if the market is "traditional, reasonable, or like-
ly to be developed 621-which is a stone's throw from concluding, as
the Ninth Circuit did in A & M Records v. Napster, that the copy-
right holder possesses both the power to enforce an existing market
for a copyrighted work and the power to determine whether a mar-
ket should emerge.622 Under this approach, markets may be defined
ex ante by the author's incentive structure, or ex post by the
author's ability to collect revenue. Markets-and fair use-are what
authors say they are.
How then should meaning be given to the idea of markets for
copyrighted works, without permitting the concept of markets to
swallow whole the notion of uncompensated use? The answer here
should be akin to the answer provided above with respect to the
definition of a social or cultural pattern relevant to consumption and
use of the work. One should take the American Geophysical Union
court at its word, but scrutinize the phrase "reasonable, customary,
or likely to be developed." The fact that the plaintiff intends to
charge for certain uses, which might make a market "likely to be
619. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
620. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385-88 (6th
Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926-31 (2d Cir. 1994).
621. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387; Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930.
622. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 1998); Ringgold v. Black Entm't
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1997); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92
F. Supp. 2d 349,352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
623. See supra note 621 and accompanying text.
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developed," does not automatically make a permission structure also
"reasonable," let alone "customary." One needs to ask whether it is
"reasonable" or "customary" or "likely" against a relevant set of
expectations. And those expectations should include not only the
expectations of the copyright holder; they also should include prov-
able social and cultural patterns, if any, that surround use of the
plaintiff's works according to the description provided in Part
IV.A.1. The notion of an independent "market" that is out there,
waiting to be found, is somewhat unsettling both economically and
philosophically. Yet just as (for fair use purposes) social patterns are
finally determined by courts, so too is the market. 24 The distinction
between the (modern) market economy and the (premodern)"embed-
ded" economy, as drawn by Karl Polanyi, both illustrates and inte-
grates how a court should distinguish between transactions requir-
ing compensation and those that do not.62 Within a social or cul-
tural pattern, information transactions are arranged according to
the conventions and structures of the pattern, rather than according
to those of the market economy.
624. The copyright owner might be able to recapture some revenues potentially associated
with "fair users" from paying customers, a theme emphasized in the patent context recently
by Judge Posner. See Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002). The
(shared) expectations of both creative and consumptive communities may fairly be said never
to have anticipated those revenues in the first place when evaluating incentives to create.
625. See POLANYI, supra note 449, at 57 ("Instead of economy being embedded in social
relations [the older model], social relations are embedded in the economic system.").
"Embedded" markets in Polanyi's account are "markets" that are organized not merely by
modem notions of price, but by socio-political structures, or (roughly) what I refer to as
patterns. See KARL POLANyi, THE LIVELIHOOD OF MAN 47-56 (Harry W. Pearson ed., 1977).
The sense of "market" as that term is used in § 107 is the modem sense of market organized
by price. In theory, the distinction, based on custom, norm, and practice, preserves the best
of both worlds: the autonomy, civility, and welfare-enhancing effects of the market economy,
see Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351-55
(1996); Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 766-71, 775-76 (1986), and the social and cultural
importance of a socially-constructed "commons" that stands apart from that market. See Carol
M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the
Information Age, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 89. Cf Victor Nee & Paul
Ingram, Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social Structure, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 19, 20-24 (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee eds., 1998)
(describing institutionalist model of social networks to complement institutional economic
models).
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3. Defining "Transformative" Uses
The Campbell decision gave the law the "transformative use"
standard as a measure of the first fair use factor.626 Making "trans-
formation" the touchstone of the first factor has led to a raft of fair
use cases in which any and every would-be fair use claimant argues
that "transformation" is involved. As a beacon of fair use, the
transformative use standard has become all things to all people. In
Campbell, Roy Orbison's pop standard "Oh, Pretty Woman" was
"transformed" into 2 Live Crew's rap "parody." 27 The court in N11 iez
agreed that reproducing the plaintiff's photograph in the newspaper
"transformed" the photograph into news.628 In Sony v. Bleem, the
defendant "transformed" the plaintiffs audiovisual work (a screen
shot of the plaintiffs video game) into comparative advertising.62 In
Sony v. Connectix, the defendant successfully argued that building
a rival video game platform using a derivative of the plaintiffs copy-
righted computer program "transformed" that program.' 0 In A & M
Records v. Napster, Napster argued unsuccessfully that users of its
MusicShare technology were "transforming" the plaintiffs' musical
works by digitizing them and sharing them around the world."
As the market must have legal boundaries, so must "transforma-
tion" (at least so long as Campbell remains the law). When con-
nected to the notion of social and cultural patterns, "transformation"
is something that happens to a work, or more to the point, to a type
of work, when it is processed in the context of a certain social prac-
tice, by participants in that practice. The idea of "degrees" of trans-
formation, implicit in the Court's note in Campbell that a defendant
who produces a work that is "more" transformative earns greater
notice under fair use," makes sense if one focuses not on the work
itself but on the manner in which the defendant practices. Social
626. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). That standard was
offered originally by Judge Leval as a unifying theme for all of fair use, to measure the kind
of creativity that fair use would do a better job of promoting than centralizing copyright
control in the author. Leval, supra note 174, at 1111.
627. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572.
628. Ndfiez v. Caribbean Intl News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000).
629. Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022, (9th Cir. 2000).
630. Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596,606-07 (9th Cir. 2000).
631. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).
632. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582 n.16.
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patterns, as I have suggested they be defined, may be inherently
transformative, that is, inherently creative. I elaborate on the social
science support for that proposition in the next Part. Here, I note
that the notion of transformative use can be successfully cabined by
referring to the patterns idea.
4. Distinguishing Between "Commercial" and "Noncommercial"
Uses
The same is true with respect to the distinction between "commer-
cial" and "noncommercial" uses. The distinction derives from the
decision in Sony, which noted that the plaintiff bore the burden of
proving market injury from the VTR users' (noncommercial) time-
shifting. 3 From that case and its successor, Harper & Row, we
get the notion that "commercial" use is "presumptively" unfair.'
Although the Court tried in Campbell to undo the damage by in-
sisting that a finding of "commercial" use under the first factor
ought to be weighed in the fair use calculus along with all other
considerations,6 courts still cite frequently to the commercial use
"presumption" in deciding not to sustain a fair use claim. At the
least, some courts and scholars use the "commercial/noncommercial"
dividing line to allocate the burden of proof with respect to market
injury.
Unless "commercial" means "income-producing," however, the
term as deployed by the Supreme Court means nothing at all,"8 and
if it means "income-producing," then virtually no use of copyrighted
material is "noncommercial." Music consumers using Napster's
technology were engaged in "commercial" use because they were
saving money that otherwise would be spent buying recorded music.
By this standard, even time-shifting with a VTR should count as
"commercial," given consumer "income" measured by the costs of
633. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984).
634. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (quoting
Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451).
635. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583-84.
636. The time-shifters in Sony received nothing from their retention of copies of the
plaintiffs' programs. The infringing journalists in Harper & Row were engaged in
"commercial" use since they were selling copies of their magazine. The noninfringing
musicians in Campbell were engaged in commercial" use since they hoped to profit from sales
of their record album.
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pre-recorded tapes that go unpurchased. As some courts have ob-
served, even the practices described in the preamble to § 107 are
routinely engaged in for money, but that should make them no more
"commercial" than genuine (if rare) altruism.
As with markets and "transformation," and for the same reasons,
evidence of social and cultural patterns can and should provide a
useful dividing line for what makes use of a copyrighted work un-
fairly "commercial." As for the facts of the case, Sony, in which the
noncommercial/commercial paradigm was introduced formally, it
may be stretching the notion of patterns to conclude that "time-shift-
ing" amounts to a social or cultural pattern that ought to be ex-
empted from the copyright market. Set against the Court's reliance
on the "staple item of commerce" doctrine from patent law, however,
it becomes clearer that the commercial/noncommercial line is in fact
based on a sensible pattern-that of VTR consumers dealing at arms'
length with a commercial vendor, Sony. (This is not a social or cul-
tural pattern in the fair use sense, but the market itself.) For doc-
trinal reasons, 7 time-shifting consumers must be deemed to be
non-infringing, but the opinion otherwise tells us relatively little
about fair use. Generalizing beyond Sony, one should conclude that
"noncommercial" use consists of a pattern in which consumption or
use of the work is structured on nonmarket grounds, that is, accord-
ing to the norms and conventions of an "embedded" rather than
price-based economy, as noted above."8 Although this standard is
considerably less than perfect even in describing the decided cases,
it has the virtue of depending on evidence other than whether or not
the defendants received, or avoided having to spend, cash.
5. Evaluating Emerging Practices of Personal Use, File
Sharing, and Critical Appropriation
That leaves the problem with which this Article began, that is,
how to evaluate claims that "file sharing" constitutes fair use. I
situate this in the somewhat broader context of the individual "per-
sonal" user, the individual appropriator, new and emerging uses,
and uses of new and evolving technologies, all of which (as Napster,
637. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text (describing procedural context of Sony).
638. See supra notes 449, 625 and accompanying text.
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Sony, and Campbell, among other cases, suggest) have reached
difficult accommodations under fair use. These problems will con-
tinue to be thorny, not only in the direct infringement versus fair
use context that this Article has addressed directly, but in the sec-
ondary liability context that was raised in Sony and again in
Napster and that is likely to arise frequently in the future, given
the pace of technological evolution. In one way or another, these
situations magnify concern over the relationship between an
individual "use" that might be minor in effect but that causes a
copyright owner significant concern when expanded dramatically
(hypotethetically or actually) to exponential levels.
Of particular concern in this area is whether the patterns-ap-
proach retains the ability to process evolving social and cultural
practices given its clear affinity for recognition of fair use at at mea-
sured pace, rather than in response to dramatic change." s
Taking the "fairness" of file sharing and file sharing technology
as an example of an arguably "fair" social or cultural pattern, the
pattern-oriented approach suggests that the question of fairness
cannot be answered in such abstract terms or with respect to P2P
technology as a whole. It is difficult and probably impossible to con-
test the abstract notion that sharing is "good" and in some sense
constitutes the kind of social pattern that should be insulated from
market-related claims of copyright owners.' But one needs to know
639. It should be clear that my conclusion differs from models that reserve special fair use
protection for "radical improvers." See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement
in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX L. REV. 989, 1068-72 (1997) (arguing that the more
transformative the individual use, the less likely the private market will support it). A
pattern-oriented approach may at times be less generous to a "radical improver" (though one
ought not necessarily to conclude that such an interest cannot otherwise be recognized in
copyright law), but more generous in fields involving what appears to be "ordinary"
improvement.
640. Why sharing is good is not a mystery. At an individual level, when we share, we may
feel better about ourselves (perhaps because others think better of us, or because we have
behaved altruistically, or because we have contributed to some collective good, or because we
expect others to behave likewise in return). We may have increased society's store of wealth,
or have effected a fairer redistribution of existingwealth. See Lunney, supra note 5, at 859-61.
With respect to collective benefits and to creative and inventive activity in particular, not only
do patterns of sharing derive from a powerful intuition, but their benefits have been observed
empirically. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1017, 1055-59 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg,
Exclusive Rights]; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 181-84 (1987); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 (1999);
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who and what is being shared, and whether what is happening gen-
uinely can be considered "sharing."
I do not agree, therefore, that there is any single, correct defini-
tion of "sharing" and that the legitimacy of "file sharing" can be
measured absolutely against that standard. Use of a P2P computer
network may or may not be part of a social pattern as described
above.6" 1 The computer science literature offers a starting point for
locating evidence of relevant patterns of which P2P systems may be
a part.642 Whether or not we refer to that pattern as a species of
"sharing" may be relevant to the fair use question, but should not
cf LEwIS HYDE, THE Gwur IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY (1983) (describing,
from the artist's perspective, the role of the free flow of artistic production in a market-
oriented society); Robert K. Merton, The Normative Structure of Science, reprinted in THE
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 267, 273-75 (Norman W.
Storer ed., 1973).
On the ground that sharing of scholarly work is a known good, disputes over copyright
ownership within the academy generally have been resolved in favor of individual scholars
and against their institutional employers, as matters of custom, tradition, and practice-i.e.,
patterns-notwithstanding the absence of an "academic" exception from copyright's work
made for hire doctrine. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1988)
(dictum); Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1093-96 (7th Cir. 1987); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability,
53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1200-04 (2000).
641. There is some evidence, for example, that at least some network contexts lack the joint
expectations of reciprocity that characterize most social or cultural patterns. Cf Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-
Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REv. 505, 532 (2003) (arguing that behavior of uploading file
sharers is based on faulty perceptions of reciprocity by other participants in file sharing
networks); Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, 5 FIRST MONDAY,
Issue 10 (Oct. 2, 2000), at http'/Jwww.firstmonday.dkissues/ssueS5_0l/adar/index.html. I
argue that how we understand the practice, and not the label, should play an important role
in understanding how the law should regulate music "sharing" and file "sharing" on the
Internet. The practice of sharing should be considered, to the extent possible, not as a matter
of dictionary definitions, but as a matter of experience.
642. There is a rich field of research focused on developing software applications around
social practices, known as Computer Supported Collaborative Work (CSCW). For examples
of suggestions that certain uses of file sharing systems may be part of an embedded social
practice, see Barry Brown et al., Music Sharing as a Computer Supported Collaborative
Application, in ECSCW 2001: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON
COMPUrER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK, 16-20 SEPTEMBER 2001, BONN, GERMANY 179-98
(Wolfgang Prinz et al. eds., 2001); cf Philip E. Agre, P2P and the Promise ofInternet Equality,
COMM. ACM Feb. 2003, at 39 (noting the impossibility of validating "distributed computing"
as such without knowing the activities that the technology supports). For a discussion of the
idea that computer networks can support social networks, see Barry Wellman, An Electronic
Group Is Virtually a Social Network, in CULTURE OF THE INTERNET 179-205 (Sara Kiesler ed.,
1997).
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be determinative. 64 In both A & M Records v. Napster and In re
Aimster, courts found an utter absence of evidence of social or cul-
tural patterns on which file sharers might have relied. In that
sense, on the fair use question, both courts likely reached the right
result.
Similarly, critical "appropriation," the sort of provocative recast-
ing of existing works for critical purposes practiced by "audiocollage"
artists such as Negativland and John Oswald and Plunderphonics
and a host of others working both in sound and in other media,
asserts compelling claims to fair use at the level of the individual
artist. To be sustained under a pattern-oriented approach, artists
and critics working in this or future genres must work both forward
and backward, in argumentative terms.6" As participants in an
643. "File sharing," if it is a pattern, is only one of a large number of sharing" phenomena
or patterns recognized by our culture. There is the "kindergarten" sharing to which this
Article referred above, so obviously noble that sharing is part and parcel of what we should
teach our children. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. But see Jane C. Ginsburg, How
Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLum.-VLA J.L. & ARIs 61, 63 (2002) (taking the
view that sharing is the playground equivalent of spinach, that is, since sharing necessarily
involves "giving something up," children hate to do it). When critiquing a pattern, however,
where you stand may depend on where you sit. If the rule is sole ownership, then it should
not be surprising to observe that children find sharing distasteful. If the community presumes
that sharing is the rule, then one might well observe the opposite. In any case, my own
children, for what it's worth, love vegetables. Even spinach. Always have. On the tricky
problem of endogenous preferences, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Elsewhere, sometimes in law and sometimes not, we find a plethora of recognized sharing
patterns, involving intangibles as well as tangibles: shared attitudes, shared resources,
shared meaning, shared language, shared culture, shared experience, shared responsibility,
shared obligation, shared strength. There is one's "fair share," market share, profit share,
shares of stock, and cropshare. "Time shares" are bought and sold in the real estate market
and time sharing was once an innovative way to accommodate multiple computer users in a
limited resource environment. "Shareware" describes a type of computer program that is
distributed for free, with the express reservation that users ought to remit some payment if
they continue to use the program."Mindshare" has gained currency in the business community
as shorthand for a relevant market's perception that a given product or service is "important."
644. There is an essential tension, which may not be entirely resolvable, between the
backward-looking nature of a legal system that both creates and relies on stable meanings,
see Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77
TEX. L. REV. 923, 940-42 (1999), and the forward-looking nature of a system that takes as one
of its guiding principles the provision of incentives for new and diverse forms of cultural
expression. That tension seems fundamental to copyright law, and as such is (happily) beyond
the scope of this Article. Cf Paul Edward Geller, Copyright History and the Future: What's
Culture Got to Do With It, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOCV OF THE U.S.A. 209, 210 (2000) ("We become
Janus-faced at the turn of every century and, more so, at the turn of each millennium. Facing
both backward and forward, we are tempted to interpret history to anticipate or to influence
the future.").
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emergent practice, they work to stake out new roles and practices
for members of that practice-even if, or especially if, that means
transcending or redefining conventional constructs of "art" or "cre-
ativity"-and to define their output with reference to those roles and
practices.' To assure the legitimacy of the practice in copyright
terms, and particularly as a matter of fair use, the pattern they
establish should be grounded initially in an existing pattern and
gradually "spun off" and recognized independently. This process
need not and indeed often will not depend on the rhetorical de-
mands of the law; it may well happen organically and/or with an
occasional legal nudge. Patterns and practices evolve and stabilize
over time (or do not), and from time to time they will respond to how
the legal system reacts if and when litigation (or other legal regula-
tion) arises. The craft of "reverse engineering" appears to have fol-
lowed this model. "Reverse engineering" was established initially as
fair use under the head of "research and investigation," practices
with an established pedigree. Over a relatively short period of time,
"reverse engineering" claims were being brought and vindicated on
their own terms, suggesting that courts have both recognized and in
part created a social or cultural pattern defined as "reverse engineer-
ing" that characteristically supports claims of fair use.
There is no reason to suppose that arguments favoring critical
appropriation may not follow a similar course.' There is some
evidence in the area of copyrighted music that it already has done
so. "Sampling" of a popular musical recording to create a new work
has been considered a matter for copyright markets following a
district court injunction against an early "sampling" defendant in
Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros.647 The explosive success of
645. See Negativland, Two Relationships to a Cultural Public Domain, LAw & CONTEmiP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 239, 239-40.
646. Some of those who consider themselves to be appropriationist artists may, of course,
choose to avoid this strategy in order to preserve the integrity of their outsider status, and to
seek legal recognition for their work in other ways. The battle against the law may be part
and parcel of the artistic enterprise. Consider the perspective of the conceptual artist Christo,
who endured years of zoning battles with local authorities before erecting his "Running Fence"
in Sonoma County, California: 'It's hard to explain that the work is not only the fabric, steel
poles, or Fence. Everybody here [at the zoning hearing] is part of my work. Even those who
don't want to be are part of my work...." Milner S. Ball, Good Old American Permits:
Madisonian Federalism on the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf, 12 ENVrL. L. 623, 656
(1982).
647. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Institutionalization of "sampling" licenses is
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"sampling"-based popular music, and the fact that unauthorized
sampling has thrived notwithstanding industry practice, 6 suggests
that the time is ripe for legal acknowledgment of a sampling pat-
tern. In fact, the Ninth Circuit recently did reject an infringement
claim against a "sampling" defendant on what amounted to a fair-
ness argument,6 9 suggesting, importantly, that the pattern-oriented
approach may be predictive of the evolution of patterns, as well as
reactive.
In the absence of such a pattern-related argument, fair use claims
on behalf of individual "appropriators" or mere "personal" or "pri-
vate" users ought ordinarily to fail. The case most commonly cited
in support of a "personal" or "private" right to use a copyrighted
work is Sony, and as I have suggested above, that case is best un-
derstood in pattern-oriented terms than in terms of the interests of
the "time-shifting" VTR users. Why this result may be the right one
in copyright terms generally is, among other things, the topic of the
next and final Part.
V. THE PURPOSES OF PATTERNS
To this point this Article has argued that a pattern-oriented ap-
proach is a descriptively appropriate method of unifying fair use
decision making. This Part takes up the counterpart argument that
this approach is one that courts ought to pursue, given our under-
standing of the policy purposes of copyright law. It does so by de-
parting from conventional economic accounts of the welfare-maxi-
mizing structures of copyright.' (One could justify the pattern-
oriented approach within a market framework. Economists have
concluded that structured sharing arrangements, particularly those
characterized by formal and informal mechanisms that police the
limits of the structure, can be part of a welfare-maximizing de-
reflected in practitioner literature. See, e.g., Donald E. Biederman et al., Counseling Clients
in the Entertainment Industry: Music Publishing, 648 PLI/PAT (Practicing Law Institute
March-April 2001).
648. See Roberta Guger, The Mash-up Revolution (Aug. 9, 2003), available at
httpJ/www.salon.com/entmusicfeature2003/08/09/mashups-crugerhndex-np.html.
649. See Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003) (characterizing defendants'
sampling as "de minimis" and therefore excused).
650. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
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sign.)"' Instead, here I suggest that it is possible that in an instru-
mental sense that relies informally on copyright policy rather than
on an economist's formal "welfare" construct, patterns are likely to
give society precisely what it needs, in copyright terms, and pre-
cisely what it is likely not to get from copyright markets alone. Rely-
ing on contemporary research and theory in sociology, anthropology,
and cognitive psychology, I suggest that creativity and creative
651. In legal terms, the four factors of the fair use statute would serve as a device for
bypassing direct, difficult questions of efficient markets in favor of an apparently neutral and
administrable proxy. Elena Kagan has proposed a related approach under First Amendment
doctrine. Cf Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413, 441 (1996) (characterizing levels of
scrutiny as an analytic technique that enables courts to avoid inquiry into governmental
motive in First Amendment cases).
The direct economic case has been made with respect to tangible goods. See Steven N. S.
Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements, 12
J.L. & ECON. 23, 26-27 (1969); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Incentives and Risk Sharing in
Sharecropping, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 219, 219-21 (1974); see also Douglas W. Allen & Dean
Lueck, The Role of Risk in Contract Choice, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 704, 724-25 (1999); Douglas
W. Allen & Dean Lueck, Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts, 24 RAND
J. EcON. 78, 79-80 (1993); Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, The "Back Forty"on a Handshake:
Specific Assets, Reputation, and the Structure of Farmland Contracts, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
366, 367-68, 370 (1992); David M.G. Newbery, Risk Sharing, Sharecropping and Uncertain
Labour Markets, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 585 (1977); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102
YALE L.J. 1315, 1341-44, 1392-93 (1993) (arguing that common property regimes operate to
reduce risk by pooling access to resources). Cheung and Stiglitz argue that cropshare
contracts are used to avoid moral hazard problems that arise between landowners and
farmers or laborers; Allen and Leuck argue that such contracts can increase social welfare
because transactions costs in monitoring compliance are low.
Parallel research confirms the potential optimality of "sharing" structures in intangible
property, such as information goods. See Hal R. Varian, Buying, Sharing and Renting
Information Goods, 48 J. INDUS. EcON. 473, 473, 475 (2000) (building on Stanley M. Besen &
Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Private Copying, Appropriability, and Optimal Copying Royalties, 32
J.L. & ECON. 255,256-57 (1989)); see also Yannis Bakos et al., Shared Information Goods, 42
J.L. & EcoN. 117, 123 (1999); Darlene C. Chisholm, Profit-Sharing Versus Fixed-Payment
Contracts: Evidence From the Motion Pictures Industry, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 169 (1997);
Lunney, supra note 5, at 862-68 (arguing that private copying of copyrighted works could not
be offset by increased prices but would deprive copyright owners only of excess incentives to
produce already popular works, leaving copyright owners still able to optimize profits);
Meurer, supra note 160, at 138; Meurer, supra note 169, at 851, 876-77 (concluding that
technological and legal changes mean that positive effects on producer profits are likely to
occur); Michael J. Meurer, Too Many Markets or Too Few? Copyright Policy Toward Shared
Works, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (arguing that different forms of shared use may
be economically efficient depending on the extent to which those forms affect the demand
curve for the information product). But see Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. (forthcoming 2004) (criticizing economic analysis of benefits sharing that are
premised in price theory).
expression may not be the direct and determinative result of the
legal rules adopted, but that creativity effects are the probabilistic
results of a system designed according to the patterns orientation. 652
To make the pattern-oriented approach a framework for future anal-
ysis rather than a recapitulation of categories adopted by courts, as
reviewed in Part IV.B, I argue that it is the concept of the pattern
itself that is a principal concern, rather than the particular patterns
identified to date.
As an initial matter, scholars appear to agree, from a variety of
perspectives, that creativity as a social good is best fostered in an
environment populated by structured social groups. Wendy Gordon
recently made explicit the possible connections among creativity,
gifts and sharing, and a group or community orientation. "Shareable
goods are a traditional source of binding groups together: not only
standard 'public goods' such as highways and defense, but also folk
tales, art, songs, and symphonies. ' It may be the case, however,
that the community (that is, the pattern) sponsors the creativity,
rather than the other way around, or at least that the relationship
between the two is bidirectional and that each reinforces the other.
The research is more suggestive than conclusive, and it is not (ei-
ther in my presentation in this Part or within the disciplines that
have produced it) tightly integrated. Overall, the material suggests
that economists may be on to something when they suggest that
shared social or cultural patterns are welfare enhancing. More spe-
cifically, organizing the law of fair use around a privilege for expres-
sive processes in the context of patterns may be a sound social policy
for promoting the kind of creativity that copyright law is designed
to encourage. Fair use is not simply a device for declaring that copy-
right comes to an end; it is an affirmative argument for no copyright
liability under a specified set of circumstances.
652. For specific accounts (in different contexts) of models that bridge economic and
pattern-oriented concerns, see Benkler, supra note 424, at 369, 406-23 (discussing P2P
systems of information production, such as "open source" software communities, structured
by software licenses generally characterized by availability of the source code to all users,
accompanied by the power to modify that code); Merges, supra note 157, at 1327-61
(describing emergence of collective rights organizations in intellectual property environments
to reduce transactions costs in repeat-play environments).
653. WendyJ. Gordon, InteUectual Property, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STuDiEs 617,
644 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003).
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A. The Importance of Patterns and Social Networks
Scholars looking at the sociology of science and its implications
for patent law have recognized, if anecdotally, that the optimal orga-
nization of scientific research consists of independent communities
of researchers working with knowledge of one another's activities."'
Welfare costs from duplicative research are more than offset by
correction of mistakes, confirmation of research results, and differ-
ential analyses of common data, leading to better syntheses. Cul-
ture, in short, is constructed of patterns and networks.
The model-that cultural production is best understood at the
level of coordinated social practices-has been formalized, for scien-
tific communities at least. Robert Merton famously described "sci-
ence" according to its norms of public information disclosure and
exchange. 5 His perspective has been updated recently by Stephen
Hilgartner and Sherry Brandt-Rauf as the "datastream" model of
scientific exchange,' which considers "data" not as objects subject
to formalized processes of development and exchange, but as ele-
ments of evolving data streams, information embedded in the social
practices of scientific communities. Data streams are characterized
by evolving, heterogeneous networks of information and resources,
both tangible (raw materials, instruments, written descriptions) and
intangible (techniques, protocols, experience), each linked to the
654. See Eisenberg, Exclusive Rights, supra note 640, at 1061, 1063-65 (1989) (citing
Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1 MINERVA 54,
56 (1962) and the various works of Robert K Merton and Warren 0. Hagstrom).
655. Merton argued that science is characterized by a normative commitment to producing
knowledge as the common resource for the scientific community. See MERTON, supra note 640,
at 270, 274-75. Hagstrom refined Merton's model using a "gift/exchanges" framework for
scientific research, in which scientific research was contributed to the community in exchange
for nonmonetary recognition. See WARREN 0. HAGsTROM, THE SCIENTIFIC COMMuNnry 13-14
(1965).
656. See Stephen Hilgartner & Sherry Brandt-Rauf, Data Access, Ownership, and Control:
Toward Empirical Studies of Access Practices, 15 KNOWLEDGE 355 (1994). Thomas Mandeville
has offered an economic model of scientific research characterized by a similar process
orientation. See THOMAS MANDEVILLE, UNDERSTANDING NOVELTY: INFORMATION,
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM (1996). An organizational model of
information exchange to the same effect is presented in JOHN SEELY BROWN & PAUL DUGUID,
THE SOCIAL LIFE OF INFORMATIoN 91-111 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of institutional
practice, in addition to formal process, in understanding the meaning of information) and
John Seely Brown & Paul Duguid, Knowledge and Organization:A Social-Practice Perspective,
12 ORG. Sci. 198, 198-213 (2001).
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others. Elements of these networks range from the ordinary to the
specialized, novel, or scarce; from the reliable and valuable to the
uncertain and even incredible; from the stable to the contingent.
Interactions with these streams are not limited to an "upstream
researcher/downstream researcher" paradigm but instead occur in
the context of research networks of a range of individual actors and
institutions, with different levels of training, involvement, and in-
terest, which both define and are defined by their information access
practices. The overall point of the model is that in drawing distinc-
tions between rules for open access and rules for controlled access
to scientific information, it is necessary to understand in detail the
structure of these data streams and the networks in which they are
embedded. The right level of analysis is not the data "object" but
instead the stream as a whole. s7
Comparable arguments are seen in other cultural contexts. It is
argued that culture, as a whole, is produced not only by individuals
working alone, but by groups of people, working and interacting in
the context of practices defined by institutions and networks.68 The
concept of the gift, for example, was originally described as based
not on generosity, but as an exercise of power and influence in social
context, that is, as a mechanism for the reproduction and perpetua-
657. With respect to legal rules applied to scientific research, Hilgartner suggests that the
scientific enterprise would be better served by legal regimes that address these processes
instead of focusing so exclusively on the end-products of research. See Hilgartner & Brandt-
Rauf, supra note 656, at 366-69. Cf Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the
Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POLY at 145 (1996) (suggesting
that experimental use doctrine in patent law be conceived as a boundary for the activity of
small, synergistic groups). To the extent that the datastream model captures 'small science"
rather than 'big science' practiced in large, formal organizations, a more complex legal regime
may be appropriate. See J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed
Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property
Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 322-23 (2003).
658. See DiMaggio, supra note 457, at 283 (describing networks as crucial environments
for the activation of cognitive schemas); Friedland & Alford, supra note 457, at 232. The
relevant actor may be not the individual, but instead a particular identity constructed by an
individual for purposes of participating in a given network. See HARRISON C. WHITE, IDENTITY
AND CONTROL: A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF SOcIAL ACTION 5-9 (1992). White describes a social
network as a network of meanings, created by narratives that individuals use to structure the
connections between identities in a given social structure. See id. at 65-67. The focus on
identity and narrative enables a given individual to participate in multiple networks, and to
adapt identities and switch from network to network as needs arise. See supra note 501 and
accompanying text (describing connection between narrative construction and patterns).
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tion of social structures." 9 Gift-giving and reciprocity are now more
typically understood both as contributing to the stability of social
patterns and as patterns in themselves.' Carol Rose notes:
In whatever ways creative communities may be organized, the
point remains that in many intellectual and artistic endeavors,
creativity may be synergistic less with the world at large than
with communities of other artists, creators, and contributors. 661
To the extent that copyright's concerns with "creativity" and "prog-
ress" are linked to the evolution of culture more broadly,'es the law's
focus on patterns of an activity-the journalism of reporters and the
scholarship of scholars, for example, rather than "ordinary" or "pri-
vate" use by an individual-seems apt.
B. The Emergence of Creativity
One wonders, nonetheless, precisely how or why such patterns
may be connected to creativity or creative expression. Individuals
are "creative," in conventional understanding; if "creativity" is asso-
ciated with patterns or groups, it is because those patterns are ori-
ented toward creativity and attract or reinforce individual creative
behavior. The classic model is based on the notions of internaliza-
tion (in which the norms and processes of the groups are imprinted
on the individual) and externalization (in which the individual's
preferences influence the distinct social structure of which the indi-
vidual is a part).w3 A modern variant is the structuration thesis of
659. See MARCEL MAUSs, THE GIwi THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC
SocIErIEs (Ian Cunnison trans. 1954). This view comes with a cost, which is the risk that the
power relationship may be illegitimate. The evolution of patterns mitigates the risk, though
perhaps not entirely. See ROSEMARY J. COOMEE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIES: AuTHoRSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAw 42 (1998) (describing the role of
intellectual property law in stifling alternative cultural visions); Rose, supra note 625, at 107
(noting risk that custom and community norms can be "hierarchical, xenophobic, and
backward-looking").
660. See Gouldner, supra note 447, at 163-64, 172.
661. Rose, supra note 625, at 107.
662. See id at 106-08 (noting importance of social structures in constraining synergism
that finds expression in the commons, to avoid dissipation of its value).
663. The model is associated with Lev Vygotsky. See also JAAN VALSINER, THE GUIDED
MIND: A SOCIOGENETIC APPROACH TO PERSONALITY (1998).
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Anthony Giddens, noted above.6 The pattern-oriented approach
suggests the importance of patterns as such, whether or not each
pattern is deemed to be "productive" or "creative," and whether or
not individual participants can claim the status of a "creator."M
More recent work, related to research on situated social practices,'
proposes an alternative "emergentist" framework for understanding
the individual/social connection, in which both individual and social
forms remain significant, but their influence on one another and the
ultimate shape of the culture thereby produced evolves over time in
a dynamic rather than deterministic way.6 7 Importantly, the notion
of "emergence" is closely tied not only to understanding connections
between individual and social development generally, but more
specifically to the development of "creativity." From research on
patterns and practice and its connection to cognitive structures, in
this Part, I attempt briefly to connect these broad inquiries into the
character of society and culture to the more specific and relevant
question of creativity and, ultimately, to copyright law.
An earlier framework for inquiry into the nature of creativity
situated creative expression primarily in the creative or gifted indi-
vidual, and characterized creative activity as the act conceptually of
breaking out of one frame of reference and entering another. Cre-
ativity was characterized as transcending a boundary of some
sort,' a sort of "a-ha!" phenomenon in which distinctions between
old and new, inside and outside, individual and domain, person and
product, and so forth, were relatively clear. 9
664. See supra note 496 and accompanying text.
665. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1527,
1549-51 (2000) (noting the importance of groups as groups, and beyond the reward structures
they provide for individuals). Cf. Albert Bandura, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND
ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY (1986) (theorizing that groups are effective as models
for individual behavior).
666. See, e.g., EDwIN HUTCHINS, COGNITION IN THE WILD (1995); Gavriel Salomon, No
Distribution Without Individuals' Cognition, in DISTRIBUTED COGNITIONS: PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 111 (G. Salomon ed., 1993).
667. The notion of emergence" in social and evolutionary development goes back to the late
nineteenth century. Its application to cultural phenomena is far more recent, and therefore
undeveloped.
668. See, e.g., David N. Perkins, The Possibility of Invention, in THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY:
CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 362-85 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1988).
669. Much of the existing structure of copyright law reflects this kind of dualism.
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The pattern-oriented perspective, by contrast, recasts creativity
as an emergent property of a complex system. Given a group, or
pattern, or system of some sort, which is not purely homogeneous
but which is characterized by a relevant set of sociocultural rules or
constraints (such as context, conventions of a domain, and represen-
tation or internalization of that domain in the individual), novelty
or creative production is the probabilistic-though not necessary-
result.670 It is a process-oriented view, that creativity inheres in the
increased number of interconnections that arise in such a context,
to be contrasted with the older product-oriented view, the compari-
son of old and new.
The emergentist approach relies in part on broader interest in
exploring the properties of complex systems. These collections of
decentralized, evolutionary phenomena are ordered roughly by prop-
erties that cannot be captured by descriptions of their constituent
parts, which produce complex structures over long periods of time
via the interaction, uncoordinated events and actions.67' It is charac-
teristic of an "emergent" system that its properties cannot be pre-
dicted completely by analyses of the properties of its constituent
parts; instead, the system is characterized probabilistically.672
670. See Jerome S. Bruner, The Conditions of Creativity, in JEROME SEYMOUR BRUNER,
BEYOND THE INFORMATION GIVEN: STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGYOF KNOWING 208, 209 (Jeremy
M. Anglin ed., 1973) (describing the connectionist phenomena represented here as "effective
surprise"); MIHALYI CSncszENTMIHALYi, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996); GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF & SOCIETY: FROM THE
STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST (1934) (describing "the emergence of the novel" from
social patterns); Ben W. Dalton, Creativity, Habit and the Products of Creative Action:
Revising Joas, Incorporating Bourdieu, in SOC. THEORY (forthcoming 2004) (arguing, following
Joas' Creativity of Action (1996), that Bourdieu's concept ofhabitus implies that creativity can
be redefined as the adaptation of habitual practices to specific contexts of action, and in so
doing calls attention to patterns of creative activity by individuals); Kevin N. Dunbar, How
Scientists Think: On-Line Creativity and Conceptual Change in Science, in CREATIVE
THOUGHT: AN INVESTIGATION OF CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 461 (Thomas B.
Ward et al. eds., 1997); R. Keith Sawyer, The Emergence of Creativity, 12 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 447
(1999) (describing novelty as a necessary property of complex emergent systems); R. Keith
Sawyer, Introduction, in CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT (R. Keith Sawyer ed., 2003)
(describing role of artifacts and domains in mediating dynamic relationship between
individual and social processes); Dean Keith Simonton, Creativity: Cognitive, Personal,
Developmental, and Social Aspects, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 151-58 (2000).
671. See generally JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: How ADAFrATION BUILDS
CoMPLEXrrY (1995). The best popular work describing the theories and properties of complex
adaptive systems is JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987).
672. For a practical description and application of complexity theory and its probabilistic
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Examples at levels far grander than copyright law and creative
expression include the laws of thermodynamics, evolution by natu-
ral selection, and evolutionary game theory. At the relatively simple
level at which the approach is represented here, social and cultural
patterns can be used to define the contours of complex social sys-
tems that are probabilistically situated to produce creative expres-
sion."'3 If one favors such patterns in the law of fair use, then it is
likely that the creativity anticipated by the law will emerge.
The emergentist approach likewise relies in part on the sociology
of Bourdieu and others, to which my discussion of patterns in the
law initially referred."' In some respects, Bourdieu himself appears
to lack the attention to the evolutionary processes that underlie the
"emergence" of creativity as described in this Part, and his theory
does not directly address precisely how the individual and the group
connect to one another. But in other respects, his work and that of
creativity researchers working in this vein strongly echo that of the
complex systems perspective. Individuals who are part of diverse,
autonomous, motivated, cohesive groups with a common purpose
over time, that is, who share and appreciate a habitus, in Bourdieu's
terms, are likely to be creative.
A person who wants to make a creative contribution not only
must work within a creative system but must also reproduce
that system within his or her mind. In other words, the person
must learn the rules and content of the domain, as well as the
criteria of selection, the preferences of the field.675
dimensions to legal theory, see J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to
Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND.
L. REv. 1407 (1996). For an adaptation to decision-making processes involving the legal
system, see David G. Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent":
Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHi.-KENT.
L. REv. 1055, 1083-93 (1998).
673. The patterns described in Part IV.B.2, supra, consist in part of these sorts of systems.
I offer one additional example of how reverse engineering by computer scientists may,
according to those researchers themselves, produce unexpectedly creative or novel results. See
Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
501, 509-12, 514-16 (2003) (describing scientists' criticism of Digital Millennium Copyright
Act controls on certain computer science research). The weblog of computer scientist Edward
Felten is emblematic of the concern; it is titled "Freedom to Tinker." See httpj/www.
freedomtotinker.com (last visited Jan. 11, 2004).
674. See supra notes 454-56 and accompanying text.
675. CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 670, at 47.
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This perspective brings this Part full circle. It calls to mind the
description of the "datastream" model for scientific research with
which the Part introduced its description of the importance of pat-
terns. The habitus, as understood by members of the field, supplies
the formal and informal rules and frameworks of the discipline. The
learning and training of its members supplies the ability to make
connections between previously unconnected phenomena, and to
recognize differences between such connected phenomena and what
existed before.676 It is creative output of this kind that the copyright
system is designed to encourage,677 and it is this sort of creative
output that is captured by the pattern-oriented approach to fair use.
It should be clear that the social cognition analysis of the utility
derived from patterns is incomplete. How, for example, do some
practices and conventions rise to the level of patterns, and others
remain tentative and ever-changing? 78 The prescriptive case for the
pattern-oriented approach to fair use must be characterized as more
tentative than conclusive. The "emergentist" theory of creativity is
in its formative stages within the social sciences themselves, and
much remains to be learned in those domains, as well as in the
possible application of the theory to law. As an explanation of why
we should attend to a pattern-oriented approach to fair use, or to
676. See SHARON BAN,ACHIEVING EXTRAORDINARY ENDS: AN EssAYoN CREATviY 66-67
(1988); TONY BASTicy, INTUITION: How WE THINK AND AcT 215 (1982) (describing intuition
as nonlinear parallel processing of global multi-categorized information).
677. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. I leave implicit the corollary that the
character of the creativity produced by the functioning of markets in copyrighted works may
turn out not to be the kind of creativity that the copyright system intends to produce.
678. One suggestion comes from Mary Douglas, in How INSTITUTIONS THINK 112 (1986)
(arguing that institutions develop legitimacy via "naturalizing analogies"). This process calls
to mind the description above of the validation of reverse engineering. See supra notes 572-83
and accompanying text. See also Kathleen M. Carley, On the Evolution of Social and
Organizational Networks, 16 RES. IN THE SOC. OF ORG., 3-30 (David Knocke & Steven Andrew
eds., 1999) (describing model of socio-cognition in which knowledge networks (who knows
what information, and what information is related to what), cognitive social structures (who
knows whom), and individual cognitive networks (what each individual knows) co-evolve);
Tom R. Burns & Thomas Dietz, Cultural Evolution: Social Rule Systems and Human Agency,
7 INTIL Soc. 259 (1992) (proposing neo-Darwinist evolutionary model of cultural and
institutional change).
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other copyright problems, it appears to be a credible, if provocative,
starting point in fields (both copyright generally and fair use in
particular) that historically have lacked much in the way of coher-
ence in their relationship with society and culture.
CONCLUSION
Prompted by discomfort over judicial treatment of claims that file
sharing of digital musical works constitutes fair use, and more gen-
erally by the uncertain relationship in fair use between the individ-
ual defendant and the social practice the defendant arguably repre-
sents, this Article has attempted to address the problem of file shar-
ing by situating the fair use argument about that practice more
broadly in the context of the uncertain relationship between the law
of fair use and contemporary social science. It has argued that exist-
ing theories of the doctrine of fair use, and applications of the doc-
trine in the leading cases, have failed to recognize properly the role
of social and cultural patterns, and how individual defendants par-
ticipate in (or fail to participate in) those patterns. As a result, the
doctrine in its current form has a needlessly arid tone, leading to
fair use decisions unpredictably based solely on the four statutory
factors listed in § 107 of the Copyright Act. Taking pattern analysis
from its current position at the margins of fair use and placing it at
the forefront creates the potential for unifying application of the
doctrine while preserving a robust fair use zone. That approach is
justified in terms of the language of the statute and the history of
the doctrine, is consistent with the pattern of fair use cases decided
at least since enactment of § 107, and most important, is supported
by preliminary cognitive science research that suggests that focus-
ing on and privileging social and cultural patterns may be a reliable
way of ensuring the production of creative expression that comple-
ments creativity fostered by market mechanisms.
To some, it will appear that courts are engaged in elaborate post-
hoc rationalizations of the behavior of seemingly deserving defen-
dants, and that a pattern-oriented approach merely lends legitimacy
to the stories that lawyers tell to exonerate their clients. There is no
way thoroughly to rebut this charge, except to adopt some or all of
the proposals I suggest and to see whether and how they affect both
copyright litigation and judicial reasoning. In the end, it may turn
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out that the criticism is correct (though I have argued at length that
it is not)-but at the very least, the approach offers these storytell-
ers and their audiences a positive framework for structuring the
domain of fair use, instead of a negative framework for repelling the
domain of copyright. That is a benefit that ought not be overlooked.
Whether or not the approach proves its worth in full, implicit
throughout is the suggestion that pattern-oriented analysis may
have broader applicability to copyright law (and perhaps to the law
beyond) than merely to the fair use doctrine. This is particularly
important in light of my conclusion that fair use may not be an ap-
propriate tool for protecting ostensibly "personal" or "private" use.
Other doctrines may serve such interests more effectively.
For example, the doctrines of contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement played a central role in decisions to enjoin operation
of file sharing systems operated by Napster and by Aimster. As I
have described the Supreme Court's decision in Sony v. Universal
City Studios, that decision used what might be characterized as the
inverse of a pattern-oriented approach in order to determine that
the defendant's conduct was purely market-oriented with respect to
VTRs, and therefore not within the reach of copyright. Both doc-
trines of secondary liability may profit from more explicit recogni-
tion of social and cultural context in defining markets for things and
machines, as well as in recognizing patterns with respect to expres-
sive works.
"First sale" as a defense to a claim of unauthorized infringement
via distribution of a copyrighted work 79 is worth exploring in the
same way. The distinction between the right and the object has been
a central feature of copyright since the first copyright statute, the
Statute of Anne.' In a world where the phrase "tangible medium
of expression" truly means a medium that can be grasped in one's
hand, this dualism is not especially troubling. Sharing a book with
a friend or family member does not necessarily implicate any impor-
tant copyright interests. In an electronic age, an equivalent act
performed with a computer file may trigger a criminal investiga-
tion.68 1
679. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
680. See Madison, Complexity, supra note 18, at 138-41; supra note 24 and accompanying
text (describing origins of copyright's concern with the "copy").
681. See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (refusing to
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In copyright law, what are the privileges of ownership, or, to put
the question as others have put it, how, if at all, should the ratio-
nale for permitting the traditional form of sharing a tangible object
be applied in this different context?6 82 Courts use the fiction of
declaring that electronic "copies" of copyrighted works have been
made or distributed in order to remedy what they perceive as
unwarranted economic injury.' A better analytic method might ask
whether the distribution dynamic in question, be it "file sharing" or
some other process, is part and parcel of some recognized social
pattern. The court in A & M Records v. Napster may have been tak-
ing this position by concluding that Napster users were not "shar-
ing" music in the way that compact discs may be shared. When
Napster users retained "copies" of the plaintiffs' works, distribution
of the new "copies" took them beyond the limits of first sale: "Both
[Recording Industry Association ofAmerica v. Diamond Multimedia
Systems, Inc.]" 4 and [Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc.]' are inapposite because the methods of shifting in those
cases did not also simultaneously involve distribution of the copy-
righted material to the general public."' As a matter of the law of
distribution rights, placing the emphasis more directly on the pro-
cesses and patterns in which Napster users engaged would make
the opinion resonate more strongly with practice and, in the end,
make it a more credible statement of the law.
A third sense in which the patterns approach might be used in
the file sharing controversy is the idea/expression foundation of
all of copyright. In part, Napster was prosecuted for distributing
not copyrighted works themselves, but information about those
works. 6 7 Courts must distinguish between the "idea" of a work and
its protected "expression"-but how? Judge Hand's "abstractions"
dismiss an indictment under the Digital Millennium Copyright for "trafficking" in technology
used to circumvent controls on electronic books).
682. See Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a
Book, 48 VILL. L. REV. 13 (2003) (urging instantiation of norms of library use in copyright law).
683. Wendy Gordon has called this phenomenon "the restitutionary impulse." See Wendy
J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78
VA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
684. 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
685. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
686. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
687. See id. at 1011-12 (describing information-indexing function of Napster's servers).
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standard,' the most famous (if still unclear) analytic tool in this
area, explicitly invokes the "patterns" concept on which the present
fair use proposal is based, a linguistic coincidence that bears fur-
ther exploration. That is, it may be that the difficult task of distin-
guishing idea from expression, if coherent at all, should depend less
on intrinsic "idea" and "expression" attributes of a given work, and
more on how patterns of different sorts treat different elements of
works and the processes that contribute to them.
Whether a pattern-oriented approach can succeed in rationalizing
these or any other domains of copyright law remains for further
investigation.6 9 For now, and for fair use, the time seems right to
acknowledge that the more than a century-long experiment with the
open-ended "four factor" fair use framework is ripe for conclusion,
and for transition to an analytic approach that can guide both law
and conduct with acceptable measures of fairness and predictability.
688. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930):
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is
left out.... [There is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his
"ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
689. Other questions remain, with respect to fair use itself. What should the roles of judge
and jury be in evaluating fair use claims? Cf Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding
Normative Issues in the American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 407 (1999) (describing
tension in American law between judge and jury as sources of normative judgments in law).
Is the pattern-oriented approach consistent with international obligations? Cf Ruth Okediji,
Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 75, 114-23 (2000)
(noting possible conflict between § 107 and Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention). What
bearing, if any, does a pattern-oriented interpretation of fair use have on whether fair use
interests can be trumped by private agreement? See Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.,
320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003) (finding that "no reverse
engineering" clause in shrinkwrap agreement was enforceable).
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